Barr v. Williamsburg County School District

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT
BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE
239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Doris Barr, Claimant, Respondent,

v.

Williamsburg County School District,

Employer, and SC School Boards

Insurance Trust, Carrier, Appellants.

Appeal From Williamsburg County

Clifton Newman, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-028

Submitted January 2, 2008 – Filed January
10, 2008

AFFIRMED

Kirsten Leslie Barr, of Mt. Pleasant, for
Appellants

Joe Ann M. Calvy, of Kingstree, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In a
decision affirmed by the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission
(Appellate Panel) and the circuit court, the single commissioner found Doris
Barr sustained an injury due to repetitive trauma at Williamsburg School
District and was entitled to temporary total benefits and compensation for
medical treatment related to Barr’s workers’ compensation injury.  Williamsburg School District and South Carolina School Boards Insurance Trust (Appellants)
appeal and we affirm.[1]

FACTS

Doris Barr (Barr) began working for Williamsburg County School District (Employer) as a food service operator in the school cafeteria in 1995.
Her duties varied but included scrubbing pans, lifting bags of ingredients,
thawing meat, and baking in preparation to feed over 700 students.

In 2000 or 2001, Barr began experiencing tingling and numbness in
her fingers. In June 2001 she was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome but
continued to work in the cafeteria. Barr’s pain had increased and progressed up
both hands by the time she saw Dr. Gheraibeh on January 30, 2003. The next day
Dr. Gheraibeh performed carpal tunnel release surgery on Barr’s left hand.  On
February 19, 2003, she underwent the same surgery on her right hand.  Barr
continued to suffer from pain and numbness after the surgeries. 

Although Barr had previously complained about her hands to her
co-workers and the cafeteria’s assistant manager, Barr did not file a Form-50
requesting workers’ compensation until May 8, 2003. The single commissioner
awarded Barr temporary total benefits for the period of January 30 to December
30, 2003. The Appellate Panel affirmed.  Appellants appealed to the circuit
court which found substantial evidence supported the Appellate Panel’s findings
of fact and the Appellate Panel did not err in any matters of law.  Appellants
appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

South Carolina Code section 1-23-380(A)(6) governs our
review of workers’ compensation decisions.  Shealy v. Aiken County, 341 S.C. 448, 454-55, 535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000).  “In an appeal from the Commission, this Court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the Commission as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact, but may reverse where the decision is affected
by an error of law.” Corbin v. Kohler Co., 351 S.C. 613, 617, 571 S.E.2d
92, 95 (Ct. App. 2002) “The findings of an administrative agency are
presumed correct and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial
evidence.” Id.  Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of
evidence, but is evidence that, considering the record as a whole, would allow
reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the agency reached.  McCraw v.
Mary Black Hosp., 350 S.C. 229, 235, 565 S.E.2d 286, 289 (2002). 

LAW/ANALYSIS

1. Appellants claim the
Appellate Panel’s finding that Barr sustained repetitive trauma to her right
and left upper extremities is not supported by substantial evidence.  Specifically,
Appellants claim Barr’s activities at the cafeteria were neither repetitive nor
traumatic.  We disagree.

Under Section 42-1-160 of the South Carolina Code (2007), a claimant is entitled to benefits for an
“injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.” Pee v.
AVM, Inc., 352 S.C. 167, 170, 573 S.E.2d 785, 787 (2002). In interpreting
“injury by accident,” the Supreme Court has held that no mishap was required
for an accident so long as there was an unexpected injury occurring while the
employee was performing his usual duties in his customary manner. Id. at 171, 573 S.E.2d at 787;  See, e.g., Colvin v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 227 S.C. 465, 88 S.E.2d 581 (1955) (injury by
accident is an injury occurring unexpectedly without the prior occurrence of
any external event of an accidental nature); Hiers v. Brunson Const. Co., 221 S.C. 212, 70 S.E.2d 211 (1952) (injury by
accident is an injury that is accidental in that it is unforeseen and
unexpected). “The focus is not on some specific event, but rather on the injury
itself.” Stokes v. First Nat'l Bank, 306 S.C. 46, 50, 410 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1991).
If an injury is unexpected from the worker's point of view, it qualifies as an
injury by accident. Pee at 171, 573 S.E.2d at 787.

The Appellate Panel found Barr sustained repetitive trauma to her
right and left upper extremities, including trigger thumbs and cyst, and such
injury arose out of and in the course of her employment as a food service
operator for Employer. Barr prepared food, served food, cleaned, and stocked
shelves, job duties which “required repetitive use of her hands.”  The Appellate
Panel concluded Barr sustained thirty-five percent loss of use to each the
right and left upper extremity. In finding Barr suffered a temporary total
disability caused by her course of employment, the Appellate Panel relied upon
testimony from Barr and deposition testimony from Dr. Gheraibeh concerning
causation, treatment, and maximum medical improvement. 

Barr testified that she began noticing numbness and tingling in
her fingers in 2000 or 2001. She continued to work but as time passed the pain
and numbness progressed to her hands, her wrists became sore, and she could not
maintain a grip on objects in her hands.  Barr also described the
“baking, mopping,… scrubbing, lifting, stocking, and serving” required by her
job. She testified she worked with three other women to prepare meals for 700
to 800 students. While the kitchen tasks rotated every week, Barr still
repeated such tasks over and over again during the course of her employment. In
addition, the tasks all required use of her hands in a repetitive motion as she
made numerous biscuits, pulled apart frozen chickens, and washed dishes every
day. Barr worked seven hours a day, five days a week during the school
year for six years in the school cafeteria.

Dr. Gheraibeh testified Barr came to him after suffering from
numbness in both hands for several years.  Dr. Gheraibeh explained that
he performed carpal tunnel release surgery on both of Barr’s hands since
surgery is more effective than Barr’s previous treatment of splinting.[2]  Dr. Gheraibeh testified the
carpal tunnel release surgeries would “not cure the damage already done to the
nerve,” but was intended to “prevent the condition from getting worse.”

Although Barr reached maximum medical improvement regarding her
carpal tunnel syndrome in April 2003, Barr also suffered from trigger thumb.
Dr. Gheraibeh performed trigger thumb release surgery on Barr’s left hand in
June 2003.[3]  Dr. Gheraibeh testified that it is difficult to conclude the pain in
Barr’s thumb is separate from carpal tunnel syndrome since “the thumb is
involved in the carpal tunnel.” In August of 2003, Dr. Gheraibeh also diagnosed
Barr as suffering from cervical strain and neck pain. Dr. Gheraibeh testified
that the pain “is all connected” as the nerve that runs through the carpal
tunnel in the wrist continues up the neck. Dr. Gheraibeh found Barr reached
maximum medical improvement in December 2003.

Dr. Gheraibeh testified that Barr’s carpal tunnel syndrome was
caused by “repeated forceful flexion of the wrist and fingers.” He described
the “combination of force and repetition and posture” present in food
processing work as the source of Barr’s repetitive trauma.[4] Accordingly, we find substantial
evidence in the record to support the Appellate Panel’s finding that Barr’s
injuries to both her right and left upper extremities arose out of repetitive
trauma in the course of her employment. 

2.  Appellants claim the
Appellate Panel erred in failing to make a detailed finding with respect to the
statutory notice requirement.  More specifically, Appellants claim Barr did not
give timely notice as required by South Carolina Code Section 42-15-20.  We
disagree.

The Appellate
Panel found the last date of exposure was January 30, 2003, and “the claimant
gave notice to employer within ninety days.” The South Carolina Supreme Court
has held, “[t]he findings of fact of an
administrative body must be sufficiently detailed to enable the reviewing court
to determine whether the findings are supported by the evidence and whether the
law has been properly applied to those findings.” Heater of Seabrook, Inc.
v. Public Service Com’n of South Carolina, 332 S.C. 20, 26, 503 S.E.2d 739,
742 (1998).  With a simple review of the record on appeal this court was able
to determine the Appellate Panel’s finding is sufficiently supported by evidence
from Employer’s own records.

On March 19, 2003, Employer stamped a “Certification of Physician
or Practitioner” form as received by their personnel department. The form
includes Barr’s name, her treating physician, and the diagnosis of bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome. The form also notes the carpal tunnel syndrome
commenced “several years ago” and that Barr is currently not able to work.
Accordingly, we find substantial evidence in the record to support the Appellate
Panel’s finding that Barr gave notice to Employer within the statutorily
required ninety days.[5]

In Bass
v. Isochem, this court found that “Section 42-15-20 provides no specific
method of giving notice, the object being that the employer be actually put on
notice of the injury so he can investigate it immediately after its occurrence
and can furnish medical care for the employee.” 365 S.C. 454, 473, 617 S.E.2d
369, 379 (Ct. App. 2005). The requirement of notice is not a mere formality and
the burden is upon the claimant to show compliance with the notice provision. Id.  A repetitive trauma injury, such as carpal tunnel syndrome, has a gradual onset
caused by the cumulative effect of repetitive traumatic events or
“mini-accidents.”  Schulknight v. City of North Charleston, 352 S.C.
175, 178, 574, S.E.2d 194, 195 (2002).  The exact date an accident occurs is
difficult to ascertain in a repetitive trauma case because there is no definite
time of injury. Id. 

Although
Barr did not file a worker’s compensation commission Form 50 until May 8, 2003,
Barr testified she previously informed her immediate supervisor and assistant
manager, Hurley McMillian, that she was hurting. “When there is some knowledge
of accompanying facts connecting the injury or illness with the employment, and
signifying to a reasonably conscientious supervisor that the case might involve
a potential compensation claim,” then notice is adequate. Bass at
473-74, 617 S.E.2d at 379.  Accordingly, we find Barr gave adequate notice to
Employer. 

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J.,
KITTREDGE and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.

[2] Before Barr sought
treatment with Dr. Gheraibeh, she saw Dr. Healy in Florence in June 2001. Dr.
Healy diagnosed Barr’s carpal tunnel syndrome and prescribed pain medication
and the use of splints on Barr’s wrists. When he first saw her in January 2003,
Dr. Gheraibeh was aware of Barr’s previous treatments and that her pain
continued to increase.

[3] Barr elected not to have
the recommended trigger thumb release surgery on her right hand.

[4] Dr. Gheraibeh denied Barr’s
carpal tunnel syndrome or trigger thumb had any relation to an incident in the
Spring of 2001 when the back of Barr’s hand was popped by a mixer.

[5] South Carolina Code Section 42-15-20 provides that
“[e]very injured employee or his representative shall immediately on the
occurrence of an accident, or as soon thereafter as practicable, give or cause
to be given to the employer a notice of the accident” and “[n]o compensation shall be payable unless such notice is given
within ninety days after the occurrence of the accident.” S.C. Code Ann. §
42-15-20 (2007).