State v. Jharaun M. Washington

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jharaun Montyce Washington, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000468

Appeal From Jasper County
Robert J. Bonds, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-004
Heard October 16, 2025 – Filed January 14, 2026

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Gary Howard Johnson, II, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and
Assistant Attorney General J. Anthony Mabry, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of
Bluffton, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: This appeal arises from Jharaun Montyce Washington's
convictions for murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a
violent crime. On appeal, Washington argues the trial court erred in denying his
motion for directed verdict as the State failed to present evidence of a preexisting
animus or agreement to fight and therefore failed to meet the elements necessary to
establish mutual combat. He asserts this failure means the State failed to produce
evidence he committed murder as alleged in his indictment. We affirm because we
find this issue is not preserved for our review.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Washington was at his mother's home at Walsh Drive Apartments in Hardeeville,
South Carolina on April 22, 2020. He and several others had gathered immediately
outside the apartment. Xavier Rivers and three others drove by the apartment in a
Chevrolet Malibu toward the apartment of Rivers's sister, who also lived in the
complex. Donovan Hay (Victim) was the driver. Surveillance video shows
Washington and another person positioned themselves behind the open door of a
white Cadillac in the parking lot. Rivers's car stopped behind a large bush, and he
retrieved a semi-automatic rifle from the trunk. Washington fired a shot, and the
two groups exchanged fire. Washington shot twenty-two times, and Rivers likely
shot approximately five times based on recovered shell casings. Rivers and
another passenger in the Malibu fled the scene on foot. Victim had been shot
during the exchange of gunfire.
Eventually, both Washington and Rivers were arrested, and both were charged
with murder under the theory of mutual combat. They were tried together, and
each defendant was represented by his own attorney. Both made directed verdict
motions. Rivers argued the State presented no evidence he killed anyone or that he
demonstrated malice aforethought. He further contended this was not a mutual
combat case and the State failed to present evidence of prior ill will or an
agreement to engage in mutual combat. Washington joined Rivers's mutual
combat argument and also argued the State had failed to definitively identify him
and had failed to prove malice aforethought. The circuit court denied the motions
stating:

I'm getting ready to make my ruling for the record, okay?
I also find that to constitute mutual combat, it's not
necessary that there should be a positive agreement
between the participating parties to enter into combat.
It's sufficient if they willfully enter into conflict upon the
impulse of the moment. I'm not passing any judgment on
the strength of the case, but what I would say is, as it
relates to mutual intent, I mean I think clearly there's the
existence of evidence that shows there's some type of
mutual intent, when there's evidence that the Defendants
are basically going to get their guns, Mr. Rivers and --
which I think the evidence is very clear that Mr. Rivers
was getting the gun.

At the same time there is some evidence to suggest that
Mr. Washington is going to get a gun. As far as to an
agreement, I don't think there has to be a stated
agreement, as in we sit down and say, hey, let's agree to
duke it out, you get your gun, I'll get my gun, let's go for
it.

I think the agreement can be upon the impulse of the
moment, and I think that's clear -- I think there's evidence
that that could be what happened here. I think both these
individuals were armed with a weapon. I think there's
evidence -- I think there's the existence of evidence, as it
relates to that.

As it relates to identity of Mr. Washington, I think that
the Facebook exhibit involving the shootout, that could
be interpreted a lot of different ways, but I think that one
of the ways that that could be interpreted is that he was
involved in a shootout, as in he was shooting that gun. I
also think, and I'm sorry, I don't recall the woman's name,
but she testified yesterday afternoon, and, yes, sir, while
she was not able to identify Mr. Washington in the photo
lineup, she did, again, I'm not passing any judgment on
the strength of her identification, but I recall that she did
indicate that he was the shooter, and that she knew him,
and was able to identify him, because she had been
maybe at a friend or some relative's house who lived very
close or next door to his mother, and she had seen him
there at the mother's. So I think that as far as meeting the
elements, giving the State in this case quite frankly every
benefit of the doubt, which I'm charged to do at this
point, I believe that there's enough evidence for this case
to move forward for the jury to consider. Hold on.

So I think with all that, I'm going to respectfully deny
both [defendants'] motion[s], and allow this matter to go
to the jury for their consideration, all right? Thank you.

In closing argument, Washington advocated for the lesser charge of voluntary
manslaughter:

When you're a defense attorney representing a client at
trial, your ultimate goal is to convince the jury that your
client's not guilty. I'm not going to do that here. My
client is guilty, he's just not guilty of murder.

....

Again, with no explanation as to why any of this
happened in the first place. If this scenario isn't the very
definition of an unlawful killing without malice, I'm not
sure what is. That is why I'm asking you to find my
client, Jharaun Washington, not guilty of murder, but I
am asking you to find him guilty of voluntary
manslaughter.

The circuit court charged the jury first on the elements of murder (with no
reference to mutual combat), then voluntary manslaughter, and then mutual
combat. The jurors were also instructed that the defendants' charges were to be
considered independently. The circuit court advised:

I want you to know each indictment
charges a separate and distinct offense, and you
must decide each indictment separately on the
evidence, and the law applicable to it uninfluenced
by your decision as to any other indictment.

....

The case of each Defendant and the evidence and
the law concerning that Defendant should be
considered separately and individually. Your
verdict does not have to be the same for both
Defendants. The fact that you may find one
Defendant guilty or not guilty should not control
your verdict as to the other Defendant. Where more
than one person is charged with a crime, if the
evidence warrants it, you may convict one and acquit
the other, or you may acquit both, or you may
convict both, it will depend on your view of the
testimony in evidence.

These charges were given without objection.

Rivers was acquitted on all charges, and Washington was convicted of murder and
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Washington
moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the same bases
previously argued and on the basis that the verdicts were inconsistent. The circuit
court denied his motion, and this appeal followed.

LAW/ANALYSIS

On appeal, Washington argues the circuit court erred in denying his directed
verdict motion, because his indictment alleged mutual combat between himself and
his codefendant and he therefore could not be convicted without proof of each
element of mutual combat. We find this precise issue was not raised to or ruled
upon by the trial court and is therefore not preserved for our review.

In State v. Young, our supreme court approved of the offensive use of mutual
combat as a theory of criminal liability, stating "[t]oday, we extend our
jurisprudence and hold that each participant who willingly engages in mutual
combat may be held accountable for the death or injury of an innocent bystander
resulting from that confrontation." 429 S.C. 155, 166, 838 S.E.2d 516. 522 (2020).
In Young, the defendants were charged with murder under the theory that they
engaged in mutual combat, and the appeal was of a party who did not actually
shoot the victim. Id. at 157, 838 S.E.2d at 517. In that case, the court elucidated
"[o]f course, mutual combat is not a stand-alone crime in South Carolina. Rather,
it is a theory of criminal liability that underlies a recognized crime such as murder
or manslaughter." Id. at 157 n.1, 838 S.E.2d at 517 n.1.
Here, the trial court ruled the State had provided sufficient evidence to send the
issue of mutual combat to the jury. However, the specific issue of whether
Washington's guilt was wholly dependent on a finding of mutual combat based on
his indictment, as argued on appeal, was not raised to the circuit court. See State v.
Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693 (2003) ("In order for an issue to
be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by
the trial judge."); State v. James, 362 S.C. 557, 562, 608 S.E.2d 455, 457 (Ct. App.
2004) (providing arguments not raised to the trial court in support of a directed
verdict motion are not preserved for appellate review). This issue was arguably
discussed during the State's response to the directed verdict motions.

THE COURT: Do you have to prove that beyond a
reasonable doubt? Are you saying that you don't -- I
mean you've indicted -- so what I want to know is, do
you -- as part of this, do you have to prove mutual
combat beyond a reasonable doubt, and that that mutual
combat then, basically, resulted in the death of [Victim];
is that what you've got to prove, mutual combat?

[THE STATE]: That is what occurs when they are
indicted for murder for engaging in mutual combat.

THE COURT: Right. So -- okay, go ahead.

However, discussion between the court and the prosecution alone is not sufficient
to preserve an argument. See State v. Williams, 439 S.C. 620, 622-23, 889 S.E.2d
562, 563 (2023) (finding appellate issue regarding transferred intent was
unpreserved and only "unveil[ed] on appeal" when defendant did not specifically
raise it at trial and it was brought up only by the State and the trial court); see also
Dunbar, 356 at 142, 587 S.E.2d at 694 ("A party need not use the exact name of a
legal doctrine in order to preserve it, but it must be clear that the argument has
been presented on that ground."). Furthermore, the circuit court's instruction that
the defendants' guilt should be considered separately was in direct opposition to the
State having to prove mutual combat to convict Washington. This instruction
permitted the jury to (1) acquit both parties; (2) find both parties guilty, which
would require a finding of mutual combat; or (3) find Washington was guilty and
Rivers was not—precisely what the jury did. However, Washington did not object
to the instruction, and its propriety is not raised on appeal. 1 Although the State
does not raise preservation in its brief, we conclude the issue presented on appeal
was not sufficiently preserved for our review. See Atl. Coast Builders &
Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 329, 730 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2012) ("[W]e
are not precluded from finding an issue unpreserved even when the parties
themselves do not argue error preservation to us.").

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
Having failed to object to the jury instruction, Washington cannot now, on
appeal, attempt to insinuate the issue of mutuality as a requirement for his
conviction into his directed verdict motion. Additionally, Washington's argument
that he was guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a crime also supported under the
theory of mutual combat, buttresses our conclusion the specific issue on appeal
was not part of Washington's directed verdict motion. Ineluctably, the voluntary
manslaughter conviction would also have failed if a mutual combat finding was
required to hold Washington responsible for Victim's death. Young, 429 S.C. at
157 n.1, 838 S.E.2d at 517 n.1 (explaining mutual combat "is a theory of criminal
liability that underlies a recognized crime such as murder or manslaughter."
(emphasis added)).