In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Fred Smith

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

In the Matter of
the Care and Treatment of Fred Smith, III, Appellant.

Appeal From Cherokee County

J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2011-UP-202 

Submitted May 1, 2011 – Filed May 3, 2011

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant,
of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief
Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Attorney General Deborah
R.J. Shupe, Assistant Attorney General R. Westmoreland Clarkson, and Assistant
Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., all of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Fred
Smith, III, appeals his commitment to the South Carolina Department of Mental
Health pursuant to a jury's finding he was a sexually violent predator (SVP)
under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (the SVP Act).  Smith argues the trial
court committed reversible error by limiting his cross-examination of the State's
forensic psychologist regarding the conditions of his expected probation.  He
contends that limitation violated his right to a meaningful cross-examination
and excluded relevant evidence regarding alternate sources of treatment.  We
affirm.[1]

The proceedings for
committing inmates under the SVP Act are civil in nature.  In re Luckabaugh,
351 S.C. 122, 135, 568 S.E.2d 338, 344 (2002).  "[A]lthough historically
limited to criminal prosecutions, [the right to confront one's witnesses] has
been applied in the civil context" under a procedural due process
analysis.  S.C. Dep't Soc. Serv. v. Holden, 319 S.C. 72, 78, 459 S.E.2d
846, 849 (1995) (citations omitted).  Within that analysis, "due process
is not violated if there has been a meaningful opportunity to be heard."  Id. at 78, 459 S.E.2d at 849-50 (citation omitted).  Moreover, "[t]he scope of
cross-examination rests largely in the discretion of the trial court."  Watson
ex rel. Watson v. Chapman, 343 S.C. 471, 482, 540 S.E.2d 484, 489 (Ct. App.
2000).  "To warrant the reversal of a limitation placed on the scope of
cross-examination by the trial court, a manifest abuse of discretion and
prejudice must be demonstrated."  Duncan v. Ford Motor Co., 385
S.C. 119, 133, 682 S.E.2d 877, 884 (Ct. App. 2009).  Whether an error is
prejudicial depends upon the importance of the witness's testimony, whether the
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of corroborating or
contradicting testimony, the extent of cross-examination permitted, and the
strength of the opposing party's case.  State v. Mizzell, 349 S.C. 326, 333-34, 563
S.E.2d 315, 318-19 (2002) (citation omitted).

Here, (1) Smith was given a
meaningful opportunity to be heard and (2) no prejudice occurred in limiting
Smith's cross-examination.  Smith extensively cross-examined the forensic
psychologist about sex-offender programs in general and whether they could reduce
the likelihood of an inmate's recidivism.  Moreover, the forensic psychologist testified
about a psychological report and actuarial risk analysis he performed on Smith
and suggested proper probation programs could reduce Smith's likelihood for
re-offending.  The forensic psychologist also provided detailed testimony about
Smith's lengthy criminal history and psychological problems.  Accordingly, the
trial court properly limited the cross-examination.

AFFIRMED.

HUFF,
WILLIAMS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.