Jasmine Gibson v. Rosa DeVeaux

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Jasmine Gibson, Respondent,

v.

Rosa DeVeaux and Virginia Patterson, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001119

Appeal From Kershaw County
Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge,

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-091
Submitted February 1, 2025 – Filed March 19, 2025

AFFIRMED

Charles Cantzon Foster, II, of Foster Law Offices, LLC,
of Columbia, for Appellants.

Andrew Sims Radeker, of Radeker Law, P.A., of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Rosa DeVeaux and Virginia Patterson (collectively, Appellants)
appeal the circuit court's order granting summary judgment and damages to
Jasmine Gibson in a case Gibson brought seeking declaratory judgment validating
her lease with Appellants and alleging abuse of process in Appellants' eviction
proceedings against her. On appeal, Appellants argue the circuit court's summary
judgment and damages orders should be set aside because Gibson failed to provide
ten days' notice of the hearing on her motion. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.

We hold the circuit court did not err in granting Gibson summary judgment and
damages because Appellants received ten days' notice of Gibson's motion and the
hearing. See Raby Const., L.L.P. v. Orr, 358 S.C. 10, 17-18, 594 S.E.2d 478, 482
(2004) (stating an abuse of discretion standard governs review of a decision to
grant or deny a motion for relief from judgment); Stark Truss Co. v. Superior
Constr. Corp., 360 S.C. 503, 508, 602 S.E.2d 99, 101-02 (Ct. App. 2004) (citations
omitted) (stating abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court's order "was
controlled by an error of law or when the order is without evidentiary support"). In
her February 15, 2023 motion for summary judgment, Gibson informed Appellants
the motion would be heard "at the non-jury trial roster meeting on February 27,
2023, [or] at any time during that trial week that the court selects." Appellants also
received a notice of electronic filing (NEF) for the motion on February 16, 2023.
See Rule 6(d), SCRCP ("A written motion other than one which may be heard ex
parte, and notice of the hearing thereof, shall be served not later than ten days
before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these
rules or by an order of the court."); Rule 56(c), SCRCP (stating a motion for
summary judgment "shall be served at least [ten] days before the time fixed for the
hearing"); In re S.C. Elec. Filing Pol'ys & Guidelines (SCEF), Section 4(e)(3), 415
S.C. 1, 7, 780 S.E.2d 600, 603 (2015) (stating service of documents subsequent to
the summons and complaint "is complete at the time of the submission of the
pleading, motion, or other paper for E-Filing, provided an NEF is transmitted by
the E-Filing System . . . . The NEF constitutes proof of service under Rule 5(b),
SCRCP"). After Appellants failed to appear at the February 27, 2023 roster
meeting, they received notice that same day from both Gibson and the court that
the hearing on Gibson's motion would occur on March 1, 2023. It was Appellants'
responsibility to review all notices they received and attend all required roster
meetings and hearings; thus, Appellants' failure to appear at the motion hearing
does not rise to the level of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect"
as defined by Rule 60(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rule
60(b)(1), SCRCP (providing the court may set aside judgment upon a showing of
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect"); § 4(e)(2), SCEF ("It is the
responsibility of an E-Filer to review the content of the E-Filed document in the
E-Filing System to determine its force and effect."); Williams v. Watkins, 384 S.C.
319, 325, 681 S.E.2d, 914, 917 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When a court sends a litigant
notice of his or her term of court, that litigant is bound by the notice and held
accountable if he or she fails to appear.").
Furthermore, we hold Appellants were not entitled to relief from summary
judgment because they failed to show a meritorious defense. See Rouvet v. Rouvet,
388 S.C. 301, 309, 696 S.E.2d 204, 208 (Ct. App. 2010) (explaining that in
deciding whether to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(1), a court must consider, among
other factors, whether a "meritorious defense" exists); Bowers v. Bowers, 304 S.C.
65, 68, 403 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ct. App. 1991) (stating neither mere allegations nor
arguments of counsel are evidence). Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's
order granting summary judgment and damages against Appellants.
AFFIRMED. 1

KONDUROS, MCDONALD, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.