Mungin v. REA Construction

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE, IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Jimmy Mungin,
Jr., Claimant, Appellant,

v.

REA Construction
Company, Employer, and Zurich-American Insurance Group, Carrier, Respondents.

Appeal From Jasper County

 Perry M. Buckner, III, Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2008-UP-591

Submitted October 1, 2008 – Filed October
17, 2008

AFFIRMED

R. Thayer Rivers, Jr., of Ridgeland, for Appellant.

Paul Linwood Hendrix, of Spartanburg, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM:  In this
workers’ compensation case, Jimmy Mungin appeals the circuit court’s order
affirming the decision of the Appellate Panel of the Workers’ Compensation
Commission.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities.

1.  As
to whether the Appellate Panel erred in holding Mungin was not entitled to
disability benefits:  S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2007) (providing an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment
of the Appellate Panel as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact
and may reverse or modify the Appellate Panel’s decision only if the findings,
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are “clearly erroneous in view of the
reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record”); Grant v.
Grant Textiles, 372 S.C. 196, 201, 641 S.E.2d 869, 871 (2007) (holding an
appellate court’s review is limited to deciding whether the Appellate Panel’s
decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is controlled
by some error of law); McCraw v. Mary Black Hosp., 350 S.C. 229, 235,
565 S.E.2d 286, 289 (2002) (“Substantial evidence is not a mere
scintilla of evidence, but evidence which, considering the record as a whole,
would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the agency reached.”); Sharpe
v. Case Produce, Inc., 336 S.C. 154, 160, 519 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1999)
(holding the Appellate Panel’s decision must be affirmed if supported by
substantial evidence in the record and the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative
agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence).

2.  As
to whether the Appellate Panel erred in awarding permanent partial disability
benefits based on a five percent impairment rating: Grant v. Grant Textiles,
372 S.C. 196, 201, 641 S.E.2d 869, 871 (2007) (holding an appellate court’s
review is limited to deciding whether the Appellate Panel’s decision is
unsupported by substantial evidence or is controlled by some error of law).

3.  As
to whether the Appellate Panel erred in denying Mungin’s request for
reimbursement of unauthorized medical costs: S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-60 (Supp.
2007) (establishing the rights of the employer and the employee with regard to
payment for medical treatment, and ultimately affording much discretion to the Appellate
Panel); Turner v. S.C. Dept. of Health and Envtl. Control, 377 S.C. 540,
546, 661 S.E.2d 118, 121 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding § 42-15-60 does not give
claimants a unilateral right to select their treating physician).

AFFIRMED.    

HEARN,
C.J., and HUFF and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.