In the Matter of the Estate of Adell Thompson Adams

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

In the Matter of the Estate of Adell Thompson Adams

Constance Washington, Appellant,

v.

Adrian E. Adams, as Personal Representative for the
Estate of Adell T. Adams, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000234

Appeal From Richland County
George M. McFaddin, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-220
Submitted June 1, 2025 – Filed July 2, 2025

AFFIRMED

Thomas Jefferson Goodwyn, Jr., of Goodwyn Law Firm,
LLC, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Soraya Martial, of Rock Hill, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Constance Washington appeals the circuit court's order
dismissing her appeal of the probate court's order denying her creditor's claim
against Adrian E. Adams, as personal representative for the Estate of Adell T.
Adams (the Estate). On appeal, Washington argues the circuit court erred in
dismissing her appeal because Adams's notice of disallowance was invalid due to
his failure to sign and timely file the disallowance. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR.

Initially, we hold Washington's argument that Adams filed the notice of
disallowance in bad faith is not preserved for appellate review because the circuit
court did not rule on this issue and Washington did not file a motion to alter or
amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Noisette v. Ismail, 304 S.C. 56, 58, 403 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1991)
(holding an issue is not preserved for appellate review if the circuit court did not
explicitly rule on the appellant's argument and appellant failed to file a Rule 59(e)
motion to alter or amend the judgment).

We further hold the circuit court did not err in dismissing Washington's appeal of
the probate court's order because the notice of disallowance was valid based upon
the plain language of the statute not requiring a signature and the probate court's
factual findings, which were supported by the record, that the probate court
extended the time for Adams to file the notice of disallowance. See Univ. of S.
Cal. v. Moran, 365 S.C. 270, 274, 617 S.E.2d 135, 137 (Ct. App. 2005) ("An issue
regarding statutory interpretation is a question of law."); Neely v. Thomasson, 365
S.C. 345, 350, 618 S.E.2d 884, 886 (2005) ("Questions of law . . . may be decided
with no particular deference to the lower court."); id. at 349-50, 618 S.E.2d at 886
("When a probate court proceeding is an action at law, the circuit court and the
appellate court may not disturb the probate court's findings of fact unless a review
of the record discloses there is no evidence to support them."); Moran, 365 S.C. at
275, 617 S.E.2d at 138 ("The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to
determine the intent of the legislature."); id. at 276, 617 S.E.2d at 138 ("When a
statute's terms are clear and unambiguous on their face, there is no room for
statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according to its literal
meaning."); id. ("If a statute's language is unambiguous and clear, there is no need
to employ the rules of statutory construction and this [c]ourt has no right to look
for or impose another meaning."); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-806(a) (2022) ("[W]ithin
sixty days after the presentment of the claim, or within fourteen months after the
death of the decedent, whichever is later, the personal representative must serve
upon the claimant a notice stating the claim has been allowed or disallowed in
whole or in part."); id. ("For good cause shown, the court may reasonably extend
the time for filing the notice of allowance or disallowance of a properly filed
claim."); id. (explaining the personal representative is only required to include a
warning that the creditor's claim will be barred if she does not commence a
proceeding to allow the claim within thirty days of the mailing of the notice of
disallowance). Moreover, Washington's claim is barred because she failed to file a
summons and petition for allowance within thirty days of the mailing of the notice
of disallowance despite the warning on the notice of disallowance that her claim
would be barred if she did not file the summons and petition within the statutory
timeframe. See id. ("A notice of disallowance or partial disallowance of a claim
must contain a warning that the claim will be barred to the extent disallowed unless
the claimant commences a proceeding for allowance of the claim in accordance
with [s]ection 62-3-804(2) [of the South Carolina Code (2022)] within thirty days
of the mailing or other service of the notice of disallowance or partial
disallowance. Every claim which is disallowed in whole or in part by the personal
representative is barred so far as not allowed unless the claimant commences a
proceeding for allowance of the claim in accordance with [s]ection 62-3-804(2) not
later than thirty days after the mailing or other service of the notice of disallowance
or partial disallowance by the personal representative.").

AFFIRMED. 1

THOMAS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.