Owens v. Thompson Construction Group

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Thomas J.
Owens, Jr., Employee, Appellant,

v.

Thompson
Construction Group, Inc., Employer, and New Hampshire Insurance Company,
Carrier, c/o Gallagher Bassett Services, Respondents.

Appeal from the Appellate Panel

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-530

Submitted November 1, 2011 – Filed
December 2, 2011   

AFFIRMED

Stephen J. Wukela, of Florence, for
Appellant.

M. Chad Abramson, Weston Adams, III, and Helen
F. Hiser, all of Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM:  Thomas
J. Owens appeals the denial of his workers' compensation claim by the Appellate Panel of the
South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (the Appellate Panel), arguing
the Appellate Panel erred in finding he did not suffer a compensable injury
arising out of and in the course of his employment.  Specifically, Owens
contends his injury was compensable because it resulted from unusual or
excessive exertion caused by rapidly ascending one hundred feet of stairs in
approximately two and a half minutes during the heat of the day.  We affirm.[1]

An employee may receive
workers' compensation benefits for an injury "arising out of and in the
course of employment."  S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160(A) (Supp. 2010).  However, heart attacks "arising
out of and in the course of employment unaccompanied by physical injury are not
considered compensable if they result from any event or series of events which
are incidental to normal employer/employee relations . . . , except when these
actions are taken in an extraordinary and unusual manner."  S.C. Code Ann.  § 42-1-160(C) (Supp. 2010); see also Black v.
Barnwell Cnty., 243 S.C. 531, 535, 134 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1964) ("The
general rule has been adopted in this State that a coronary attack suffered by
an employee constitutes a compensable accident . . . if it is induced by
unexpected strain or over-exertion in the performance of the duties of his
employment, or by unusual and extraordinary conditions in the employment.").  In
order to prove a heart attack occurring at work constitutes a compensable
injury, the claimant must show (1) the employee's exertion during the
performance of his duties at work was unusual and extraordinary and (2) a
causal connection existed between the exertion during his employment and the
heart attack.  Black, 243 S.C. at 535-36, 134 S.E.2d at 755.  "If the
evidence was conflicting upon these issues, or either of them, such conflicts
in the evidence could only be resolved by the [Appellate Panel], the
fact-finding body."  Id. at 536, 134 S.E.2d at 755.

We find substantial evidence
supports the Appellate Panel's finding that Owens did not suffer a compensable
injury arising out of and in the course of his employment.  See S.C.
Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5)(e) (Supp. 2010) (providing this court must affirm a
decision of the Appellate Panel if it is supported by substantial evidence).   Furthermore,
we defer to the Appellate Panel's finding that Owens died of a cardiac arrhythmia and
due to natural causes.  See Lockridge
v. Santens of Am., Inc., 344 S.C.
511, 518-19, 544 S.E.2d 842, 846 (Ct. App. 2001). (noting "[t]he final determination of witness credibility and
the weight to be accorded evidence is reserved to the [Appellate Panel]" and
finding "expert medical testimony is designed to aid the
[Appellate Panel] in coming to the correct conclusion; therefore, the
[Appellate Panel] determines the weight and credit to be given to the expert
testimony" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

SHORT,
WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.