Estate of Connor 2

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

In the Estate
of: Margaret S. Connor,

Leroy W. Connor
and Yvonne C. Austin, Appellants,

v.

Stephen M.
Slotchiver, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Margaret S. Connor, Respondent.

Appeal From Charleston County

 R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-502

Heard September 2, 2009 – Filed October
29, 2009

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Bernard Fielding, of Charleston, for Appellants.

John Massalon, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Leroy Connor and Yvonne Austin
(collectively Appellants) appeal the circuit court's order affirming the
probate court's authorization of the sale of certain real properties from the
estate of their mother, Margaret S. Connor (Margaret), and directing payment
from estate assets of fees earned by the special administrator and his
counsel.  Appellants argue the circuit court erred in applying the standard of
review, authorizing the sale of certain estate assets, denying Appellants'
claims relating to due process and breach of fiduciary duty, and discerning
which issues were stayed by Appellants' prior appeal.  We reverse and remand.

FACTS

Appellants' mother, Margaret, died August 4, 2004.  Shortly after
her death, the probate court, on its own motion, appointed Stephen Slotchiver
as special administrator of her estate.  In January 2006, Slotchiver filed a
proposal for distribution of Margaret's estate.  Appellants filed a number of
exceptions that were heard by the probate court in October 2006.  Appellants also
challenged Slotchiver's petition for payment of fees to the special
administrator and his counsel; the probate court heard these matters in March
2007.  Subsequently, the probate court issued two orders dismissing the
exceptions.  Appellants appealed both orders to the circuit court, which
affirmed in September 2007, and then appealed to this court. 

During the pendency of the appeal from the circuit court's
September 2007 orders, Slotchiver petitioned the probate court for
authorization to sell some of the estate's real property to pay creditors. 
Appellants responded by filing an answer and a motion to dismiss the petition. 
About the same time, Slotchiver's counsel petitioned for payment of attorney's
fees.  The probate court denied the motion to dismiss and approved both
Slotchiver's petition to sell property and his counsel's petitions for payment
of attorney's fees.  Appellants appealed to the circuit court.  After hearing
arguments on April 17, 2008, the circuit court affirmed.  This appeal followed
and was heard contemporaneously with the appeal from the circuit court's
September 2007 orders.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appeals from the probate court are governed by the provisions of
the Probate Code.  Matter of Howard, 315 S.C. 356, 360, 434 S.E.2d 254,
256 (1993).  The Probate Code provides that a final order or decree of the
probate court may be appealed to the circuit court.  S.C. Code Ann. § 62‑1‑308
(2009).  Generally, an appeal from an order of the circuit court is to the
court of appeals.  S.C. Code Ann. § 14-8-200 (Supp. 2008). 

An issue regarding statutory interpretation is a question of law.  Univ. of S. Cal. v. Moran, 365 S.C. 270, 274-75, 617 S.E.2d 135,
137 (Ct. App. 2005).  If the proceeding in the probate court is in the
nature of an action at law, neither the circuit court nor the appellate court
may "disturb the probate court's findings of fact unless a review of the
record discloses there is no evidence to support them."  Neely v.
Thomasson, 365 S.C. 345, 349-50, 618 S.E.2d 884, 886 (2005).  Likewise, in an equitable matter decided
by the probate court and affirmed by the circuit court, the
"two-judge" rule requires an appellate court to uphold the decision
of the circuit court if any evidence supports it.  Dean v. Kilgore, 313
S.C. 257, 259-260, 437 S.E.2d 154, 155 (Ct. App. 1993). 

LAW/ANALYSIS

Appellants assert the circuit court erred in failing to find
Slotchiver was precluded from bringing additional actions in the probate court
while the validity of his appointment was on appeal.  We agree. 

Service of a notice of appeal deprives the trial court of
jurisdiction over the matters appealed: 

Upon the service of the notice of appeal, the appellate court
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal; the lower court or administrative
tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain petitions for writs of
supersedeas as provided by Rule 241.  Nothing in these Rules shall prohibit the
lower court, commission or tribunal from proceeding with matters not affected
by the appeal.

Rule 205, SCACR. 

As a general rule, the service of a notice of appeal in a civil
matter acts to automatically stay matters decided in the order, judgment,
decree or decision on appeal, and to automatically stay the relief ordered in
the appealed order, judgment, or decree or decision.  This automatic stay
continues in effect for the duration of the appeal unless lifted by order of
the lower court, the administrative tribunal, appellate court, or judge or
justice of the appellate court.  The lower court or administrative tribunal
retains jurisdiction over matters not affected by the appeal including the
authority to enforce any matters not stayed by the appeal.

Rule 241(a),
SCACR.  "After service of notice of appeal, any party may move [the lower
court, administrative tribunal, appellate court, or judge or justice of the
appellate court] for an order lifting the automatic stay."  Rule
241(c)(1).  The supersedeas or lifting of the automatic stay, as well as any
other affirmative relief granted, may be conditioned on such terms as the
tribunal, court, judge, or justice entering the order deems appropriate.  Rule
241(c)(3). 

We reverse the circuit court's refusal to dismiss Slotchiver's
petition to sell real estate as a matter stayed by appeal under Rules 205 and
241.  The circuit court found the validity of Slotchiver's appointment was an
issue already on appeal, yet went on to find Slotchiver's petition to sell
estate assets was unaffected by the appeal.  We find Slotchiver's authority to
pursue a petition to sell estate assets derived from and depended entirely upon
his position as special administrator of Margaret's estate.  Because the
legitimacy of Slotchiver's appointment as special administrator was an issue on
appeal, Rule 241 imposed an automatic stay on his administration of the
estate.  Thus, the automatic stay prohibited him from performing additional
administrative duties during the pendency of the appeal. 

In so ruling, we are mindful that suspending the sole
administrator's authority to manage an estate may grind the gears of the
probate process to a halt and could expose the estate to liability for unpaid
accounts, for example, property taxes, that become due during the period of
suspension.  While the suspension may preserve estate assets, it does not
further the Probate Code's purpose of "promot[ing] a speedy and efficient
system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and making distribution to
his successors."  S.C. Code Ann. § 62-1-102(b)(3) (2009).  However, an
automatic stay under Rules 205 and 241 is not unassailable:  a party to the
action need only petition either the trial court or the appellate court for an
order lifting the stay.  See Rule 241.  In this matter, Slotchiver could
have petitioned for a writ of supersedeas under Rule 241.  The record does not
reflect he did so.  Because Slotchiver's authority to administer the estate was
automatically stayed under Rule 241 but he failed to seek an order lifting the
stay, he lacked authority to submit petitions for court action on behalf of the
estate.  Therefore, the probate court erred in considering the petition to sell
real estate, and the circuit court erred in affirming the probate court's
decision. 

Because reversal as to this issue is dispositive of the case, we
decline to address Appellants' remaining issues.  See Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591,
598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not review remaining issues when its determination of a
prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).

CONCLUSION

We conclude the appeal of the validity of the special
administrator's appointment imposed an automatic stay upon his administration
of Margaret's estate.  Because the special administrator did not obtain a court
order lifting the automatic stay, it was still in effect when he petitioned to
sell estate assets.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's decision
approving the sale of estate assets and remand this case for further
proceedings.  We do not reach Appellants' remaining issues. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

KONDUROS and LOCKEMY, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur.