Pamela Wallin v. Ross Holliday

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Pamela Holliday Wallin, Mark Bennett Holliday,
Kingsley K. Holliday, Sara Jane Holliday, and John C.
Holliday, Appellants,

v.

Ross Samuel Holliday, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Warren Phillip Holliday, Ross Samuel Holiday,
individually, Warren Lea Holliday, Individually, 2233
Highway 17 North, LLC, 2237 Highway 17 North, LLC,
2805 Highway 17 North, LLC, 1606 Meeting Street,
LLC, Bacons Bridge Road, LLC, 4687 Franchise Street,
LLC, Zeezrom Properties, LLC, John Doe Leased
Vehicle, 1905 North Main Street, Summerville, LLC,
815 Folly Road, LLC, 832 Coleman Blvd, LLC, 2189
Discher Avenue, LLC, New Space Science, LLC, Pirates
Plunder, LLC, Sawgrass Technologies, Inc., Holliday
Amusement Company, Inc., and the Revocable Trust
Agreement Between Warren P. Holliday as Settlor and as
Trustee, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000592

Appeal From Charleston County
Bentley Price, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-322
Heard December 4, 2024 – Filed September 24, 2025
REVERSED AND REMANDED

Daniel Scott Slotchiver and Stephen Michael Slotchiver,
both of Slotchiver & Slotchiver, LLP, of Mount Pleasant;
Brent Souther Halversen, of Halversen & Halversen,
LLC, of Mount Pleasant; Michael A. Timbes and Sarah
D. Baum, of Thurmond, Kirchner & Timbes, P.A., of
Charleston, all for Appellants.

Alice F. Paylor, of Saxton & Stump, LLC, of Mount
Pleasant; and Bijan Khaladj-Ghom, of Saxton & Stump,
LLC, of Charleston, both for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Pamela Holliday Wallin (Pamela) and Mark Bennett Holliday
(Mark) (collectively, Older Children), along with Mark's children, appeal orders of
the circuit court, arguing the court erred in granting summary judgment to their
siblings, Ross Samuel Holliday (Ross) and Warren Lea Holliday (Lea)
(collectively, Younger Children), 1 on their challenge to the validity of the
revocation of their father's, Warren Phillip Holliday (Decedent), trust and on their
other claims for relief. We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the
matter to the circuit court.

This appeal involves a revocable trust (the trust) created by Decedent. Decedent
was married to Patricia Holliday (Wife) for approximately fifty years, and during
their marriage, they had four children—Pamela, Mark, Ross, and Lea.

Decedent executed a revocable trust in October 2008, which provided that upon his
death, Decedent's assets would pass to Wife during her lifetime. Following her
death, the trust assets would pass to the four children in equal shares. The assets of
the trust were estimated to be worth around twenty million dollars, consisting of
various real estate and business holdings of Decedent. Article 3 of the trust
expressly reserved the right for Decedent to revoke the trust, providing, "The
Settlor shall have and possess, and hereby reserves the right to revoke this
Trust . . . without the consent of the Trustee, or any beneficiary . . . ."

1
Numerous businesses owned by the decedent also join Ross and Lea as
respondents.
In 2012, Ross became the trustee; Ross also primarily managed Decedent's
numerous businesses. In 2013, Decedent and Wife divorced, and the family court
issued a final order and divorce decree incorporating a settlement agreement. The
settlement agreement provided that Wife's support would be paid by Zeezrom
Properties, LLC—an asset of the trust. The divorce was contentious, resulting in
strained relationships between Decedent, Wife, and their children. Following the
divorce, Decedent remained close with Younger Children, and Wife remained
close with Older Children.

On March 21, 2014, Decedent executed a will (the 2014 Will), distributing his
estate to the four children in varying shares. 2 Pursuant to the 2014 Will, Ross was
to receive 40% of the estate, Lea was to receive 40%, Mark was to receive 15%,
and Pamela was to receive 5%. On January 7, 2016, Decedent executed a codicil
(the Codicil) to the 2014 Will, which provided specific bequests of $300,000 to
Mark and $100,000 to Pamela. The Codicil further provided Younger Children
would receive the remainder of Decedent's estate in equal shares. Decedent's
probate documents were prepared by his longtime attorney, Truett Nettles
(Attorney Nettles). The 2014 Will and the Codicil named Ross as the personal
representative for Decedent's estate. Neither the 2014 Will nor the Codicil
referenced the trust.

Decedent executed a revocation to the trust (the Revocation) a few weeks before
his death in September 2016. Attorney Nettles; Aliecia Bores, an associate of
Attorney Nettles's firm; and Greg Bosch, Decedent's personal trainer, all witnessed
the Revocation. 3 Anticipating future probate disputes, Decedent specifically
requested Bosch stay following a training session to witness the Revocation.

Decedent died on September 28, 2016. Pamela and Mark were with Decedent at
the time of his death. As the personal representative, Ross distributed the devises
of money to Older Children and the remainder of the assets to Younger Children.

On September 19, 2018, Older Children 4 filed this action in the probate court,
seeking to set aside the Revocation; they also asserted claims for constructive trust,

2
Decedent divorced his wife after the creation of the trust but before the execution
of the 2014 Will.
3
At the time of the Revocation, Bosch had been Decedent's personal trainer for
two years.
4
Mark's children, Decedent's grandchildren, also were parties to the action.
undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, declaratory relief, an accounting and
receivership, and intentional interference with inheritance. Younger Children
moved to remove the matter to the circuit court, which the probate court granted.
Younger Children then filed an amended answer and counterclaims. In June 2020,
Younger Children moved for summary judgment. Following discovery and two
hearings, the circuit court issued an order on March 3, 2022, granting summary
judgment to Younger Children on Older Children's challenge to the validity of the
Revocation and their remaining claims for relief. Older Children filed a Rule
59(e), SCRCP, motion, which the circuit court denied. This appeal followed.

LAW/ANALYSIS

This court reviews a grant of summary judgment under the same standard applied
by the circuit court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP. Loflin v. BMP Dev., LP, 427 S.C.
580, 588, 832 S.E.2d 294, 298–99 (Ct. App. 2019), aff'd as modified on other
grounds, 432 S.C. 246, 851 S.E.2d 713 (2020). Pursuant to Rule 56(c), summary
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." "Thus, the appellate court reviews all ambiguities,
conclusions, and inferences arising in and from the evidence in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party." Pee Dee Stores, Inc. v. Doyle, 381 S.C. 234,
240, 672 S.E.2d 799, 802 (Ct. App. 2009). "However, it is not sufficient for a
party to create an inference that is not reasonable or an issue of fact that is not
genuine." McMaster v. Dewitt, 411 S.C. 138, 143, 767 S.E.2d 451, 453–54 (Ct.
App. 2014) (quoting Town of Hollywood v. Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 477, 744 S.E.2d
161, 166 (2013)).

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The circuit court found the statute of limitations imposed by section 62-7-604(a) of
the South Carolina Code (2022) barred Older Children's claims for relief. This was
error. Section 62-7-604(a) provides:

A person must commence a judicial proceeding to
contest the validity of a trust that was revocable at the
settlor's death within the earlier of: (1) one year after the
settlor's death; or (2) one hundred twenty days after the
trustee sent the person a copy of the trust instrument and
a notice informing the person of the trust's existence, of
the trustee's name and address, and of the time allowed
for commencing a proceeding.

§ 62-7-604(a) (emphasis added). "The primary rule of statutory construction is to
ascertain the intent of the General Assembly." S.C. Pub. Int. Found. v. Calhoun
Cnty. Council, 432 S.C. 492, 497, 854 S.E.2d 836, 838 (2021). "Whe[n] the
statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear, definite meaning, the
rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose
another meaning." Id. (quoting Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts, 393 S.C. 332,
342, 713 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2011)). The plain language of section 62-7-604(a)
addresses only actions to contest the validity of a trust; it does not contain language
incorporating actions challenging trust revocations. Here, Younger Children are
seeking a declaration that the trust is valid, rather than contesting the validity of a
trust in place. These are two different scenarios. See § 62-7-604 (noting in the
Reporter's Comment that "[a] 'contest' is an action to invalidate all or part of the
terms of the trust or of property transfers to the trustee" and "[a]n action against a
beneficiary or other person for intentional interference with an inheritance or gift,
not being a contest, is not subject to this section"). Thus, we hold the circuit court
erred in finding the statute of limitations barred Older Children's claims.

TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY & UNDUE INFLUENCE

The circuit court also found summary judgment was proper because Decedent had
testamentary capacity and was not subject to undue influence. Upon review of the
record, we find Older Children have established that genuine issues of fact exist as
to whether Decedent lacked testamentary capacity and whether Ross exerted undue
influence upon Decedent.

"In order to invalidate a will, a testator's insanity should be established at the time
of execution, unless the insanity is of a permanent or chronic nature." Hairston v.
McMillan, 387 S.C. 439, 445, 692 S.E.2d 549, 552 (Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis
added). Here, the testimony of Dr. Collins raises an issue of fact as to whether
Decedent possessed the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the revocation
due to chronic dementia. Dr. Collins testified that Decedent suffered from
longstanding dementia. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving parties, we find summary judgment was improper as to testamentary
capacity.

"[T]he standard of proof in an undue influence case is unmistakable and
convincing evidence . . . ." Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353 S.C. 208, 218,
578 S.E.2d 329, 334 (2003). Younger Children concede that a fiduciary
relationship existed between Ross and Decedent. "The existence of a fiduciary
relationship between the influencer and the [testator] creates a rebuttable
presumption of undue influence." Gunnells v. Harkness, 431 S.C. 116, 123, 847
S.E.2d 97, 100 (Ct. App. 2020). "[A]lthough the proponents of the will must
present evidence in rebuttal [when a fiduciary relationship exists], they do not have
to affirmatively disprove the existence of undue influence. Instead, the contestants
of the will still retain the ultimate burden of proof to invalidate the will." Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Howard v. Nasser, 364 S.C. 279, 288, 613 S.E.2d
64, 68–69 (Ct. App. 2005)). "A contestant must show that the influence was
brought directly to bear upon the testamentary act." Hairston, 387 S.C. at 447, 692
S.E. 2d at 553 (quoting Mock v. Dowling, 266 S.C. 274, 277, 222 S.E.2d 773, 774
(1976)). "General influence is not enough." Id. (quoting Mock, 266 S.C. at 277,
222 S.E.2d at 774).

We find Younger Children failed to sufficiently rebut the presumption of undue
influence, rendering summary judgment improper. The conflicting testimony of
Attorney Nettles and other parties in relation to Ross's involvement with and
orchestration of the signing of the revocation raises multiple genuine issues of fact
as to whether Decedent was unduly influenced by Ross to sign the revocation. At
a 2015 Rule to Show Cause hearing, Attorney Nettles stated Decedent did not
"personally run the business or write the checks or make business decisions. And
given his age and condition he probably doesn't know the answers to any
questions . . . ." Further, in 2016, Attorney Nettles sent an email to Ross asking
"How is Warren doing today? I discussed the trust revocation with [] as you
requested . . . . call me about having Warren execute this document." Ross stated
at his deposition that Attorney Nettles was his attorney. At the signing of the
revocation, Decedent asked Bosch to stay in the room to witness his signature and
"tell them that this is my signature and that this is what I want." However, Bosch
testified that Ross was just outside the room and Bosch recalled seeing Ross at
Decedent's condo only two times in the two years that Bosch worked with
Decedent. Ross stated he was in the condo during the signing of the revocation but
only because he had come into town to spend time with Decedent, who was
nearing the end of life.

Based on the foregoing, we find summary judgment was improper, and we
REVERSE and REMAND to the circuit court for further proceedings.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.