Godley v. Dowling

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR
RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2),
SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Christopher T.
Godley, Respondent,

v.

Helene Dowling,
Milton Kelley, Harvey Kelley, and All Pro Contractors, Inc. d/b/a Custom Cut
Log Homes, Defendants, 

of whom Helene
Dowling is the Appellant.

Appeal From Beaufort County

Judge Carmen T. Mullen, Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2011-UP-571

Heard December 7, 2011 – Filed December
20, 2011

AFFIRMED

James Moss, of Beaufort, for Appellant.

J. Thomas Mikell, of Beaufort, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  This appeal arises out of a jury verdict
awarding Respondent Christopher T. Godley $10,000 in actual damages and $40,000
in punitive damages against Appellant Helene Dowling.  On appeal, Dowling
argues the trial court erred in:  (1) directing a verdict for Godley regarding
his cause of action for trespass; (2) allowing arborist testimony of the
commercial value of the trees where the trees were noncommercial; (3) failing
to direct a verdict for Dowling on the issue of actual damages; and (4) failing
to direct a verdict for Dowling on the issue of punitive damages.  We affirm.

1.  As to Dowling's argument that the
trial court erred in granting a directed verdict on Godley's cause of action
for trespass, we find this argument unpreserved for appellate review.  See Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Probation, Parole, & Pardon Servs., 372
S.C. 279, 283, 641 S.E.2d 895, 897 (2007) ("Because court rules require
the appealing party to prepare the record on appeal, see Rule 210(a),
SCACR, South Carolina courts have traditionally held the appealing party
accountable for failing to present the court with an adequate record on appeal
for review."); Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d
731, 733 (1998) ("[A]n issue cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be
preserved for appellate review.").

2.  As to Dowling's argument that the
trial court erred in allowing testimony from an arborist, we find this argument
abandoned on appeal.  See Ahrens v. State, 392 S.C. 340, 357, 709 S.E.2d 54, 63 (2011) (stating
that issues raised on appeal but not argued in the brief are deemed abandoned
and will not be considered by the appellate court).  Additionally, because
Dowling did not object to the arborist's testimony, we find this issue
unpreserved for appellate review.  See Burke v. AnMed Health, 393
S.C. 48, 54, 710 S.E.2d 84, 87 (Ct. App. 2011) ("A contemporaneous
objection is typically required to preserve issues for appellate
review."); S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. First Carolina Corp., 372 S.C.
295, 302, 641 S.E.2d 903, 907 (2007) (noting a party must make a meaningful
objection with sufficient specificity to allow the trial court to rule on the
issue).  Finally, even if Dowling's argument is preserved for review, we find Dowling
did not show how she was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling.  See Carolina
Chloride, Inc. v. Richland Cnty., 394 S.C. 154, 714 S.E.2d 869, 879 (2011)
("To warrant reversal based on the admission or exclusion of evidence, the
appealing party must show both the error of the ruling and prejudice."). 

3.  As to Dowling's
remaining arguments regarding damages, we note Dowling made post trial motions
arguing there was no basis for the actual damages awarded by the jury and that
Dowling did not have the ability to pay the excessive punitive damages award. 
We decline to address the merits of the appeal regarding damages because
Dowling's appellate brief fails to reveal a challenge to the denial of Dowling's
post trial motions.[1]  See Jones v. Lott, 387 S.C. 339, 346, 692 S.E.2d 900, 903 (2010)
("Under the two issue rule, where a decision is based on more than one
ground, the appellate court will affirm unless the appellant appeals all
grounds because the unappealed ground will become the law of the case.").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF,
PIEPER, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur. 

[1] To the extent Dowling argues the trial court erred in
giving an instruction to the jury regarding intent as an element of trespass,
Dowling did not object.  The only objection made to the trial court following
the charge to the jury concerned Dowling's assertion that the trial court
should not have charged punitive damages.  Therefore, we find Dowling's
arguments in this regard unpreserved for review.  See Berberich v.
Jack, 392 S.C. 278, 290, 709 S.E.2d 607, 613 (2011) (finding an issue
unpreserved for review where the appellant failed to object to the jury
charge).