Paul Kitchin, Jr. v. Christina Spinelli

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Paul Richard Kitchin, Jr., Respondent,

v.

Christina Spinelli, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000176

Appeal From Charleston County
Daniel E. Martin, Jr., Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-005
Heard October 7, 2025 – Filed January 14, 2026

REVERSED

Gregory Samuel Forman, of Gregory S. Forman, PC, of
Charleston; Anthony P. LaMantia, III, of LaMantia Law
Firm, of Mount Pleasant, both for Appellant.

Marie-Louise Ramsdale, of Ramsdale Law Firm, of
Mount Pleasant; John S. Nichols, of Bluestein Thompson
Sullivan LLC, of Columbia; and William Brendan
Koontz, of Columbia, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this domestic case, Christina Spinelli (Wife) appeals the
family court's order approving and enforcing a mediation agreement (the
Mediation Agreement) she executed with Paul Kitchin, Jr. (Husband). Wife also
appeals the family court's order denying her motion to reconsider. 1 We reverse.

Wife asserts the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adopt and
enforce the Mediation Agreement because it was a post-divorce agreement
addressing property previously apportioned in the Divorce Order. We agree. It is
undisputed that a family court generally has jurisdiction and authority to enforce or
modify an agreement that it approves. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(25)
(2010) (stating the family court has exclusive jurisdiction to modify or vacate any
order issued by the court). However, this is not the case for orders involving
equitable distribution. See S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-620(C) (2014) ("The court's
order as it affects distribution of marital property shall be a final order not subject
to modification except by appeal or remand following proper appeal."); Green v.
Green, 327 S.C. 577, 581, 491 S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ct. App. 1997) ("[T]he law in
South Carolina is exceedingly clear that the family court does not have the
authority to modify court ordered property divisions."). The family court may
enforce such property divisions through its contempt powers. See Simpson v.
Simpson, 404 S.C. 563, 579, 746 S.E.2d 54, 63 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding the family
court improperly modified the property divisions included in the divorce decree but
remanding to the family court to enforce the property provisions through its
contempt powers); Swentor v. Swentor, 336 S.C. 472, 479, 520 S.E.2d 330, 334
(Ct. App. 1999) ("Once approved, an agreement may be enforced by the family
court through its contempt powers, unless the agreement unambiguously denies the
court continuing jurisdiction over the matter.").

The record indicates issues arose between the parties once it was time to sell Wife's
home as agreed upon in the Settlement Agreement. The parties then proceeded to
mediation, which resulted in the contested agreement Husband sought to enforce
through a new action. Similar to Simpson, we hold the family court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to adopt and enforce the Mediation Agreement because it
modified property previously apportioned in the Divorce Order. Under the
Mediation Agreement, Wife would receive all of the proceeds from the sale of her
home, and she would also receive Husband's pension but no other proceeds from
Husband's retirement accounts. These are substantial modifications to the property
divisions adopted by the family court in the Divorce Order. The Mediation
Agreement also divides real property not addressed in the Divorce Order.

1
Husband and Wife divorced in May 2016 by order of the family court (Divorce
Order). The Divorce Order incorporated a settlement agreement (the Settlement
Agreement) agreed to by the parties.
Accordingly, the family court's issuance of the order adopting and enforcing the
Mediation Agreement was improper and exceeded the scope of the court's
jurisdiction. See Green, 327 S.C. at 581, 491 S.E.2d at 262 ("[T]he law in South
Carolina is exceedingly clear that the family court does not have the authority to
modify court ordered property divisions."). Thus, we reverse the family court's
orders.2

This opinion should not be construed as a ruling in Wife's favor regarding the sale
of the home. Pursuant to the facts, Wife is in violation of the adopted Settlement
Agreement by refusing to sell her home. We note the proper avenue for Husband
to seek enforcement of the sale of Wife's home is through filing a contempt action.
See Swentor, 336 S.C. at 479, 520 S.E.2d at 334 ("Once approved, an agreement
may be enforced by the family court through its contempt powers, unless the
agreement unambiguously denies the court continuing jurisdiction over the
matter.").3

Because we reverse the family court's orders adopting and enforcing the Mediation
Agreement and denying Wife's motion to reconsider, we also reverse the awards of
fees and costs included in those orders. See Bojilov v. Bojilov, 425 S.C. 161, 191,
819 S.E.2d 791, 807 (Ct. App. 2018) ("The appellate court may reverse an
attorney's fees award when the beneficial results achieved by trial counsel are
reversed on appeal.").

REVERSED. 4

WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

2
Although the Divorce Order promotes mediation to resolve disputes, it is outside
the scope of the family court's powers to adopt an order modifying prior property
divisions.
3
The Divorce Order does reserve jurisdiction for the family court to address such
conflicts.
4
Because our holding above as to subject matter jurisdiction is dispositive, we
decline to address Wife's remaining issues. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an
appellate court need not address remaining issues on appeal when its determination
of a prior issue is dispositive).