Dorthea Ryles v. Leon Ryles

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Dorthea Ryles, Appellant,

v.

Leon Ryles, Willie N. Ryles, and Theresa Williams,
Respondents.

IN RE:
The Estate of Edith W. Ryles,
Estate File: 2018-Es-21-00899

Appellate Case No. 2023-001842

Appeal From Florence County
Clifton Newman, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-362
Heard October 7, 2025 – Filed October 29, 2025

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

James Ross Snell, Jr., of Law Office Of James R. Snell,
Jr., LLC, of Lexington, for Appellant.

Brown W. Johnson, of Clarke Johnson Peterson &
McLean, PA, of Florence, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Dorthea Ryles appeals orders of the probate and circuit courts
setting aside the will and power of attorney (POA) of her mother, Edith Ryles, due
to a lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence and finding she breached
her fiduciary duty to Edith.1 On appeal, Dorthea argues the circuit court erred by
(1) allowing lay witnesses to testify regarding Edith's capacity at the time of the
signing of the will and POA; (2) finding Edith lacked the testamentary capacity to
execute the will and POA; (3) finding she exercised undue influence on Edith; and
(4) finding she breached her fiduciary duty to Edith and requiring her to reimburse
Edith's estate (the Estate) for damages stemming from the breach. We affirm as
modified pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. We hold the probate and circuit courts correctly found undue influence in the
creation of Edith's will such that the will should be voided. See In re Est. of
Cumbee, 333 S.C. 664, 670, 511 S.E.2d 390, 393 (Ct. App. 1999) ("An action to
contest a will is an action at law."); id. ("If the proceeding in the probate court is in
the nature of an action at law, the circuit court and this [c]ourt may not disturb the
probate judge's findings of fact unless a review of the record discloses there is no
evidence to support them."). Dorthea was in a fiduciary relationship with Edith at
the time the will was created, as she held Edith's POA, which created a rebuttable
presumption of undue influence. Hairston v. McMillan, 387 S.C. 439, 447, 692
S.E.2d 549, 553 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The existence of a fiduciary relationship
between a testator and beneficiary raises a presumption of undue influence.");
Howard v. Nasser, 364 S.C. 279, 288, 613 S.E.2d 64, 68 (Ct. App. 2005) ("[I]f the
contestants of a duly executed will provide evidence that a confidential/fiduciary
relationship existed sufficient to raise the presumption, the proponents of the will
must offer evidence in rebuttal."). Dorthea failed to offer sufficient evidence to
rebut the presumption.

The POA was executed in June 2016, approximately two months after Edith was
found disoriented in the street in front of her house.2 Testimony at trial established

1
Because many of the parties and witnesses are related and share the same last
name, we will use first names as identifiers. We refer to the respondents in this
action—Willie, Leon, and Theresa—collectively, as Siblings.
2
The question of the validity of the POA itself is moot since Edith is now
deceased. However, we discuss the circumstances surrounding the execution and
use of the POA because they are relevant to the question of the validity of the will,
which was executed a year and a half later in December 2017. See Franklin v.
Chavis, 371 S.C. 527, 535 n.7, 640 S.E.2d 873, 877 n.7 (2007) ("Regarding the
power of attorney, it is no longer valid since [the testatrix] is deceased . . . . [T]here
that by 2016, Edith was physically infirm to the point that she need help with
day-to-day activities, including managing her finances and paying bills, showering,
cooking, and getting dressed, and that she could no longer drive; further, Willie
testified Edith would sign anything that was put in front of her by a family
member. Dorthea took her mother to the appointments to execute both the POA
and the will without informing Siblings, who were Edith's primary caregivers, and
the will was prepared by non-lawyer employees of Hawkins Tax Service, both of
whom invoked their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when called
to testify about the circumstances surrounding its execution. Further, Dorthea
repeatedly exercised her powers under the POA improperly, gifting herself
thousands of dollars from the Estate and ultimately spending a total of
$212,866.12. Although it appears from the record that some of the money went to
maintaining at least one of the Estate's properties, Dorthea did not provide any
receipts or documents to corroborate those amounts, and much of the money she
testified was spent on "taxes" was withdrawn in cash from Edith's accounts with no
records to show to whom it was paid, for what, or when. Moreover, Dorthea
admitted to spending Edith's money to redeem a non-Estate property, as well as for
personal expenses like groceries, manicures, and attending a charity event at
Yankee Stadium. See Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353 S.C. 208, 217, 578
S.E.2d 329, 333 (2003) ("Undue influence is demonstrated where the will of the
influencer is substituted for the will of the maker."); Calhoun v. Calhoun, 277 S.C.
527, 530, 290 S.E.2d 415, 417 (1982) ("[B]y the very nature of the case, the
evidence of undue influence will be mainly circumstantial."); id. ("In determining
whether the contestants sustained [the] burden [of proof], the evidence has to be
viewed in the light most favorable to the contestants."); Cumbee, 333 S.C. at 670,
511 S.E.2d at 393 ("[T]his [c]ourt may not disturb the [trial] judge's findings of
fact unless a review of the record discloses there is no evidence to support them.");
see also Byrd v. Byrd, 279 S.C. 425, 427, 308 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1983) (voiding a
will on the basis of undue influence when the "evidence establishe[d] the testator
was infirm, both mentally and physically, prior to and contemporaneously with the
execution of the will . . . and, consequently, particularly susceptible to influence"). 3

is nothing to be achieved by voiding the power of attorney now."); Wayne's Auto.
Ctr., Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 431 S.C. 465, 475, 848 S.E.2d 56, 62 (Ct.
App. 2020) ("An appellate court will not pass judgment on moot and academic
questions; it will not adjudicate a matter when no actual controversy capable of
specific relief exists." (quoting Sloan v. Greenville County, 380 S.C. 528, 535, 670
S.E.2d 663, 667 (Ct. App. 2009))).
3
We decline to reach the issue of testamentary capacity, as our finding of undue
influence is dispositive. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335
2. We hold the probate and circuit courts correctly found Dorthea breached her
fiduciary duty to Edith and must repay $212,866.12 in damages. See Bennett v.
Est. of King, 436 S.C. 614, 621-22, 875 S.E.2d 46, 50 (2022) ("[A]n action for
breach of fiduciary duty is either an action at law or in equity depending on the
remedy sought."); Verenes v. Alvanos, 387 S.C. 11, 17, 690 S.E.2d 771, 773 (2010)
("Restitution and disgorgement are equitable remedies."); Greer v. Spartanburg
Technical College, 338 S.C. 76, 79, 524 S.E.2d 856, 858 (Ct. App. 1999) ("In
reviewing a proceeding in equity, this court may find facts based on its own view
of the preponderance of the evidence."); id. (explaining, however, that "[t]his broad
scope of review does not require this court to ignore the findings below when the
trial court was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses").

Dorthea conceded that she was in a fiduciary relationship with Edith via the POA,
that she breached her duty by spending Edith's funds for personal use, that she had
a duty to "keep a record of all receipts, disbursement[s], and transactions[,]" and
that she "was unable to account for the spending" with documentation. Further,
Dorthea failed to respond to Siblings' requests to admit to the accuracy of various
transactions from Edith's accounts totaling $212,866.12, and the probate court
deemed them admitted. At trial, she offered only her testimony as to the purpose
of various withdrawals and transactions. Because Dorthea failed to provide any
records or receipts to corroborate her assertions, we cannot determine how much of
the money, if any, was properly spent. Accordingly, we affirm the damages
amount of $212,866.12; however, the probate court's order stated the damages
should be repaid to Siblings, rather than the Estate. We therefore modify that
portion of the order to clarify that Dorthea must repay the $212,866.12 to the
Estate. 4 See RFT Mgmt. Co. v. Tinsley & Adams L.L.P., 399 S.C. 322, 335-36, 732
S.E.2d 166, 173 (2012) ("To establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the
plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty, (2) a breach of that duty
owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, and (3) damages proximately resulting from
the wrongful conduct of the defendant."); Moore v. Moore, 360 S.C. 241, 253, 599
S.E.2d 467, 473 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Damages in an action for breach of a fiduciary
duty are those proximately resulting from the wrongful conduct of the defendant.").

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not
address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).
4
At oral argument, Siblings agreed the damages should be repaid to the Estate.
MCDONALD, HEWITT, and TURNER, JJ., concur.