State v. Quinterious R. Truesdale

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Quinterious Raquon Truesdale, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000903

Appeal From Lancaster County
Maite Murphy, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-038
Submitted January 2, 2026 – Filed February 4, 2026

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Jessica M. Saxon, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General W. Jeffrey Young, Deputy Attorney
General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy
Attorney General Melody J. Brown, and Assistant
Attorney General William Joseph Maye, all of Columbia;
and Solicitor Randy E. Newman, Jr., of Lancaster, all for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Quinterious Raquon Truesdale appeals his convictions for
murder, first-degree burglary, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a violent crime. 1 Truesdale also appeals his concurrent sentences
of life without parole for murder and first-degree burglary.2 On appeal, Truesdale
argues the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter
because evidence supported the charge. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.

We hold any error in denying Truesdale's request to charge the jury on voluntary
manslaughter was harmless because there was no evidence of Truesdale's sudden
heat of passion. See State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 584
(2010) ("An appellate court will not reverse the trial [court]'s decision regarding a
jury charge absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Reyes, 432 S.C. 394, 406, 853
S.E.2d 334, 340 (2020) ("Whether an error is harmless depends on the
circumstances of the particular case." (quoting State v. Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 573,
336 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1985))); id. ("Error is harmless when it 'could not reasonably
have affected the result of the trial.'" (quoting Mitchell, 286 S.C. at 573, 336 S.E.2d
at 151)); State v. Sams, 410 S.C. 303, 308, 764 S.E.2d 511, 513 (2014) ("The trial
court is required to charge a jury on a lesser-included offense if there is evidence
from which it could be inferred that the defendant committed the lesser, rather than
the greater, offense."); id. ("In determining whether the evidence requires a charge
on a lesser-included offense, the [appellate] [c]ourt must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the defendant."); State v. Geiger, 370 S.C. 600, 607, 635 S.E.2d
669, 673 (Ct. App. 2006) ("To justify charging the lesser crime, the evidence
presented must allow a rational inference the defendant was guilty only of the
lesser offense." (emphasis added)); State v. Walker, 324 S.C. 257, 260, 478 S.E.2d
280, 281 (1996) ("Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being
in sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal provocation."); id. ("The sudden
heat of passion, upon sufficient legal provocation, . . . must be such as would
naturally disturb the sway of reason, and render the mind of an ordinary person
incapable of cool reflection, and produce what, according to human experience,
may be called an uncontrollable impulse to do violence."); State v. Starnes, 388
S.C. 590, 598, 698 S.E.2d 604, 609 (2010) ("[T]he mere fact that a person is afraid

1
Truesdale was also convicted of possession of a firearm or ammunition by a
person convicted of a felony and possession of a handgun by a person convicted of
a violent crime.
2
Truesdale was not sentenced on his convictions for possession of a firearm during
the commission of a violent crime due to his sentences of life without parole on the
corresponding convictions.
is not sufficient, by itself, to entitle a defendant to a voluntary manslaughter
charge."); id. ("[T]he fear must be the result of sufficient legal provocation [and]
cause the defendant to lose control and create an uncontrollable impulse to do
violence."); State v. Cole, 338 S.C. 97, 102, 525 S.E.2d 511, 513 (2000) (stating
that three to five minutes between the confrontation and the search for a weapon
constituted sufficient time for cool reflection).

AFFIRMED.3

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.