State v. Sanders

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Lavar Patrick
Sanders, Appellant.

Appeal From Sumter County

R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-217  

Submitted May 1, 2011 – Filed May 17, 2011

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek,
of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief
Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General David Spencer, all of
Columbia; and Cecil Kelly Jackson, of Sumter, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Lavar
Patrick Sanders appeals his conviction for possession with intent to distribute
cocaine within one-half mile of a park.  He argues the trial court erred in
charging the jury on the statutory inference regarding intent to distribute because
the trial court failed to use specific language instructing the jury that it
was free to accept or reject the inference.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v.
Simmons, 384 S.C. 145, 178, 682 S.E.2d 19, 36 (Ct. App. 2009) ("A jury
charge is correct if, when the charge is read as a whole, it contains the
correct definition and adequately covers the law." (citation omitted)); State
v. Adkins, 353 S.C. 312, 318-19, 577 S.E.2d 460, 464 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The
substance of the law is what must be charged to the jury, not any particular
verbiage." (citations omitted)); see also State v. Gathers,
295 S.C. 476, 481, 369 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1998) (holding that a defendant's
argument that an instruction on the inference of implied malice was not
"burden shifting" because "[n]owhere in the charge does the
judge mention the need for rebuttal or explanation of the evidence presented by
the State" and "the judge's charge comports with the requirement that
it is for the jury to determine from all the evidence whether or not malice is
proven" (citation omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., HUFF and
THOMAS, JJ. concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.