State v. Timothy J. Thompson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Timothy James Thompson, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000397

Appeal From Fairfield County
Brian M. Gibbons, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-365
Submitted October 23, 2025 – Filed November 5, 2025

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Gary Howard Johnson, II, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and
Assistant Attorney General J. Anthony Mabry, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Randy E. Newman, Jr., of
Lancaster, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Timothy James Thompson appeals his convictions for murder
and hit-and-run involving death and concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for
murder and ten years' imprisonment for hit-and-run involving death. On appeal,
Thompson argues the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify remotely
because the circumstances were not sufficient to justify the remote testimony and
he was entitled to a live confrontation with the witness. We affirm pursuant to
Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the witness to
testify remotely because there was evidence demonstrating the elderly witness was
unable to travel to court without a risk to his health. See State v. Bray, 342 S.C.
23, 27, 535 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2000) ("A trial court's decision to allow videotaped or
closed-circuit testimony is reversible 'only if it is shown that the trial judge abused
his discretion in making such a decision[.]'" (quoting State v. Murrell, 302 S.C. 77,
82, 393 S.E.2d 919, 922 (1990))); id. at 27, 535 S.E.2d at 639 ("Where there is
evidence to support a trial court's ruling, it will not be overturned for an abuse of
discretion."). Although the witness was within the county on the day of the trial,
the trial court allowed the witness to testify via remote communication technology
based on his advanced age and the "risk to [his] health and safety." The witness
testified under oath that his health prevented him from traveling and agents of the
court sent to transport him to the courthouse confirmed he was in too much pain to
be moved. Accordingly, the trial court's finding of necessity does not lack
evidentiary support. See Re: Use of Remote Communication Technology by the
Trial Courts, 2021-001032 (S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated Feb. 19, 2025) (stating that a
trial court may allow remote testimony without the consent of the parties if the
justification to do so rises to the standard established by Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836 (1990)); Craig, 497 U.S. at 837 ("[T]he right to confront accusatory
witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial
only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public
policy and only where the testimony's reliability is otherwise assured."); State v.
Johnson, 422 S.C. 439, 453, 812 S.E.2d 739, 746 (Ct. App. 2018) (explaining
"courts have generally permitted such testimony only in cases in which the
witness's health prevents him or her from traveling or possibly when a witness is
beyond the subpoena power of the court."); State v. Carter, 433 S.C. 352, 357, 857
S.E.2d 910, 912 (Ct. App. 2021) ("The law favors face-to-face confrontation but
requires the court to 'treat sensitively witnesses who are very young, elderly,
handicapped, or who have special needs by using closed or taped sessions when
appropriate.'" (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1550(E) (2015))).
AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and VINSON and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.