Reep v. Sonco Technology

THIS OPINION HAS
NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE, IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

David P. Reep, Respondent,

v.

Sonco
Technology, Employer, and Cypress Insurance Company, Carrier, Appellants.

Appeal From Marlboro County

 J. Michael Baxley, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-241

Submitted April 1, 2008 – Filed April 18,
2008   

AFFIRMED

Adrianne L. Turner, of Columbia, for Appellants.

William P. Hatfield, of Florence, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In
this workers’ compensation case, Sonco Technology and Cyprus Insurance Company (collectively
“Appellants”) appeal the circuit court order affirming the South Carolina Workers’
Compensation Commission’s finding that David Reep did not experience a change
of condition for the better.  Appellants also argue the circuit court erred in holding
Reep suffered from trigger finger as a result of the accident and trigger
finger is compensable under Reep’s claim.  We affirm.[1]

FACTS

Reep worked at Sonco Technology as a
welder/machinist.  His job involved cutting, fitting, fabricating, and tacking
weld devices.  The work required him to use both hands and often involved heavy
lifting of metal plates, welding supplies, and torches.

Reep
left his job in November of 1999 because of chronic pain, swelling, and loss of
stregnth in both of hands.  Reep’s physician, Dr. Rush, diagnosed Reep
with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and performed open carpal tunnel releases
on Reep’s hands.  Reep slowly recovered from the surgeries and began suffering
from trigger finger.  Dr. Rush opined Reep sustained a 7.5 percent impairment
to each hand. 

Reep filed
a workers’ compensation action against Appellants on October 16, 2000.  The
latter denied Reep’s claim, arguing his injuries were limited to his wrists. 
After a hearing, the single commissioner awarded Reep permanent disability
benefits and medical expenses. 

On November 9, 2004, Appellants filed a
request to stop compensation payments.  Appellants argued Reep experienced a
change of condition for the better.  They relied upon video surveillance taken
of Reep using a chainsaw to cut a fallen tree.

A
hearing was held before the single commissioner on March 17, 2005.  Reep
testified he used the chainsaw to cut down a dead tree for safety reasons.  He
stated that Dr. Rush encouraged him to remain active to avoid the loss of use
of his hands.  Reep also requested additional medical treatment to correct his
trigger finger.  Dr. Rush recommended A-1 pulley release surgery for the
triggering.

The
single commissioner held evidence did not support a finding that Reep
experienced a change of condition for the better.  The single commissioner also
found the videotape surveillance did not convince him that Reep could return to
work or work outside of his restrictions.  The single commissioner further held
Reep was entitled to additional medical treatment as recommended by Dr. Rush.

Appellants appealed to the appellate panel. The appellate panel
affirmed the single commissioner’s findings.  It specifically found Reep was
entitled to treatment for his trigger finger as related to his original injury.     

Appellants then sought judicial review in the circuit court.  The
circuit court affirmed the order of the appellate panel on all issues. 
Appellants appeal.

LAW / ANALYSIS

I.  Change of Condition
for the Better

Appellants first
argue the circuit court erred in finding substantial evidence supported the
appellate panel’s finding that Reep did not experience a change of condition
for the better and could not return to work or perform work outside of his medical restrictions.  We disagree.

“The Workers’
Compensation Act provides a mechanism for reopening an award if there has been
a change in condition.”  Clark v. Aiken County Government, 366 S.C.
102, 108, 620 S.E.2d 99, 102 (Ct. App. 2005); see S.C.Code Ann. § 42-17-90 (Supp. 2006).  The purpose of this section is to enable the commission to
change the amount of compensation, including diminishing compensation when
circumstances indicate a change of condition for the better. Cromer v.
Newberry Cotton Mills, 201 S.C. 349, 354-55, 23 S.E.2d 19, 21
(1942).   The determination of whether a claimant has experienced a change of
condition is a question for the fact finder.  Gattis v. Murrells Inlet VFW,
353 S.C. 100, 576 S.E.2d 191 (Ct. App. 2003).  An appellate court will not
disturb the findings of the workers’ compensation commission if its findings
are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.  Lark v.
Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981).

Here, substantial
evidence supports the commission’s finding that Reep did not experience a
change of condition for the better.  The only evidence Appellants submitted to support a change of
condition was the videotape of Reep using a chainsaw and one report from a
non-treating physician who viewed the videotape.  Reep testified he used the
chainsaw, but the chainsaw was only six pounds and was not as difficult to
maneuver as the machines he used as a welder/machinist.  In addition, Reep
testified Dr. Rush encouraged him to keep his hands active to avoid the loss of
use of his hands.  Reep also stated he has trouble making a fist with his
hands, buttoning his clothing, zipping a zipper, squeezing toothpaste, tying
his shoes, and shaving.  Further, Dr. Rush’s medical evaluations indicate Reep
continues to suffer pain in his hands and fingers.

II.  Trigger Finger

Appellants next argue the circuit court
erred in finding Reep suffered from trigger finger as a result of the accident
and trigger finger is compensable under Reep’s claim.  Specifically, Appellants
argue Reep’s trigger finger is not causally related to the accident or Reep’s carpal
tunnel syndrome.  

We are bound, of course, to uphold the commission’s
decision unless its factual determination is not supported by substantial
evidence. Jones v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 S.C. 413, 417-18, 586 S.E.2d 111,
113-14 (2003); S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-386(A)(6) (Supp. 2006) (“[T]he court
shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of
evidence on the questions of fact.”).

While Dr. Rush never specifically opined that Reep’s
trigger finger condition is causally related to the accident or Reep’s carpal
tunnel syndrome, Dr. Rush noted that Reep experienced triggering within a month
after his second carpal tunnel release surgery.  He recommended surgery on Reep’s
affected fingers as the appropriate treatment.  We therefore hold substantial
evidence was presented upon which the commission could conclude Reep suffered from trigger finger as a result of the accident.

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., PIEPER, JJ., and GOOLSBY,
A.J., concur.

[1] We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.