State v. Hughes

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jerry Martin
Hughes, Appellant.

Appeal From Greenville County

C. Victor Pyle, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.   2008-UP-333

Heard June 4, 2008 – Filed July 1, 2008

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, South Carolina Commission,
of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M.
Coombs, Jr., Office of the Attorney General, all of Columbia; and Solicitor
Robert Mills Ariail, of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER
CURIAM:  Jerry Hughes appeals his
convictions of trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of the controlled
substance (Xanax), with intent to distribute, and possession of the controlled
substance (morphine).  Hughes asserts the detention and subsequent request for
consent to search exceeded the scope of the original stop, and the scope of any
general consent given was exceeded by the officer’s search.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:  Hubbard v.
Rowe, 192 S.C. 12, 5 S.E.2d 187 (1939) (stating the questions presented for
appellate review must first have been fairly and properly raised in the lower
court and passed upon by that court); I’On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant,
338 S.C. 406, 422, 526 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2000) (finding a losing party must
first try to convince the lower court it has ruled wrongly and then, if that
effort fails, convince the appellate court that the lower court erred); State
v. McKnight, 352 S.C. 635, 656, 576 S.E.2d 168, 179 (2003) (determining whether
consent to search is voluntary is a question of fact to be resolved from the
totality of the circumstances); State v. Brockman, 339 S.C. 57, 66, 528
S.E.2d 661, 665-66 (2000) (applying a “clearly erroneous” standard of
review in determining whether trial judge properly held defendant consented to
search); State v. Mattison, 352 S.C. 577, 585-86, 575 S.E.2d 852, 856
(Ct. App. 2003) (“The scope of the consent is measured by a test of ‘objective
reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the
exchange between the officer and the suspect?’”); c.f. State v.
Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 541 S.E.2d 837 (2001) (finding a suspect’s overt
act of merely opening the pocket book for inspection after consent was
requested, limited the scope of the general grant of consent previously given).

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., and SHORT, J., and KONDUROS, J., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.