SCDSS v. Karen A. Anise

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,

v.

Karen A. Anise, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000118

Appeal From York County
David G. Guyton, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-005
Submitted December 2, 2024 – Filed January 8, 2025

AFFIRMED

Robin M. Lalley, of Sodoma Law, P.C., of Rock Hill, for
Appellant.

Barbara Sullivan Cooper, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Karen A. Anise appeals the family court's denial of her motion to
vacate a child support order entered against her. In 2018, Anise's former husband
(Father) requested assistance from the South Carolina Department of Social Services
(DSS) in receiving support from Anise for their two children. Anise argues that
Father made fraudulent misrepresentations to the South Carolina family court about
prior orders issued in the state of Florida and that the South Carolina court lacked
jurisdiction to enter a support order against her. We respectfully disagree with these
arguments. Therefore, we affirm.

The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act

The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act was enacted to ensure one order, from
one place, will control a particular child support matter. Badeaux v. Davis, 337 S.C.
195, 206, 522 S.E.2d 835, 840–41 (Ct. App. 1999). All states receiving federal
assistance for child support services are required to follow this act. Id. at 205, 522
S.E.2d at 840. The act became effective in South Carolina in 1994. Id. at 207, 522
S.E.2d at 841.

Section 63-17-3070(A) provides: "If a proceeding is brought under this article and
only one tribunal has issued a child-support order, the order of that tribunal controls
and must be recognized." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-17-3070(A) (Supp. 2024). Section
63-17-3070(B) gives guidelines for determining a controlling support order when
there are two or more support orders from different states and "with regard to the
same obligor and same child." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-17-3070(B) (Supp. 2024). We
find the South Carolina family court's order controlling for two reasons.

First, the 2013 Florida order did not provide for any support. Instead, it terminated
all of Father's support obligations and awarded Father full custody of the children.
It is true the order stated that any provisions of the 2010 Florida divorce decree that
were not inconsistent with the new terms would remain in full effect. Anise argues
this inclusion of the divorce decree makes the 2013 order a support order because
the divorce decree instructed Father to maintain healthcare for the children and the
subsequent order did not address healthcare. We respectfully reject this argument.

The 2013 order stated that it terminated Father's "child support obligation[s]," not
solely his monetary obligations. By definition under section 63-17-2910(28),
healthcare falls within "support." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-17-2910(28) (Supp. 2024).
We assume Father continued to maintain healthcare for the children, but that
healthcare "obligation" would have stemmed from Father's duties as the custodial
parent with sole parental responsibility, not any order from the Florida court.
Father's provision of healthcare in the time between the 2013 Florida order and the
South Carolina family court order surely would not estop his request that Anise aid
him in supporting the children. Anise is bound by law to assist Father with child
support. See SCDSS/Child Support Enf't v. Carswell, 359 S.C. 424, 431, 597 S.E.2d
859, 862 (Ct. App. 2004) ("[A] parent's support obligation arises at the birth of a
child.").

Second, even if the 2013 order was a support order, it dealt with a different obligor.
Section 63-17-3070(B) provides steps for determining a controlling support order
when there are two or more support orders from different states, but specifically
when the orders are regarding "the same obligor and same child." § 63-17-3070(B)
(emphasis added); see also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 88.6111(3) (West) ("If two or more
tribunals have issued child support orders for the same obligor and same child, the
order that controls and must be so recognized . . . establishes the aspects of the
support order which are nonmodifiable."). When the Florida court reviewed and
terminated support, it terminated Father's support obligations to Anise and the
children. When Father petitioned for support from Anise, Anise became the new
obligor. We do not see how an order terminating Father's support obligations and
addressing no support obligations whatsoever of Anise could control this case.

Anise tries to frame Father's petition for support as a modification of the Florida
order. As explained above, the Florida order did not constitute a support order.
Further, even if it was a support order, the South Carolina family court was not acting
in a "modification" capacity. Again, we view the support matter before us as
separate and distinct from the Florida court's termination of Father's support
obligations.

Further, section 63-17-3050(A) provides requirements for a South Carolina court to
maintain continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order that it issued.
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-17-3050(A) (Supp. 2024). This case satisfies all of the
requirements. As explained above, the South Carolina family court addressed an
entirely new support matter and thus its order is valid and controlling. See
§ 63-17-3070(A). Additionally, South Carolina was the state of Father's residence
and the residence of both benefitting children at the time this action was commenced.
See § 63-17-3050(A)(1). Anise also appeared in open court in York County for the
family court's initial hearing and signed the court's order consenting to its continued
jurisdiction. See § 63-17-3050(A)(2).

Based on the foregoing, the South Carolina family court appropriately ordered Anise
to pay child support.

The Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act
Our analysis under the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act is similar.
Here, as in the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, this regime "settles the
interrelationship between various support orders by creating a system where there is
one court with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction." Carswell, 359 S.C. at 432, 597
S.E.2d at 862.

The act provides: "If only [one] court has issued a child support order, the order of
that court must be recognized." 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(f)(1). The act also provides
guidelines for determining a controlling order between two orders from different
states regarding the same obligor and child. § 1738B(f); § 1738B(f)(2)–(4). It
further provides a state court that has issued a support order in compliance with the
act will maintain jurisdiction over the order "if the [s]tate is the child's [s]tate or the
residence of any individual contestant or the parties have consented in a record or
open court that the [state court] may continue to exercise jurisdiction to modify its
order." 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(d).

For the same reasons explained in the previous section, the South Carolina family
court properly exercised jurisdiction pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit for Child
Support Orders Act.

Fraud Allegations

Anise argues the South Carolina family court should have vacated its support order
because Father failed to register the Florida order in South Carolina; failed to inform
DSS and the South Carolina family court of the "actual language" in the Florida
order; and violated the Florida order's terms "by seeking to modify and litigate the
action outside of Florida."

To accept these arguments, we would first need to agree that the South Carolina
family court was "modifying" the Florida order. As explained above, the South
Carolina order was a separate and controlling order. In that same vein, we disagree
that Father's failure to register the Florida order amounts to "fraud" warranting the
South Carolina court vacate its support order. Again, the Florida order did not
constitute a support order, and certainly not one against Anise. It seems illogical to
require Father to register an order that terminated his support obligation and lacked
any mandate requiring someone else to assist in supporting the children. See S.C.
Code Ann. § 63-17-3610 (Supp. 2024) ("A support order . . . issued in a tribunal of
another state . . . may be registered in this State for enforcement." (emphases added));
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-17-3810 (2010 & Supp. 2024) ("A party or support
enforcement agency seeking to modify, or to modify and enforce, a child-support
order issued in another state shall register that order in this State." (emphasis added)).

Additionally, Anise had every opportunity to present arguments regarding the
Florida order to the South Carolina family court prior to her motion to vacate.
Instead, Anise voluntarily appeared before the South Carolina court and consented
to that court's continuing jurisdiction. Accordingly, the family court did not err in
declining to vacate its support order based on the alleged fraud. See Ware v. Ware,
404 S.C. 1, 10, 743 S.E.2d 817, 822 (2013) ("The decision to deny or grant a motion
made pursuant to Rule 60(b), SCRCP[,] is within the sound discretion of the trial
judge."); id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the order of the court is controlled
by an error of law or where the order is based on factual findings that are without
evidentiary support.").

Conclusion

The South Carolina family court's support order is AFFIRMED. 1 We decline to
address any remaining issues. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc.,
335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling it unnecessary for an appellate
court to address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).

THOMAS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.