SCDSS v. Allaina Johnson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,

v.

Allaina Johnson, Alterek Anderson, Christian
Boatwright, Patrice McAdams, and Anthony McAdams,
Defendants,

Of whom Allaina Johnson is the Appellant.

In the interest of a minor under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001346

Appeal From Laurens County
Joseph C. Smithdeal, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-422
Submitted December 12, 2024 – Filed December 13, 2024

AFFIRMED

Kindle Kay Johnson, of K. Johnson Law Firm, LLC, of
Rock Hill, for Appellant.
Rosemerry Felder-Commander, of South Carolina
Department of Social Services, of Laurens; and Andrew
Troy Potter, of Anderson, both for Respondent.

Marcus Wesley Meetze, of Laurens, for the Guardian ad
Litem.

PER CURIAM: Allaina Johnson (Mother) appeals a family court order requiring
custody of her minor child (Child) to remain with Child's maternal grandmother
(Grandmother) and her husband (collectively, Grandparents), allowing the South
Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) to forego services aimed at
reunification, closing the case, and granting her unsupervised visitation with Child.
On appeal, Mother argues the family court erred in (1) allowing DSS to forego
services aimed at reunification without providing for a subsequent permanency
planning hearing, (2) authorizing the agency to forego services without identifying
a more specific statutory basis for doing so, and (3) finding Mother had not made
sufficient behavioral changes and could not provide a safe home for Child. We
affirm.

"On appeal from the family court, the appellate court reviews factual and legal
issues de novo." Klein v. Barrett, 427 S.C. 74, 79, 828 S.E.2d 773, 776 (Ct. App.
2019). Despite this court's standard of review, we are mindful that the family
court, which saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses and assign comparative weight to their testimonies.
Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 385, 709 S.E.2d 650, 651-52 (2011). Moreover, the
appellant has the burden of showing this court the greater weight of the evidence is
against the family court's findings. Id. at 392, 709 S.E.2d at 655.

Initially, we find Mother did not preserve either issue regarding the authorization
of DSS to forego reunification services because she failed to raise these issues to
the family court. See Payne v. Payne, 382 S.C. 62, 70, 674 S.E.2d 515, 519 (Ct.
App. 2009) ("Issues not raised and ruled upon in the [family] court will not be
considered on appeal."). When the parties discussed whether the hearing was one
for permanency planning or judicial review, Mother did not argue that closing the
case would be premature. Instead, after the family court confirmed that the hearing
was "simply a judicial review," Mother stated she was seeking to close the case
that day. Moreover, the record does not reflect any posttrial motions pointing out
alleged error in the order's general citation to section 63-7-1640 of the South
Carolina Code (Supp. 2024). Accordingly, we find these issues unpreserved for
this court's review.

Further, we hold the preponderance of the evidence supports the family court's
findings regarding Mother's failure to make behavioral changes and inability to
provide a safe home for Child. See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 392, 709 S.E.2d at 655
(explaining that the de novo standard of review does not absolve the appellant of
the burden of showing this court the greater weight of the evidence is against the
family court's findings); id. at 384, 709 S.E.2d at 651 ("In appeals from the family
court, the appellate court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its view
of the preponderance of the evidence." (quoting Eason v. Eason, 384 S.C. 473,
479, 682 S.E.2d 804, 807 (2009))); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-20(22) (Supp. 2024)
("'Preponderance of evidence' means evidence which, when fairly considered, is
more convincing as to its truth than the evidence in opposition."). The DSS
caseworker testified Mother was court-ordered to complete anger management or
individual counseling, and although Mother attended counseling until July 2022,
she testified that she no longer needed counseling. Her former therapist and expert
in mental health counseling, however, testified that in July 2022, she recommended
Mother continue receiving mental health therapy and referred Mother to another
provider when Mother indicated she was moving. Moreover, much of the
testimony revolved around Mother's actions at a December 2022 visitation during
which Grandmother called the police after Mother hurled epithets at her and
disrupted the visitation. Denean Banister, Child's therapist and DSS's mental
health counseling expert, testified that this incident led her to recommend
temporarily suspending visitation and caused Child to regress therapeutically.

Additionally, the record contains no indication Mother acknowledged the reasons
for Child's removal. Child was first removed from her care in 2018 following a
reported incident of domestic violence in which Mother locked Child in the
bathroom due to threats by Alterek Anderson, her then-boyfriend—and
now-husband—to kill him. However, even five years later, she termed the events
that led to Child's initial removal a "misunderstanding" and a "mistake." Child was
again removed from her care later in 2018 following allegations that Mother
violated a no-contact order by allowing Anderson around Child. At the judicial
review hearing, she admitted only to a "perception" that she allowed Anderson to
have contact with Child, despite Banister's testimony that Child's distrust of
Mother stemmed, in part, from Mother allowing Anderson to attend an
unsupervised visitation. Finally, neither of Child's therapists who testified—
including Mother's own expert—recommended Child return to Mother's care.
Banister, in particular, testified Child had a "tremendous" fear of returning to
Mother's home because he was afraid of Anderson and did not trust Mother. We
hold Mother's minimization of the events that led to Child's removal, the copious
testimony regarding his continued fear of Anderson, and his safety and stability in
Grandparents' home support the family court's finding that Mother failed to make
behavioral changes and was unable to provide a safe home for Child.

AFFIRMED. 1

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.