SCDSS v. Julie M.

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina
Department of Social Services, Respondent,

   v.

Chris M. and
Julie M., Defendants,

Of Whom Julie
M. is the Appellant.

In the interest of one minor child under the age of 18.

Appeal From Laurens County

Joseph W. McGowan, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-382 

Submitted July 1, 2011 – Filed August 4,
2011

AFFIRMED

Jonathan A. Neal, of Greenville, for
Appellant.

Laura Bardsley Houck, of Laurens, for Respondent.

Donna J. Jackson, of Clinton, for Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM:  Julie M. (Mother) appeals from the family
court's permanency planning order awarding custody of her child (Child) to
relatives and relieving the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS)
from providing treatment services for her.  Mother argues the family court
erred in finding DSS made reasonable efforts to provide treatment services that
would assist in her in remedying the cause of Child's placement in foster
care.  We affirm.[1]

We find a
preponderance of the evidence supports the family court's holding that DSS made
reasonable efforts to provide treatment services that would assist Mother in
remedying the cause of Child's placement in foster care.[2]  See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1640 (Supp. 2010) (identifying several factors
for the family court to consider when making a determination of reasonable
efforts).  Here, it was in Child's best interests for DSS to forgo reasonable
efforts to provide further treatment services for Mother because of Mother's
failure to complete the goals of her treatment plan as well as the necessity of
providing a stable placement that could address Child's special-needs
requirements.  A review of the record indicates DSS provided treatment services
for Mother in the form of parenting classes and living and parenting skills
training from a disability advocate.  However, Mother failed to complete her
living and parenting skills training despite the disability advocate's repeated
efforts to schedule appointments with her.  Additionally, DSS, the disability
advocate, and the GAL all expressed strong concerns about Mother's capacity to
care for Child, especially given Child's special-needs issues and Mother's
inability to comprehend and apply the information she learned in order to
properly care for Child without endangering Child's safety.  Accordingly, the
family court did not err in finding DSS made reasonable efforts to provide
treatment services for Mother.

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS
and GEATHERS, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.

[2] The family court "must make specific written
findings in support of its conclusion" to either terminate or continue
reasonable efforts.  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1640(F) (Supp. 2010).  We note the
family court failed to include specific written findings supporting its
decision to terminate reasonable efforts.  When an order of the family court
violates Rule 26(a), SCRFC, by failing to set forth specific findings of fact
and conclusions of law, this court may remand the matter to the family court or
make its own findings of fact in accordance with the preponderance of the
evidence if the record is sufficient to allow such a review.  Griffith v.
Griffith, 332 S.C. 630, 646-47, 506 S.E.2d 526, 535 (Ct. App. 1998); see also Ex parte Morris, 367 S.C. 56,
61, 624 S.E.2d 649, 652 (2006) ("In appeals from the family court, the
appellate court has the authority to find the facts in accordance with its view
of the preponderance of the evidence.").  We find the record in the case at bar is sufficient to allow such a
review.