State v. Grant

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Kevin Lamar
Grant, Appellant.

Appeal From Charleston County

Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-082

Heard January 8, 2009 – Filed February 12,
2009

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Joseph L. Savitz, III, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant
Attorney General Melody J.  Brown, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne
Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Kevin
Lamar Grant appeals from his convictions for murder and using a firearm during
the commission of a violent crime.  Grant asserts the trial court erred by (1) refusing
to direct a verdict acquitting him of these charges and (2) allowing into
evidence a statement he made while in the custody of investigating detectives. 
We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1. Regarding the trial court’s refusal to grant a directed
verdict in Grant’s favor:  State v.
Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d
641, 648 (2006) (stating in reviewing the denial of a directed verdict, the
appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State); State v. McCombs, 368 S.C. 489, 493, 629 S.E.2d 361, 362-63 (2006)
(stating a defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the State fails to
produce evidence of the charged offense; however, if there is any direct
evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the
guilt of the accused, the case is properly submitted to the jury); State v.
Fleming, 254 S.C. 415, 420, 175 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1970) (explaining when the
evidence “merely raises a suspicion” the accused is guilty, the trial court
should grant the motion for directed verdict). 

2. Regarding
Grant’s argument that his statements were involuntary and should have been
suppressed because they were induced by implied promises:  State v. Johnson,
363 S.C. 53, 58-59, 609 S.E.2d 520, 523 (2005) (internal citation omitted) (“The
objection should be addressed to the trial court in a sufficiently specific
manner that brings attention to the exact error.  If a party fails to properly object, the party
is procedurally barred from raising the issue on
appeal.”); State v. Adams, 354 S.C. 361, 380, 580 S.E.2d 785, 795 (Ct.
App. 2003) (“[A] defendant may not argue one ground below and another on appeal.”).

AFFIRMED.

HEARN,
C.J., SHORT and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.