Derrick S. Hester . Mark Razzano (2)

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Derrick S. Hester, Debra S. Hester, James H. Nicholls,
Emma Viola Nicholls, James E. Gregg, Jr., Paulette J.
Gregg, Michael Ben Coley, Ashley Coley, Grady L.
Barnes, Sr., Julia W. Barnes, Ewen Lennon, and Amy
Lennon, Respondents,

v.

Mark Razzano and Carre Razzano, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2022-001149

Appeal From Spartanburg County
Shannon Metz Phillips, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-040
Submitted January 29, 2026 – Filed February 4, 2026

AFFIRMED

John T. Crawford, Jr. and Mark Anthony Bible, Jr., both
of Kenison Dudley & Crawford, LLC, of Greenville, for
Appellants.

Kenneth C. Anthony, Jr., of The Anthony Law Firm, PA,
of Spartanburg; and Kenneth Jay Anthony, of Anthony
Law, LLC, of Greenville, both for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Mark Razzano and Carre Razzano (collectively, Appellants)
appeal the master-in-equity's order denying their request to lift the injunction
prohibiting residential use of their garage and finding the garage was not
sufficiently attached to the main residence to remove it from the restrictive
covenant's ban on "outbuildings" being used as residences.1 On appeal, Appellants
argue the master erred in concluding their garage was an "outbuilding" because the
term is ambiguous and undefined and they received no express method of attaching
or joining their garage and main residence. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.

In a 2020 order, the master found the garage was an outbuilding and specified that
it would retain that character unless attached to the main residence. We hold that
because Appellants failed to appeal the 2020 order, these findings are the law of
the case. See Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 329,
730 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2012) ("[A]n unappealed ruling, right or wrong, is the law of
the case."). Further, we agree with the master and hold the addition of wooden
trellises between the buildings is not sufficient to change the character of the
garage from an outbuilding as required by the 2020 order to comport with the plain
and ordinary meaning of the term. See Kinard v. Richardson, 407 S.C. 247, 256,
754 S.E.2d 888, 893 (Ct. App. 2014) ("An action seeking an injunction to enforce
restrictive covenants sounds in equity."); id. ("In an equitable action, this court
may make findings according to its own view of the preponderance of the
evidence."); Penny Creek Assocs., LLC v. Fenwick Tarragon Apartments, LLC,
375 S.C. 267, 271, 651 S.E.2d 617, 620 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Restrictive covenants
are contractual in nature, and thus, the language used in the restrictive covenant is
to be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning."); Outbuilding,
Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining an "outbuilding" as "[a] detached
building (such as a shed or garage) within the grounds of a main building"). The
evidence showed the structures were separate, with no shared roofline or common
walls. Additionally, the structures had separate HVAC units, plumbing, and
electricity. Therefore, we hold the garage remains an outbuilding, and the master
did not err in refusing to lift the injunction barring its residential use.

AFFIRMED.2

1
The covenant at issue states that no "garage . . . or other outbuilding erected on
any lot shall, at any time, be used as a residence temporarily or permanently . . . ."
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
THOMAS, MCDONALD, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.