Yonder Field, LLC v. Scott Suprina

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Yonder Field, LLC, Respondent,

v.

RI, Inc. and Seating Services, LLC; Scott Suprina; and
John Doe Shareholders, Defendants,

Of whom Scott Suprina is the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000600

Appeal From Orangeburg County
Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge
R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Heath P. Taylor, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-060
Submitted January 2, 2026 – Filed February 11, 2026

AFFIRMED

Christopher David Kennedy and N. Douglas Brannon, of
Kennedy & Brannon, P.A., both of Spartanburg, for
Appellant.

Skyler Bradley Hutto, of Williams & Williams, of
Orangeburg, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Scott Suprina appeals the trial court's order granting Yonder
Field, LLC's motion to amend its pleadings to add him as a defendant pursuant to
Rules 15 and 25 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the court's denial
of his motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 3(a)(2) of the South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure, and the jury's verdict and award of $160,100 in damages. On
appeal, Suprina argues the trial court (1) abused its discretion in granting the
amendment, (2) erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on untimely service,
(3) improperly denied his post-trial motions, (4) incorrectly entered judgment
against him personally, and (5) erred in admitting evidence of the sale price. We
affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the motion to
join Suprina and John Doe Beneficiary Shareholders as new defendants to the
action because Rule 15 encourages the trial court to freely grant amendments,
Suprina failed to demonstrate prejudice, and Rule 25 allows for joinder in cases
involving a transfer of interest. See Foggie v. CSX Transp., Inc., 313 S.C. 98, 22,
431 S.E.2d 587, 590 (1993) ("It is well established that a motion to amend is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial [court], and that the party opposing
the motion has the burden of establishing prejudice."); Bryant v. Waste Mgmt.,
Inc., 342 S.C. 159, 165, 536 S.E.2d 380, 383 (Ct. App. 2000) ("A trial court has
the sound discretion to substitute parties when some act has affected the capacity
of a named party to be sued, and its decision will not be reversed on appeal absent
a showing of an abuse of discretion."); Rule 15(a), SCRCP (providing leave of
court so a party may amend his pleading "shall be freely given when justice so
requires and does not prejudice any other party"); Patton v. Miller, 420 S.C. 471,
489, 804 S.E.2d 252, 261 (2017) (providing Rule 15 of the South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure "strongly favors amendments and the court is encouraged to freely
grant leave to amend" (quoting Parker v. Spartanburg Sanitary Sewer Dist., 362
S.C. 276, 286, 607 S.E.2d 711, 717 (Ct. App. 2005))); Lee v. Bunch, 373 S.C. 654,
661, 647 S.E.2d 197, 201 (2007) ("The prejudice that would warrant denial of a
motion to amend the pleadings is a lack of notice that a new issue is to be tried and
a lack of opportunity to refute it."); Rule 25(c), SCRCP ("In case of any transfer of
interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the
court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be
substituted in the action or joined with the original party.").

2. Although Suprina argues that he was not served with the amended complaint
within the statute of limitations, we hold this issue is not preserved for review
because he failed to present a record sufficient to allow appellate review. See Park
Regency, LLC v. R & D Dev. of the Carolinas, LLC, 402 S.C. 401, 419, 741 S.E.2d
528, 537 (Ct. App. 2012) ("Generally, an 'appellate court will not consider any fact
which does not appear in the [r]ecord on [a]ppeal.'" (quoting Rule 210(h),
SCACR)); id. ("The burden of presenting a record sufficient to allow appellate
review lies with the appellant.").

3. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), or, in the alternative, motion for a
new trial because evidence supported the jury's verdict. See Sabb v. S.C. State
Univ., 350 S.C. 416, 427, 567 S.E.2d 231, 236 (2002) (explaining that when ruling
on JNOV motions, the trial court views the evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and will deny the motion when the evidence yields more
than one inference); id. ("[A] trial court's decision granting or denying a new trial
will not be disturbed unless the decision is wholly unsupported by the evidence or
the court's conclusions of law have been controlled by an error of law."). Evidence
supported the jury's finding of a breach of contract because Suprina testified that
Yonder Field paid him to install event seating inside its venue, and Yonder Field
confirmed the seating was not delivered and the payments were not returned. See
Hennes v. Shaw, 397 S.C. 391, 399, 725 S.E.2d 501, 505 (Ct. App. 2012) ("The
necessary elements of a contract are offer, acceptance, and valuable
consideration."); id. at 399, 725 S.E.2d at 506 ("To recover for a breach of
contract, the plaintiff must prove: (1) a binding contract; (2) a breach of contract;
and (3) damages proximately resulting from the breach."). Moreover, evidence
supported the finding of conversion because Suprina's financial records showed
Yonder Field's payments were spent on multiple, unrelated hotel charges in Florida
and North Carolina, and Suprina testified that he sold the inventory he designed for
Yonder Field. See Brannon v. Palmetto Bank, 371 S.C. 357, 364, 638 S.E.2d 105,
109 (Ct. App. 2006) (explaining conversion may occur through the illegal use,
misuse, or illegal detention of another's personal property).

4. We hold the trial court did not incorrectly enter judgment against Suprina
personally because a preponderance of the evidence supported piercing the
corporate veil due to Yonder Field demonstrating fundamental unfairness. See
Dumas v. InfoSafe Corp., 320 S.C. 188, 192, 463 S.E.2d 641, 643 (Ct. App. 1995)
("An action to pierce the corporate veil is one in equity. Thus [the appellate court]
may take its own view of the preponderance of the evidence."); Sturkie v. Sifly, 280
S.C. 453, 457, 313 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ct. App. 1984) ("[A] corporation will be
looked upon as a legal entity until sufficient reason to the contrary appears."); id. at
459, 313 S.E.2d at 319 ("[P]roving fundamental unfairness requires that the
plaintiff establish (1) that the defendant was aware of the plaintiff's claim against
the corporation, and (2) thereafter, the defendant acted in a self-serving manner
with regard to the property of the corporation and in disregard of the plaintiff's
claim in the property."). First, Suprina's deposition testimony indicated that RI,
Inc. had been dissolved and liquidated, and Suprina, as RI Inc.'s representative and
owner, was previously served and aware of the suit prior to the company's sale.
Second, Suprina's trial testimony that he sold RI Inc.'s assets and the inventory he
designed for Yonder Field indicated that Suprina acted in a self-serving manner
with regard to the company's property. See Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 457, 313 S.E.2d at
318 ("[W]hen the notion of legal entity is used to protect fraud, justify wrong, or
defeat public policy, the law will regard the corporation as an association of
persons.").

5. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the
company's sale price because it was relevant to proving conversion and to the
jury's determination of damages because it reasonably demonstrated the fair market
value of the inventory. Lee, 373 S.C. at 658, 647 S.E.2d at 199 ("An appellate
court reviews Rule 403 [of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence] rulings pursuant
to an abuse of discretion standard and gives great deference to the trial court.");
Johnson v. Sam Eng. Grading, Inc., 412 S.C. 433, 448, 772 S.E.2d 544, 552 (Ct.
App. 2015) ("The trial court has wide discretion in determining the relevancy of
evidence."); Rule 401, SCRE ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."); Rule 403, SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice . . . ."); Richardson's Rests., Inc. v. Nat'l Bank of S.C., 304 S.C. 289, 294,
403 S.E.2d 669, 672 (Ct. App. 1991) ("Conversion is the unauthorized exercise of
ownership over the personal property of another."); Brannon, 371 S.C. at 364, 638
S.E.2d at 109 (explaining conversion may occur through the misuse or illegal
detention of another's personal property); Gauld v. O'Shaugnessy Realty Co., 380
S.C. 548, 559, 671 S.E.2d 79, 85 (Ct. App. 2008) ("[T]he evidence should allow
the court or jury to determine the amount of damages with reasonable certainty or
accuracy.").

AFFIRMED.1

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.