Allen-Hines v. Hines

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Karen
Allen-Hines, Appellant,

v.

Franklin Hines, Respondent.

Appeal From Darlington County

Roger E. Henderson, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-054 

Heard December 6, 2011 – Filed February 1,
2012

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED

Robert N. Rosen, of Charleston, and Cynthia
B. Patterson, of Columbia, for Appellant.

J. Anthony Floyd and Rob F. Gardner, III,
both of Hartsville, and Marian D. Nettles, of Lake City, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Karen Allen-Hines appeals several
decisions the family court made on remand from this court.  See Allen-Hines
v. Hines, Op. No. 2008-UP-198 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Mar. 20, 2008).  We affirm
in part, reverse in part, and remand.

1.  Karen argues the family court
erred in awarding her rehabilitative alimony instead of permanent periodic
alimony.  We agree.  The purpose of awarding rehabilitative alimony is "to
encourage a dependent spouse to become self-supporting by providing alimony for
a limited period of time during which the dependent spouse might retrain and
rehabilitate himself or herself thereby limiting the duration of the time in
which the supporting spouse is burdened by spousal support."  Eagerton
v. Eagerton, 285 S.C. 279, 282, 328 S.E.2d 912, 914 (Ct. App. 1985).  Here,
however, the family court found Karen "is very able to work," "does
not need any training in order to secure employment," and "does not
need any additional time to acquire job skills in that she presently has more
than adequate job skills."  We conclude the family court erred in awarding
rehabilitative alimony to someone it found needed no rehabilitation.  Further, having conducted our own review
of the record, we find no special circumstances warranting rehabilitative
alimony.  See Canady v. Canady, 296 S.C. 521, 525, 374 S.E.2d 502, 504 (Ct. App.
1988) ("Rehabilitative alimony may be awarded only upon a showing of
special circumstances justifying a departure from the normal preference for
permanent, periodic support.").  We therefore reverse the family court's decision awarding Karen
rehabilitative alimony and denying her permanent periodic alimony.

This is the
second appeal in this case.  In the first appeal, we concluded Karen "is
entitled to permanent periodic alimony, unless a showing is made of special
circumstances justifying rehabilitative alimony."  Our determination in
the present appeal that the record contains no such circumstances leaves an
award of permanent periodic alimony as the only outcome available under the law
of this case.  On remand, the family court shall make written findings of fact under
the factors listed in subsection 20-3-130(C) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2010) and award Karen an
appropriate amount of permanent periodic alimony. 

2. Karen argues the family court
erred in awarding attorney's fees without making specific findings explaining
its basis for the amount of the award.  We agree.  The family court's only
explanation for the award was that it had reviewed "the record herein,
arguments of counsel[,] and the directions from the Court of Appeals."  Because
this statement identifies no specific basis for the amount of the award, the family
court abused its discretion.  See Johnson v. Johnson, 296 S.C.
289, 304, 372 S.E.2d 107, 115 (Ct. App. 1988) ("A decision lacking a
discernable reason is arbitrary and constitutes an abuse of
discretion."). 

In the first appeal, we instructed the family court to
award attorney's fees after making "specific findings as to the factors
expressed in" E.D.M. v. T.A.M., 307 S.C. 471, 415 S.E.2d 812
(1992), Glasscock v. Glasscock, 304 S.C. 158, 403 S.E.2d 313 (1991), and Mitchell v. Mitchell, 283 S.C. 87, 320 S.E.2d 706 (1984).  The family
court's order contains no such findings.  We reiterate our previous instructions. 
On remand, the family court shall make written findings of fact under the factors
in E.D.M., Glasscock, and Mitchell, and award attorney's
fees in an amount appropriate under those factors.

3. Karen argues
post-judgment interest should accrue on the family court's $11,025.00 interest
award until Franklin pays it.  Because the family court did not make a ruling regarding
whether interest accrues on this award, this issue is not preserved.  See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It
is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but
must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for
appellate review."). 

4. Finally, Karen argues
the family court erred in refusing to hold Franklin in contempt.  We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: Browder v. Browder, 382 S.C. 512, 521, 675
S.E.2d 820, 824-25 (Ct. App. 2009) ("[A] decision regarding contempt is
not subject to reversal absent an abuse of discretion."); Tirado v.
Tirado, 339 S.C. 649, 654, 530 S.E.2d 128, 131 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Contempt
is a consequence of the willful disobedience of a court order."
(emphasis added)).

The judgment of
the family court is

AFFIRMED IN
PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

FEW, C.J., and
THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.