Richardson v. P.V., Inc.

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Leola
Richardson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Dominick Richardson, Respondent,

v.

P.V., Inc. and
Harbor Inn, Inc., Appellants.

Appeal From Georgetown County

Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-247

Heard January 26, 2012 – Filed April 25,
2012   

AFFIRMED

J. Dwight Hudson, of Myrtle Beach, for
Appellants.

William P. Walker, Jr., of Lexington, and
Frances I. Cantwell, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  P.V.
Inc. and Harbor Inn, Inc. (Appellants) appeal the trial court's award of $1,500,000
in damages to Leola Richardson as the Personal Representative of the Estate of
Dominick Richardson on her wrongful death claim.  We affirm.

1. We find no merit to
Appellants' argument attempting to minimize their own negligence and shift the
blame to the relatives who were with Dominick at the time he drowned.  See Roche v. Young Bros., 332 S.C. 75, 81, 504 S.E.2d 311, 314 (1998)
(stating by suffering a default, the defaulting party is deemed to have
admitted the truth of the plaintiff's allegations and to have conceded
liability). 

2. We similarly find no
merit to Appellants' contention that Richardson's main interest in Dominick was
pecuniary and her shock, grief, and sorrow did not support the damages award.  Parents
of a deceased child are entitled to a presumption of nonpecuniary damages such
as mental shock, suffering, grief and sorrow.  Scott v. Porter, 340 S.C.
158, 168, 530 S.E.2d 389, 394 (Ct. App. 2000); Self v. Goodrich, 300
S.C. 349, 352, 387 S.E.2d 713, 714-15 (Ct. App. 1989).  A determination of
reasonable compensation for nonpecuniary damages turns on the facts of each
case and is usually left to the fact-finder's discretion.  Scott, 340
S.C. at 169-70, 530 S.E.2d at 395.  "Losses to parents from the untimely
death of a child 'are intangibles, the value of which cannot be determined by
any fixed yardstick.  Their loss to the beneficiaries must be estimated by the
jury in the exercise of their sound judgment under all the facts and
circumstances of the case.'"  Id. at 170, 530 S.E.2d at 395
(quoting Lucht v. Youngblood, 266 S.C. 127, 137, 221 S.E.2d 854, 859
(1976)).  "There is no mathematical formula which can easily establish the
value of this kind of loss, and it is not this court's place to do so."  Id. 
"Credibility determinations regarding testimony are a matter for the
finder of fact, who has the opportunity to observe the witnesses, and those
determinations are entitled to great deference on appeal."  Okatie
River, L.L.C. v. Se. Site Prep, L.L.C., 353 S.C. 327, 338, 577 S.E.2d 468,
474 (Ct. App. 2003).  The trial court's award of $1,500,000 was consistent with
other wrongful death damages that have been affirmed by our appellate courts.  See,
e.g., Knoke v. S.C. Dep't of Parks, Recreation & Tourism, 324
S.C. 136, 141-42, 478 S.E.2d 256, 258-59 (1996) (affirming $3,000,000 verdict
for parents' grief, shock, and sense of loss in wrongful death of twelve-year-old
child); Scott, 340 S.C. at 170, 530 S.E.2d at 395 (finding $1,500,000 in
actual damages in wrongful death of a toddler was not grossly excessive).

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, PIEPER,
and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.