James G. Sercu v. Douglas S. Hart

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

James G. Sercu and Sherri A. Sercu, Respondents,

v.

Douglas Steven Hart, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001417

Appeal From Lexington County
James O. Spence, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-200
Heard March 13, 2025 – Filed June 18, 2025

AFFIRMED

Charles Cantzon Foster, II, of Foster Law Offices, LLC,
of Columbia, for Appellant.

James Randall Davis and Matthew Gordon Rogers, both
of Davis Frawley, LLC, of Lexington, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: James and Sherri Sercu and Douglas Hart are neighbors who live
on adjacent lots. The Sercus access their lot (Lot 2) by crossing Hart's lot (Lot 1)
because Lot 2 is landlocked. Additionally, the utility lines for Lot 2 run through
Lot 1. The Sercus filed a complaint, claiming Hart obstructed and interfered with
their right to the use of easements for access and utilities. Hart filed a
counterclaim, arguing there were no valid easements and the Sercus' use of the
alleged easements was therefore trespass. The master-in-equity found there were
valid easements, therefore there was no trespass, and awarded the Sercus actual
damages and punitive damages for negligence and private nuisance. On appeal,
Hart argues the trial court erred in (1) finding the Sercus have easements across
Lot 1, (2) denying his trespass claim, and (3) awarding actual and punitive
damages. We affirm.

I. Easements

A. Access Easement
First, we find the master did not err in finding an access easement for Lot 2 over
Lot 1. See Murrells Inlet Corp. v. Ward, 378 S.C. 225, 231, 662 S.E.2d 452, 455
(Ct. App. 2008) ("In an action at law tried without a jury, the [master]'s findings of
fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is no evidentiary support for the
[master]'s findings."); id. at 231, 662 S.E.2d at 454 ("The determination of the
existence of an easement is a question of fact in a law action . . . ."). At one time,
Richard Hanson owned the land that later became a subdivision called The Woods
at Lake Murray. He subdivided the land into lots numbered one through four and
sold them with reference to a plat (the Plat). The Plat delineates each lot, as well
as the location of the access easement, and contains the following language in the
designated easement location: "[twenty-five-foot] access [easement] on [and]
across Lot 1 for the benefit of Lot 2." Additionally, each deed in the chain of title
for Lot 2 references the Plat. Therefore, we hold the grantees of Lot 2 acquired the
access easement. See Davis v. Epting, 317 S.C. 315, 318, 454 S.E.2d 325, 327 (Ct.
App. 1994) ("Where land is subdivided, platted into lots, and sold by reference to
the plats, the buyers acquire a special property right in the roads shown on the
plat."); id. ("If the deed references the plat, the grantee acquires a private easement
for the use of all streets on the map."); Murrells Inlet Corp., 378 S.C. at 233, 662
S.E.2d at 456 ("As to the grantor, who conveyed the property with reference to the
plat, and the grantee and his successors, the dedication of the easement is complete
at the time the conveyance is made."); Carolina Land Co., Inc. v. Bland, 265 S.C.
98, 105, 217 S.E.2d 16, 19 (1975) ("[W]here a deed describes land as is shown as a
certain plat, such becomes a part of the deed."); Boyd v. Bellsouth Tel. Tel. Co.,
369 S.C. 410, 416, 633 S.E.2d 136, 139 (2006) (explaining "[w]hatever easements
are created by implication must be determined as of the time of the severance of
the ownership of the tracts involved").

We acknowledge Hart's argument that there are discrepancies between the Plat and
the property description in the deeds, including the title of the Plat 1 and the date it
was prepared. We also note that the Plat was certified by Cliff Hall before the
deed to Hall Builders LLC was filed, and that Hall never owned Lot 1. However,
the Plat was prepared while Hanson still owned the entire subdivision. The Plat
divides the property into four lots, which were sold by Hanson with reference to
the Plat and to the lot numbers on the Plat. Furthermore, it defies logic to believe
Hanson would create a subdivision with a landlocked lot, such as Lot 2, without
creating an access easement for future owners to reach the lot. Therefore, we find
there is evidence to support the master's finding of an implied easement for access
to Lot 2. See Inlet Harbour v. S.C. Dep't of Parks, Recreation & Tourism, 377
S.C. 86, 96, 659 S.E.2d 151, 156 (2008) ("Implied easements ask the court to take
a deed between grantor and grantee which is silent regarding any grant or
reservation of a right to cross one party's land to access the other's and imply what
the parties must have meant to include in the deed but did not."); Gooldy v. Storage
Ctr.-Platt Springs, LLC, 422 S.C. 332, 338, 811 S.E.2d 779, 782 (2018)
("Generally, when a deed references a plat that contains an easement, an implied
easement arises even though the deed itself is silent.").

Additionally, we hold the master correctly found the discrepancy between the Plat
and the property descriptions in the deeds was a scrivener's error. The plat book
and page numbers referenced in the deeds are the same book and page numbers
where the Plat is recorded. Further, the name on the Plat is the name of the
subdivision where the lots are located. Additionally, Hart failed to produce any
evidence of a specific, contrary intention of the grantor. See Gooldy, 422 S.C. at
338, 811 S.E.2d at 782. ("[A] presumption of an implied easement arises unless
rebutted by a specific, contrary intention by the grantor."). Hart admitted he was
unable to produce a plat entitled "464 Woods Point Road," even after searching for
one; therefore, he was unable to meet his burden of rebutting the presumption of an
implied easement.

B. Utility Easement

We find the master did not err in finding the Sercus have an easement for utilities.
See Murrells Inlet Corp., 378 S.C. at 231, 662 S.E.2d at 455 ("In an action at law
tried without a jury, the [master']s findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal
unless there is no evidentiary support for the [master]'s findings."); id. at 231, 662
S.E.2d at 454 ("The determination of the existence of an easement is a question of

1
The Plat is titled "The Woods at Lake Murray," while the deeds in the chain of
title refer to a plat titled "464 Woods Point Road."
fact in a law action . . . ."); Carolina Land Co., Inc., 265 S.C. at 105, 217 S.E.2d at
19 ("[W]here a deed describes land as is shown as a certain plat, such becomes a
part of the deed."); Boyd, 369 S.C. at 416, 633 S.E.2d at 139 (explaining
"[w]hatever easements are created by implication must be determined as of the
time of the severance of the ownership of the tracts involved"). At the time
Hanson subdivided the property into four separate lots, it was not known where the
future owners would build their respective homes. Therefore, the exact location of
the utility lines could not be determined at that point. The Plat would have to
establish that utilities were available to the subdivided lots prior to being approved.
The Plat references the water and sewer providers and contains a certification that
dedicates all easements and rights-of-way. Although the certification is not signed
by Hanson, Hart failed to provide any evidence that the certification language was
not included on the Plat at the time it was prepared for Hanson. It is clear from the
reference to the water and sewer providers, as well as the certification dedicating
all rights-of-way, that Hanson intended to grant utility easements to each lot for the
benefit of future owners, including the Sercus. See id. ("Easements may be
implied by necessity, by prior use, from map or boundary references, or from a
general plan."); Hamilton v. CCM, Inc., 274 S.C. 152, 158, 263 S.E.2d 378, 381
(1980) ("[T]he intent of the parties as shown by all the facts and circumstances
under which a conveyance was made may give rise to an easement by
implication."); id. ("Circumstances surrounding the origin of an alleged restriction
may also be considered in construing that restriction."); id. at 158-59, 263 S.E.2d at
381 (holding evidence existed—including a previously prepared plat—to suggest
the original designation of an area was conveyed as an "open space" easement).
Therefore, we hold the Sercus have an easement for utilities.
In particular, in 2002, Hanson granted SCE&G a right-of-way to construct,
maintain, and operate electric lines along the "northern property boundary parallel
to Woods Point Road." That easement was recorded in August 2002. The Plat
also references Gilbert Summit Rural Water District (Gilbert Water) and Town of
Lexington Sewer. Additionally, the Plat contains the certification that dedicates all
easements and rights-of-way. Therefore, when Hart purchased his property in
2011, he had constructive notice of these specific utilities. See Spence v. Spence,
368 S.C. 106, 119, 628 S.E.2d 869, 876 (2006) ("[C]onstructive or inquiry notice
. . . is grounded in an examination of the public record because it is the proper
recording of documents asserting an interest or claim in real property which gives
constructive notice to the world."); id. at 120, 628 S.E.2d at 876 ("The party will be
charged by operation of law with all knowledge that an investigation by a
reasonably cautious and prudent purchaser would have revealed.").
II. Trespass

We hold the master properly dismissed Hart's claim for trespass because there were
valid easements. See Murrells Inlet Corp., 378 S.C. at 231, 662 S.E.2d at 454
("The determination of the existence of an easement is a question of fact in a law
action . . . ."); id. at 231, 662 S.E.2d at 455 ("In an action at law tried without a
jury, the [master']s findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is
no evidentiary support for the [master]'s findings."). As stated above, we find
Hanson granted an access easement over Lot 1 to benefit Lot 2 by including the
same on the Plat and granted utility easements as referenced in the Plat.
Additionally, the easements were granted to all future grantees. Because the
Sercus had an access easement and an easement for utilities, we hold there was no
trespass. See Snow v. City of Columbia, 305 S.C. 544, 552, 409 S.E.2d 797, 802
(Ct. App. 1991) ("The unwarrantable entry on land in the peaceable possession of
another is a trespass . . . ."); id. ("[I]f one without license from the person in
possession of land walks upon it, or casts a twig upon it, or pours a bucket of water
upon it, he commits a trespass by the very act of breaking the enclosure."
(emphasis added)). Additionally, because there was no trespass, we decline to
discuss the statute of limitations or laches issues. See Futch v. McAllister Towing
of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an
appellate court need not address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior
issue is dispositive).
III. Damages

A. Actual Damages
We find evidence exists to support the master's award of actual damages; therefore,
we affirm. See Santoro v. Schulthess, 384 S.C. 250, 267, 681 S.E.2d 897, 906 (Ct.
App. 2009) ("This [c]ourt's task in reviewing a damages award is not to weigh the
evidence, but to decide if any evidence exists to support the damages award."); id.
("[T]his [c]ourt's review on appeal is limited to the correction of errors of law.").
The master awarded $50,000 in actual damages based on James's testimony that
the rental value of the property was diminished 20% to 25% due to Hart's
interference with the easement. The master also found the monthly rental value
was $2,100 per month based on James's testimony at the hearing. The master
found Hart's actions occurred for eighty-one months and, therefore, the diminution
in value totaled $42,525. See Babb v. Lee Cnty. Landfill SC, LLC, 405 S.C. 129,
142, 747 S.E.2d 468, 475 (2013) ("The lost rental value of the property is the
difference between the rental value absent the trespass or nuisance and the rental
value with the trespass or nuisance."); id. ("The rental value with the trespass or
nuisance present would be less, in part, because a hypothetical renter would have
to suffer the annoyance and discomfort of the nuisance or trespass."); id. ("Thus,
the lost rental value measures the monetary value of the harm to the property
interest."). Additionally, James testified that it would cost $12,000 to $13,000 to
replace the concrete damaged by Hart. Finally, Hart did not provide any evidence
to contradict the testimony regarding damages. Therefore, we find there was
evidence to support the master's award of $50,000.

Additionally, the master did not err in relying on James's testimony as to the value
of Lot 2 because a property owner can offer testimony as to the value of his
property. See Cooper v. Cooper, 289 S.C. 377, 379, 346 S.E.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App.
1986) ("[A] property owner is ordinarily competent to offer testimony as to value
of his property.").
B. Punitive Damages

We hold the master did not err in awarding $100,000 in punitive damages under
the "any evidence" standard. See Santoro, 384 S.C. at 267, 681 S.E.2d at 906
("This [c]ourt's task in reviewing a damages award is not to weigh the evidence,
but to decide if any evidence exists to support the damages award."); id. ("[T]his
[c]ourt's review on appeal is limited to the correction of errors of law."). In the
order, the master cited Austin v. Specialty Transportation Services, Inc. 2 and the
ten relevant Gamble v. Stevenson 3 factors to consider when awarding punitive
damages. Further, the order provides facts to support the master's decision,
including (1) that Hart "actively sought to damage and interfere with" the
easement, (2) that Hart's "willful conduct" lasted six years, (3) that Hart's
testimony was not credible, and (4) that Hart's similar past conduct necessitated a
2013 temporary injunction. The master also found a two-to-one ratio of actual
damages to punitive damages was "appropriate under the circumstances." See
Austin, 358 S.C. at 318, 594 S.E.2d at 877 (holding a "single-digit" ratio "comports
with due process"). Therefore, there is evidence sufficiently supporting the
master's award of damages.

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and GEATHERS and TURNER, JJ., concur.

2
358 S.C. 298, 313-14, 594 S.E.2d 867, 875 (Ct. App. 2004).
3
305 S.C. 104, 111-12, 406 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1991).