State v. Peake

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Tijuan Peake, Appellant.

Appeal From Union County

John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-297 

Submitted June 1, 2011 – Filed June 14,
2011

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief
Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Julie M. Thames, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Kevin S. Brackett, of York, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Tijuan Peake appeals his convictions for
distribution of crack cocaine and distribution of crack cocaine in proximity of
a school.  Peake argues the trial court erred in the following: (1) admitting tax
maps into evidence because they constituted inadmissible hearsay; and (2)
refusing to charge the jury on the law of entrapment.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1.  As to whether the trial court erred in
allowing the tax maps into evidence:  S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Wilson,
254 S.C. 360, 369, 175 S.E.2d 391, 396 (1970) ("[T]he admission or
exclusion of evidence is a matter which is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial judge and . . . in the absence of a clear abuse of such
discretion, amounting to an error of law, his ruling will not be
disturbed."); S.C. Code Ann. §
19-5-510 (1985) ("A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as
relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness
testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made
in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or
event and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method
and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission."); Rule
803(6), SCRE ("A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any
form, of acts, events, conditions, . . . made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of
that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.").

2. As to
whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the law of
entrapment:  State v. Johnson, 295 S.C. 215, 217, 367 S.E.2d 700,
701 (1988) ("It is a well settled principle of law that the defense of
entrapment is not available to a defendant exhibiting a predisposition to
commit a crime independent of governmental inducement and influence."); State v. Brown,
362 S.C. 258, 261-62, 607 S.E.2d 93, 95 (Ct. App. 2004) ("The law to be charged to the
jury is determined by the evidence presented at trial."). 

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, KONDUROS, and
GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.