SCDOT v. Hood

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina
Department of Transportation, Condemnor, Appellant,

v.

Gloria G. Hood,
Landowner, Respondent.

Appeal From Fairfield County

 Kenneth G. Goode, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-171

Submitted April 1, 2009 – Filed April 27,
2009   

VACATED

Paul D. de Holczer and Robert L. Brown, both of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Creighton B. Coleman, of Winnsboro, and Robert J. Sheheen, of
Camden, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: The South Carolina Department of Transportation (the
Department) appeals the circuit court's award of attorney's fees to Gloria
Hood.

On
June 30, 2004, the Department filed a notice of condemnation in Fairfield
County to acquire a 3.5-acre portion of Gloria Hood's 14.2-acre tract for a
highway project.  The Department then filed an action to determine the
value of the condemned property.  After a jury trial resulting in a $100,000
verdict to Hood, the circuit court awarded attorney's fees pursuant to section
28-2-510 of the South Carolina Code.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-510(B)
(Supp. 2008) (providing a landowner who prevails in the trial of a condemnation
action may recover his reasonable litigation expenses).  

The
Department thereafter filed two appeals with this court.  In its first appeal,
the Department argued the circuit court erred in admitting evidence of an
expired unexercised option contract to prove the value of Hood's property.  This
court agreed, reversing and remanding the action to the circuit court.  See S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. Hood, 381 S.C. 318, 672 S.E.2d 595 (Ct. App.
2009).  Prior to the issuance of this court's opinion, the Department filed the
instant appeal concerning attorney's fees. 

Based
on this court's reversal of the Department's initial appeal, we hold Hood is not
entitled to attorney's fees under section 28-2-510(B) because Hood is no longer
the prevailing party.

VACATED. [1]

KONDUROS, J., CURETON,
A.J., and GOOLSBY, A.J., concur.

[1]  We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.