Morris Communications v. City of Greenville

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Morris
Communications Company, LLC, d/b/a Fairway Outdoor Advertising Division, Respondent,

v.

The City of
Greenville, South Carolina, Appellant.

Appeal From Greenville County

R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-384  

Heard February 16, 2011 – Filed August 8,
2011

AFFIRMED

Ronald W. McKinney, of Greenville, for
Appellant.

Reid Sherard and Timothy Madden, both of
Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  The City of Greenville (the City) appeals the circuit
court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Morris Communications
Company, LLC, d/b/a Fairway Outdoor Advertising (Fairway), which effectively
made void the City's ordinance regarding the amortization of billboards.[1] 
We affirm.

FACTS

In 1993, the City passed a
billboard amortization ordinance that allowed for amortization of billboards
without the payment of compensation to the sign owner.  In 1996, the City
repealed this ordinance.  In early 2005, the South Carolina legislature
introduced legislation that would prevent local governments from amortizing
private billboard properties without compensation to the owner.  On May 9, 2005,
the City enacted the ordinance at issue in this litigation.  The ordinance
purported to repeal the 1996 ordinance that had repealed the 1993 ordinance,
thereby reinstating the right of the City to amortize billboards without
compensation.  The ordinance stated the 1993 ordinance had remained in effect
from the time of its passage until the passage of the 2005 ordinance. 

The proposed state
legislation was ratified but vetoed by Governor Mark Sanford.  The veto was
overridden, and the law became effective on February 22, 2006, as the "South
Carolina Landowner and Advertising Protection and Property Valuation Act,"
sections 39-14-10 to -40 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2010) (the Act). 

The Act provides "[a]
local governing body may enact or amend an ordinance of general applicability
to require the removal of any nonconforming, lawfully erected off-premises
outdoor advertising sign only if the ordinance requires the payment of just
compensation to the sign owners . . ."  S.C. Code Ann. §
39-14-30(B)(2) (emphasis added).  As enacted, Section 6 of the Act provided:

Time Effective - SECTION 6. This act takes effect upon
approval by the Governor. Nothing in this act preempts or otherwise alters,
modifies, applies to, or effects relocation or removal of any off-premises
outdoor advertising signs pursuant to an ordinance or regulation enacted by a
local governing body prior to April 14, 2005. It is the intent of the General
Assembly that nothing in this act may be construed to
require the payment of monetary compensation for any off-premises outdoor
advertising signs relocated or removed pursuant to an ordinance enacted before
the effective date of this act unless the ordinance otherwise requires the
payment of monetary compensation.

After the passage of the Act,
the City attempted to amortize certain of Fairway's billboards without
compensation.  Fairway filed a declaratory judgment action against the City to
have the ordinance stricken from the City Code.  In the alternative, Fairway
requested a permanent injunction and also alleged an inverse condemnation cause
of action and unconstitutional takings in violation of the state and federal
constitutions.  Fairway filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to the
declaratory judgment action.  The City filed a document entitled "Motion
for Summary Judgment" as well.  The circuit court granted Fairway's motion
finding the plain language of the Act rendered all amortization ordinances
illegal and holding the effective date section of the Act related to removals
that occurred before the effective date, not ordinances passed prior to that
time.  The circuit court further found the City's interpretation of the Act's
effective date section would transform the Act into unconstitutional special
legislation because it would treat municipalities differently.  The City filed
a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.  This appeal followed. 

LAW/ANALYSIS

I.  The
Act and the Ordinance

The City argues the time
effective section of the Act states compensation ordinances enacted prior to
the effective date of the legislation are not affected by the Act.  We disagree.

"The issue of
interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the court.  [The appellate
court] is free to decide questions of law with no particular deference to the
lower court."  Jeter v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 369 S.C. 433, 438,
633 S.E.2d 143, 146 (2006) (citations omitted).  "The
determination of legislative intent is a matter of law."  Eagle
Container Co., LLC v. Cnty. of Newberry, 379 S.C. 564, 568, 666 S.E.2d 892,
894 (2008) (quoting Charleston Cnty. Parks & Recreation Comm'n v. Somers,
319 S.C. 65, 67, 459 S.E.2d 841, 843 (1995)).  "All rules of statutory construction
are subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail if it can be
reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed
in light of the intended purpose of the statute."  McClanahan
v. Richland Cnty. Council, 350 S.C. 433, 438, 567 S.E.2d 240, 242 (2002). 
The language in a statute should be construed in a way that reflects the
statute's intended purpose.  Nelson v. Ozmint, 390 S.C. 432, 436, 702
S.E.2d 369, 371 (2010).  "A statute as a whole must receive practical,
reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and
policy of lawmakers."  Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam'rs,
370 S.C. 452, 468, 636 S.E.2d 598, 606 (2006). 

The time effective section
of the enacting legislation is ambiguous.  It is unclear whether the removal of
signs is prohibited after a certain date or whether the passage of new "no
compensation" ordinances is the prohibited action.  Further complicating
matters, two dates, April 15, 2005, and the effective date of the legislation,
which was ultimately February 22, 2006, are cited.  Because the language used
in the second and third sentences of this section is ambiguous, we must attempt
to ascertain the legislature's intent and construe any ambiguity in a way that
reconciles it with the Act's overall purpose. 

In this case, section (B) of
the Act makes clear the legislature disfavors the amortization of billboards
without just compensation to the owners.  Interpreting the Act to allow local
governments to continue amortizing billboards without just compensation under
previously enacted ordinances does not comport with the overall intent of the
Act, which is aimed at protecting the property interests of sign owners.  Furthermore, if the time effective section referred to a cutoff
date for the passage of no-compensation ordinances, nothing would have
prevented all local jurisdictions from hurriedly passing no-compensation
ordinances.  Such action would have rendered the Act completely ineffective,
and we are charged with construing legislation in a manner that does not lead
to an absurd result.  SeeKiriakides v. United Artists Commc'ns, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 275, 440 S.E.2d 364, 366
(1994) (holding the court should reject a meaning when to accept it would lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not
have been intended by the legislature).  Therefore, we construe the second
sentence of the time effective section as banning the removal or relocation of
signs prior to April 15, 2005, under a no-compensation ordinance. 

The same
principles that lead to our interpretation of the second sentence are
applicable to a construction of the last sentence of the time effective
section.  Again, to interpret the last sentence to permit the continued
existence of no-compensation ordinances would conflict with the overall purpose
of the Act.  Consequently, two possible interpretations of the final sentence emerge:
(1) it prohibits the removal or relocation of signs after the time effective
date of the Act or (2) it simply clarifies for sign owners that the passage of
the Act does not entitle them to seek compensation for signs already removed
under a previously existing no-compensation ordinance.  In other words, the
statute is not retroactive.  The first interpretation is incongruent with our
construction of the second sentence in this section finding April 15, 2005, to
be the cutoff date for the removal or relocation of signs.  Therefore, the
second construction is most reasonable and is in keeping with the overall
purpose of the Act.  Local governments cannot continue operating under no-compensation
ordinances, and sign owners cannot use the Act to seek compensation for prior
amortizations that were accomplished without just compensation.[2]

Because we
conclude the time effective section of the Act does not permit the continuing
existence of no-compensation ordinances, we find the circuit court did not err
in holding the City's ordinance was preempted by the Act.  Furthermore, because we interpret the Act in such a way as to
preempt the City's amortization ordinance, we not need address the circuit
court's findings regarding special legislation and we need not determine
whether the unconventional way in which the ordinance was passed rendered it
void.  See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335
S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not
address remaining issues when the determination of a prior issue is dispositive
of the appeal).

II.  Failure
to Grant Summary Judgment

The City also urges this
court to find the circuit court erred in failing to grant summary judgment in
its favor on Fairway's remaining causes of action.  We decline to address this
issue. 

The parties disagree to some
extent on whether the City's pleading entitled "Motion for Summary
Judgment" actually seeks summary judgment as to the other causes of action
alleged by Fairway: permanent injunction, inverse condemnation cause of action,
and unconstitutional takings in violation of the state and federal
constitutions.  However, we need not determine whether the City sought summary
judgment on those issues because the denial of those motions would be
unappealable.  See Olson v. Faculty House of Carolina, Inc., 354
S.C. 161, 168, 580 S.E.2d 440, 444 (2003) (reaffirming the denial of a motion
for summary judgment is unappealable).

For all of the foregoing
reasons the order of the circuit court is

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and SHORT and
KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] Amortization of
billboards means requiring the removal or relocation of non-conforming
billboards within a certain period of time.

[2] Under either interpretation
of the last sentence, the City's case fails as the signs at issue were not
removed before the effective date of the Act, nor is Fairway seeking
compensation for an amortization that was concluded prior to the effective date
of the Act.