State v. Osman Benitez

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Osman Uvaldo Jimenez Benitez, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2021-001500

Appeal From Jasper County
Bentley Price, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-421
Submitted November 1, 2025 – Filed December 23, 2025

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Mark Reynolds
Farthing, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie
Stone, III, of Bluffton, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Osman Uvaldo Jimenez Benitez appeals his conviction for hit
and run resulting in death and sentence of four years' imprisonment. On appeal, he
argues his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated when the hearing court
failed to apply the factors for analyzing a speedy trial violation and the appropriate
remedy of dismissal, and when the trial court also failed to apply the factors for
analyzing a speedy trial violation and denied his motion. We affirm pursuant to
Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold there is evidence in the record to support both the hearing and trial court's
decisions not to dismiss Benitez's case. See State v. Hunsberger, 418 S.C. 335,
342, 794 S.E.2d 368, 371 (2016) ("The trial court's ruling on a motion for speedy
trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard."); id. at 342, 794 S.E.2d at
371-72 ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision is based on an
error of law or upon factual findings that are without evidentiary support."); State
v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 549, 647 S.E.2d 144, 155 (2007) ("In determining
whether a defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial, the court must
consider four factors: 1) length of the delay; 2) reason for the delay; 3) the
defendant's assertion of the right; and 4) prejudice to the defendant.").

First, Benitez's trial took place twenty-five months after his arrest, a presumptively
prejudicial delay that triggered an analysis of the remaining speedy trial factors. 1
See Hunsberger, 418 S.C. at 342-43, 794 S.E.2d at 372 ("To trigger a speedy trial
analysis, the accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has
crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay,
since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a
'speedy' trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness."
(quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992))); State v. Langford,
400 S.C. 421, 442-43, 735 S.E.2d 471, 482 (2012) (finding a delay of twenty-three
months when the "factual proof [in the case] was not complicated" was
"presumptively prejudicial and trigger[ed] the remaining Barker inquiry").
Second, we hold the second speedy trial factor, the reason for the delay, favored
neither Benitez nor the State. The State attributed the delay to turnover in the
solicitors' office, the case being reassigned due to immigration issues, and its
assertion that many solicitors' offices waited "until the last minute" to indict
defendants. However, we hold these are not compelling reasons to justify the
delay. See Hunsberger, 418 S.C. at 346, 794 S.E.2d at 374 ("Ultimately, justifying
the delay between charge and trial is the responsibility of the State."); State v.
Brazell, 325 S.C. 65, 76, 480 S.E.2d 64, 70 (1997) (finding the State's claims that
the delay in bringing the case to trial after the appellant was re-indicted "was

1
See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (outlining the four factors a court
must weigh when it considers whether it will dismiss a case on speedy trial
grounds).
necessary because of the complexities of the case including the location of
witnesses[,]" "piecing together the circumstantial evidence[,]" and "upheaval in the
solicitor's office" did not excuse the delay"). Additionally, Benitez waited two
years to assert his right to a speedy trial. See Pittman, 373 S.C. at 549, 647 S.E.2d
at 155 ("However, the [c]ourt must also consider and weigh the defendant's
contribution to the delay in determining whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights have been violated."); State v. Reaves, 414 S.C. 118, 130, 777 S.E.2d 213,
219 (2015) ("Delays caused by the defendant should weigh against him."). Third,
we hold the third factor, the defendant's assertion of the right, weighs against
Benitez because he first asserted his right to a speedy trial in November 2021,
twenty-four months after his arrest and therefore, he did not promptly assert his
right. See id. at 131, 777 S.E.2d at 220 (holding the appellant's "failure to assert
his right to a speedy trial weigh[ed] strongly against him" when he "did not assert
his right to a speedy trial until over three years after his arrest"). Fourth, we hold
that Benitez did not show actual prejudice because his assertion that he was
prejudiced by a missing 911 call was refuted by the record and he did not explain
the specific content of the potential absent witness testimony. See Hunsberger,
418 S.C. at 351, 794 S.E.2d at 376 ("Actual prejudice occurs when the trial delay
has weakened the accused's ability to raise specific defenses, elicit specific
testimony, or produce specific items of evidence."); State v. Waites, 270 S.C. 104,
109, 240 S.E.2d 651, 654 (1978) (holding the "respondent's bare assertion of
prejudice because his principal witness moved to another state [wa]s insufficient to
warrant the lower court's conclusion that respondent suffered actual prejudice
thereby"); State v. Smith, 307 S.C. 376, 381, 415 S.E.2d 409, 412 (Ct. App. 1992)
(stating the court was "unable to determine whether [the appellant] was actually
prejudiced by the witness' unavailability because [the appellant] made no proffer as
to what this witness would have testified"). Consequently, because Benitez
experienced minimal, if any, prejudice due to the State's delay in prosecuting his
case, and he delayed asserting his speedy trial right, we hold the Barker factors do
not favor dismissing his case on speedy trial grounds and the hearing and trial
courts did not abuse their discretion in declining to dismiss the case. See
Hunsberger, 418 S.C. at 343, 794 S.E.2d at 372 ("A speedy trial claim must be
'analyzed in terms of the circumstances of each case, balancing the conduct of the
prosecution and the defense.'" (quoting Pittman, 373 S.C. at 549, 647 S.E.2d at
155)); Brazell, 325 S.C. at 76, 480 S.E.2d at 70-71 ("Although the delay was
lengthy and the justification was unsatisfactory, [the appellant's] right to a speedy
trial was not denied when one balances the Barker factors. The long delay was
negated by the lack of prejudice to the defense. There is no evidence that the delay
was willful or intentional. The trial judge, by setting an August trial date (less than
two months away) and warning the prosecution that any further delay would
probably result in dismissal, adequately protected [the appellant's] right to a speedy
trial under these circumstances.").

AFFIRMED.2

WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.