State v. Scott

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Anthony Quentin
Scott, Appellant.

Appeal From Horry County

Edward B. Cottingham, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-043

Heard November 2, 2011 – Filed January 25,
2012

Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled January
31, 2012

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John
W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor J. Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: 
Anthony Quentin Scott was convicted of murder in the death of Efrain Rosado
(Victim), and now appeals that conviction asserting (1) he was entitled to a
directed verdict, as there was insufficient direct or substantial
circumstantial evidence he was responsible for the murder and (2) he was
entitled to an instruction on "criminal intent," which he did not
receive.  We affirm.

We
find no error in the trial court's denial of Scott's motion for directed
verdict.  "A case should be submitted to the jury when the evidence is
circumstantial 'if there is any substantial evidence which reasonably tends to
prove the guilt of the accused or from which his guilt may be fairly and
logically deduced.'"  State v. Bostick, 392 S.C. 134, 139, 708
S.E.2d 774, 776 (2011) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 341 S.C. 406, 409,
535 S.E.2d 126, 127 (2000)).  On appeal of the denial of a directed verdict of
acquittal, the appellate court must look at the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, and absent a total failure of competent evidence as to
the charges alleged, refusal by the trial judge to direct a verdict of
acquittal must be affirmed.  Id.  at 139, 708 S.E.2d at 776-77.  Viewing
the evidence in the case at hand in the light most favorable to the State, the
State presented the following substantial circumstantial evidence which
reasonably tended to prove Scott's guilt:  (1) On the evening of, and prior to
Victim being shot, Williams and Scott arrived at Rudy's residence, nearby
Victim's home, and Williams was heard on the phone, upset and addressing Victim
by his name, stating "you don't play me like that," exclaiming on the
phone, "I don't appreciate the way you talking to me, and, matter of fact,
I might come down there right now," and then immediately telling Scott to
leave with him, at which point Scott and co-defendant Williams left; (2) Scott
and Williams were driving a white Ford Escort that night, and when they left
Rudy's residence, the car was observed heading toward Victim's house and the
car's brake lights came on when it pulled in front of Victim's house; (3)
within thirty minutes of Williams and Scott leaving Rudy's and heading toward
Victim's house, Victim was discovered in his injured condition; (4) shortly
after Rudy found the injured Victim, Scott and Williams returned to Rudy's
home, where they were observed carrying guns, and Scott in particular was seen
carrying a rifle which was identified as the one found in the wood line behind
Williams' mother's home at the time Williams and Scott were located and
arrested at the home; (5) the bullet causing the fatal injury to Victim,
although not conclusively matched to the rifle in question, was determined to have
been fired from a weapon similar to the rifle carried by Scott that night; (6)
two shell casings were recovered from the white Ford Escort belonging to and
being driven by Scott and Williams on the night in question, the two shell
casings were conclusively determined to have been fired from the weapon carried
by Scott that evening, and Victim suffered two gunshot wounds that night; and
(7) when Scott and Williams returned to Rudy's house and the discussion arose
regarding Victim having been injured, Williams expressed disdain for Victim. 
Although Scott and Williams were not placed at Victims home at the exact time
of the shooting, they were placed near scene of the crime within the condensed
time frame that Victim was shot, and that, along with the other evidence
concerning Williams' and Scott's actions and words that night and the ballistic
evidence, raised more than a mere suspicion of Scott's guilt and was sufficient
to submit the matter to the jury.

Due
to the lack of specificity as to the charge Scott sought on criminal intent at
his trial, as well as his failure to specify in his brief the exact deficiency
in the trial court's charge as to "criminal intent" law, we find no
prejudicial error in the trial court's failure to charge the same.  See Kline
Iron & Steel Co. v. Superior Trucking Co. 261 S.C. 542, 549-50, 201
S.E.2d 388, 391-92 (1973) (holding, where appellant challenged the trial
court's failure to instruct the jury as to principles governing liability for special
damages, "assuming that there was a request for an instruction as to
special damages, the contents thereof [were] not included in the record and the
court, therefore, [could not] review the request to determine whether the lower
court erred in refusing it"); Wren v. Kirkland Distrib. Co., 250
S.C. 178, 181-82, 156 S.E.2d 865, 866 (1967) (noting an appellate court will
not review a trial court's failure to give a requested charge where the
contents of the charge do not appear in the record); see also Robinson
v. Estate of Harris, 391 S.C. 114, 130, 705 S.E.2d 41, 49 (2011) (noting "an
appellate court should not be forced to 'grope in the dark' to ascertain the
precise nature of an issue on appeal"); Jones v. Lott, 387 S.C.
339, 348, 692 S.E.2d 900, 904 (2010) (holding an issue raised by Petitioner which
was not concise and direct, but rather was a broad general statement, ought to
be disregarded by the appellate court).  Scott only cites to general law
regarding "criminal intent" in his brief, but fails to discuss how
any of this law is applicable to, and was required by, the facts of his case. 
Scott does not argue how he was prejudiced by the failure of the trial court to
give a general "criminal intent" charge.  Further, he does not argue
how the charge, as given, failed to cover the law on criminal intent.  Thus, we
hold Scott failed to show both error and prejudice, as Scott has failed to
establish that he was prejudiced by the failure of the trial court to give any
particular jury instruction on "criminal intent."  See State
v. Burkhart, 350 S.C. 252, 261, 565 S.E.2d 298, 303 (2002) (holding it is
the substance of the law that must be charged to the jury and, to warrant
reversal, a trial judge's refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both
erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant).

For
the foregoing reasons, Scott's conviction is

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, PIEPER and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.