David v. Dorchester County School District Two

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Laurie L.
David, Employee, Respondent,

v.

Dorchester County School District Two, Employer
and South Carolina School Boards Insurance Trust, Insurer, Appellants.

Appeal From Richland County

 L. Casey Manning, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-117

Submitted March 2, 2009 – Filed March 5,
2009   

AFFIRMED

Kirsten Leslie Barr, of Mt. Pleasant, for Appellants.

J. Leeds Barroll, IV, and John Koon, both of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Laurie David brought this workers' compensation case
seeking benefits and medical treatment for injuries resulting from a car
accident.  Dorchester School District Two and South Carolina School Boards
Insurance Trust (collectively Appellants) argued: (1) most of David's injuries
were preexisting; and (2) David was disqualified from receiving benefits
pursuant to section 42-1-560 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2007).  The
single commissioner awarded compensation and held David was not disqualified
from receiving benefits. The Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation
Commission (Appellate Panel) reversed, holding David was disqualified from
receiving benefits for failure to comply with section 42-1-560.  The circuit
court reversed.  Appellants appeal, arguing the circuit court erred in reinstating
the decision of the single commissioner and remanding the case to the Workers'
Compensation Commission for any further action consistent with the order of the
single commissioner.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:  Pelican
Bldg. Ctrs. of Horry-Georgetown, Inc.  v. Dutton, 311 S.C. 56, 60, 427
S.E.2d 673, 675 (1993) (holding where an issue has not been ruled upon by the
trial judge nor raised in a post-trial motion, such issue may not be considered
on appeal); In re Timmerman, 331 S.C. 455, 460, 502 S.E.2d 920,
922 (Ct. App. 1998) ("When a party receives an order that grants
certain relief not previously contemplated or presented to the trial court, the
aggrieved party must move, pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, to alter or amend the
judgment in order to preserve the issue for appeal."); Godfrey v. Heller, 311 S.C. 516, 520, 429 S.E.2d 859,
862 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding where a theory of relief was first raised in lower
court's order, appellant must challenge this theory with a Rule 59, SCRCP,
motion).

AFFIRMED.

HUFF,
WILLIAMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.