Greene v. Cherokee County School District

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals 

Joel Greene, Appellant,

v.

Cherokee County
School District, Respondent.

Appeal From Cherokee County

J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-391

Submitted August 1, 2011 – Filed August
16, 2011

AFFIRMED

Lovic A. Brooks, III, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Andrea Eaton White and Kiosha A. Hammond,
both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Joel
Greene appeals the trial court's order granting Cherokee County School District's
(the School District) motions for summary judgment on his claims for breach of
contract and breach of implied contract.  On appeal, Greene argues the trial
court erred in finding no genuine issues
of material fact existed regarding whether:
(1) a prior settlement agreement was ambiguous concerning whether the parties
agreed to not consider Greene's prior disciplinary record in future
disciplinary proceedings, and (2) a personnel memorandum issued by the School
District in 1997 created an implied employment contract.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and
the following authorities:

1.  As to whether the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Greene's breach of contract claim: Rule 56(c), SCRCP (providing that
summary judgment is appropriate and "the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact"); Pee Dee Stores, Inc. v.
Doyle, 381 S.C. 234, 241-42, 672 S.E.2d 799, 803 (Ct. App. 2009) ("General
contract principles are applied in the construction of a settlement agreement because . . . a settlement agreement is a contract.  Summary judgment is not
appropriate if a contract is ambiguous.
 Thus, the initial determination for a court seeking to ascertain whether a
grant of summary judgment based on a settlement agreement's interpretation is proper is whether the
agreement is ambiguous."); Id. at 242, 672 S.E.2d at 803 (noting
an ambiguity arises when the terms of the contract are reasonably susceptible
to more than one interpretation); Columbia East Assocs. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 299
S.C. 515, 520-21, 386 S.E.2d 259, 262 (Ct. App. 1989) (noting when an
agreement is silent on an issue, courts may turn to extrinsic evidence to
discern the parties' intentions).

2.  As to whether the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Greene's breach of implied contract claim: Rule
56(c), SCRCP (providing that summary judgment is appropriate and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law" when "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact"); Grant v. Mount Vernon Mills, Inc., 370 S.C.
138, 145-46, 634 S.E.2d 15, 19 (Ct. App. 2006) ("South Carolina has long
recognized the doctrine of employment at-will.  This doctrine allows either
party to terminate the employment for any reason or no reason without being
subject to a claim for breach of contract . . . .") (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); Nelson v. Charleston Cnty. Parks & Recreaction
Comm'n, 362 S.C. 1, 6-7, 605 S.E.2d 744, 746-47 (Ct. App. 2004)
(noting one exception to the at-will employment doctrine occurs when an
employer creates an implied contract with the employee by contractually altering the at-will
relationship); Prescott v. Farmers
Telephone Coop., 335 S.C. 330, 336,
516 S.E.2d 923, 926 (1999) (providing the elements of a contract are as
follows: "1) a specific offer, 2) communication of the offer to the
employee, and 3) performance of job duties in reliance on the offer"); Id. at 336-37, 516 S.E.2d at 926 ("To be binding,
an offer must be definite.").

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, WILLIAMS,
and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.