Charles J. Madden v. SCDPPPS

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Charles J. Madden, #00182326, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and
Pardon Services, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000693

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
S. Phillip Lenski, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-194
Submitted April 1, 2025 – Filed June 11, 2025

AFFIRMED

Michael Paul Stover and Mary Scott-Chancey Williams,
both of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

General Counsel Matthew C. Buchanan, of the South
Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon
Services, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Charles J. Madden appeals the decision of the Administrative
Law Court (ALC) affirming the Parole Board's (the Board's) denial of his parole.
On appeal, Madden argues the ALC erred in (1) remanding to the Board and
deferring to the Board's interpretation of the term "community supervision
program," (2) finding the Board routinely denied his parole, and (3) considering
matter outside of the record on appeal. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.

We hold the ALC did not err in remanding to the Board for clarification of the
meaning of "community supervision program" or in deferring to the Board's
interpretation of the phrase. See Buchanan v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole, &
Pardon Servs., 442 S.C. 393, 401, 899 S.E.2d 600, 605 (Ct. App. 2023), cert.
denied (Apr. 16, 2024) (explaining this court may reverse or modify the decision of
the ALC "only if substantive rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because
the decision is clearly erroneous in light of the reliable and substantial evidence on
the whole record, arbitrary or otherwise characterized by an abuse of discretion, or
affected by other error of law"). Initially, we hold the Board indicated it
considered all necessary factors for considering parole eligibility, thus, the ALC's
review was limited to ensuring the Board followed proper procedure. See Cooper
v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 377 S.C. 489, 500, 661 S.E.2d 106,
112 (2008), abrogated on other grounds by Allen v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 439 S.C.
164, 886 S.E.2d 671 (2023) (explaining that if the Board "clearly states in its order
denying parole that it considered the factors outlined in section 24-21-640 [of the
South Carolina Code (2025)] and the fifteen factors published in [the Form 1212]"
then the decision is a routine denial of parole and the ALC has only "limited
authority to review the decision to determine whether the Board followed proper
procedure"); Buchanan, 442 S.C. at 406, 899 S.E.2d at 607 (stating that based on
current law, "as long as [the Board's] notice of rejection states it followed the
statutory and Form 1212 criteria, its order of denial is valid"). In its order denying
parole, the Board listed Madden's "failure to successfully complete a community
supervision program" as one of five reasons it was denying parole. Because
Madden was sentenced to life imprisonment and therefore cannot participate in the
more commonly known Community Supervision Program (CSP), it was
appropriate for the ALC to remand the case to the Board for an explanation of the
phrase, which would allow the ALC to determine whether Madden's due process
rights were violated by the Board holding him to an inapplicable standard. See
Allen, 439 S.C. at 171, 886 S.E.2d at 674 ("[The ALC] may not grant an inmate
relief from an erroneous administrative decision by SCDC . . . unless the inmate
demonstrates the error deprived him of due process."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 1-23-380(4) (Supp. 2024) ("In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before
the agency, not shown in the record, and established by proof satisfactory to the
[ALC], the case may be remanded to the agency for action as the [ALC] considers
appropriate."). On remand from the ALC, the Board explained this finding was
based on Madden violating a term of probation in 1982. We thus hold it was
logical for the ALC to conclude the Board was referring to Madden's failed term of
probation as a basis, in part, to deny Madden parole, rather than denying Madden
parole based on his failure to complete CSP, a program he was not eligible for.
See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-560(A) (2025) ("[E]xcept in a case in which the death
penalty or a term of life imprisonment is imposed, any sentence for a 'no parole
offense' . . . must include any term of incarceration and completion of a [CSP]
operated by the Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services."). Based
on the foregoing, we hold there was evidence that the Board considered all
required criteria and followed proper procedure; therefore, the ALC's dismissal of
Madden's appeal as a routine denial of parole is supported by substantial evidence.
See Sanders v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 379 S.C. 411, 417, 665 S.E.2d 231, 234 (Ct.
App. 2008) ("In determining whether the AL[C]'s decision was supported by
substantial evidence, this court need only find, considering the record as a whole,
evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion that the
AL[C] reached.").

Finally, as to whether the ALC erred by considering information not included in
the record on appeal, we find these arguments are without merit. On remand, the
Board's order clarified "that [Madden] did not successfully complete a term of
probation in 1982" and thus this information became part of the record before the
ALC and the information was not contested thereafter. Additionally, although the
ALC's order mentions the nature of his offense, a detail that the ALC only had
because it was included in Respondent's brief to the ALC, this detail had no impact
on the ALC's final determination which, as discussed above, was limited to
determining whether the Board considered the appropriate criteria and followed
proper procedure. 1

AFFIRMED. 2

WILLIAMS, C.J., and GEATHERS and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
Importantly, we note Madden does not dispute that he violated a term of
probation.
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.