State v. Tremaine P. Johnson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Tremaine Pierre Johnson, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000701

Appeal From Spartanburg County
J. Derham Cole, Sr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-018
Submitted October 1, 2024 – Filed January 23, 2025

AFFIRMED

Elizabeth Anne Franklin-Best, of Elizabeth
Franklin-Best, P.C., of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown,
all of Columbia; and Solicitor Barry Joe Barnette, of
Spartanburg, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Tremaine Pierre Johnson appeals his conviction for murder and
sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred by
denying his motion for a directed verdict. We affirm.

We hold Johnson's argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a
directed verdict was not preserved for appellate review because he did not
articulate any specific grounds in his motion. See State v. Sterling, 396 S.C. 599,
612, 723 S.E.2d 176, 183 (2012) ("A general directed verdict motion . . . does not
preserve any issue for appeal."); State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442, 455, 503 S.E.2d
214, 221 (Ct. App. 1998) ("In reviewing a denial of directed verdict, issues not
raised to the trial court in support of the directed verdict motion are not preserved
for appellate review."), aff'd, 337 S.C. 617, 524 S.E.2d 837 (1999); In re
McCracken, 346 S.C. 87, 92, 551 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2001) (alteration in original)
(holding the defendant's motion for a directed verdict—"I think [the State has]
failed to meet their burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt"—was not
preserved because it "stated no specific ground").

Despite our concern with preservation, we address the merits out of an abundance
of caution. We hold the trial court did not err in denying Johnson's motion for a
directed verdict because, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State,
there is substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove Johnson
committed murder. See Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 27-28, 602
S.E.2d 772, 782 (2004) ("When reviewing the denial of a motion for [a] directed
verdict . . . , an appellate court must employ the same standard as the trial court by
viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party."); State v. Butler, 407 S.C. 376, 381, 755 S.E.2d 457, 460
(2014) ("On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the
evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State.");
State v. Rogers, 405 S.C. 554, 563, 748 S.E.2d 265, 270 (Ct. App. 2013) ("If there
is any direct evidence, or if there is substantial circumstantial evidence, that
reasonably tends to prove the defendant's guilt, we must find the trial court
properly submitted the case to the jury."). The totality of the State's evidence
allowed for a reasonable inference that Johnson killed the victim with malice
aforethought. Johnson and the victim had been in a relationship, and upon learning
of the victim's pregnancy, Johnson searched the internet for poison, an abortion
clinic, and abortion medication. On the morning of the murder, Johnson learned
the victim had blocked him from contacting her, responded to her angrily, and then
contacted an acquaintance, his codefendant, whom he had not spoken to in at least
a month. Additionally, the State presented a witness who saw the codefendant and
Johnson together mere hours before the murder occurred. Further, the forensic
firearms examiner opined the markings on the bullet found at the crime scene
indicated it could only have been fired from a .40 caliber Smith & Wesson, the
same type of gun codefendant owned; the codefendant's gun was never found. The
State also presented evidence to support Johnson's presence at the crime scene: the
victim's mother recalled that a man called the victim that night and told her to meet
him by the water at the park, where the victim's body was later found.
Additionally, an expert in cell tower analysis stated Johnson and the victim were
both in the vicinity of the crime scene on the night of the victim's disappearance.
Further, the State provided evidence that in the days following the murder, Johnson
worked with his codefendant to dispose of the murder weapon. The day after the
murder, Johnson texted the codefendant to ask where he worked and to tell him
that he needed to ask him "something." Johnson later sent him a message telling
him to "do it today." The codefendant subsequently searched the internet for how
to report firearms missing and asked his coworker how to report a stolen gun.
Finally, Johnson's internet search history tended to show Johnson was aware of the
victim's death prior to the discovery of the body. See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-10
(2015) ("'Murder' is the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either
express or implied."); State v. Wilds, 355 S.C. 269, 276, 584 S.E.2d 138, 141-42
(Ct. App. 2003) ("Malice is the wrongful intent to injure another and indicates a
wicked or depraved spirit intent on doing wrong."); id. at 277, 584 S.E.2d at 142
("The use of a deadly weapon gives rise to a permissive inference of malice.");
State v. Burdette, 427 S.C. 490, 503-04, 832 S.E.2d 575, 583 (2019) ("[W]hen
ruling on a defendant's motion for [a] directed verdict on the ground the State
failed to prove the element of malice, a trial court may take into account the fact
that the deed was done with a deadly weapon."); Rogers, 405 S.C. at 567, 748
S.E.2d at 272 ("Circumstantial evidence . . . gains its strength from its combination
with other evidence, and all the circumstantial evidence presented in a case must
be considered together to determine whether it is sufficient to submit to the jury.");
State v. Bennett, 415 S.C. 232, 237, 781 S.E.2d 352, 354 (2016) ("[A]lthough the
jury must consider alternative hypotheses, the court must concern itself solely with
the existence or non-existence of evidence from which a jury could reasonably
infer guilt.").

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.