Mohammad v. Spencer Real Estate

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Karen D.
Mohammad, Respondent,

v.

Spencer Real
Estate Investments, Inc., Appellant.

Appeal From Aiken County

Robert A. Smoak, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-098

Submitted March 1, 2011 – Filed March 14,
2011

AFFIRMED

Brian Austin Katonak, of Aiken, for Appellant.

Scott William Patterson, of Aiken, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Spencer Real Estate Investments, Inc. appeals the
master-in-equity's grant of a directed verdict, arguing the master erred in:
(1) allowing Ian Davis to be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41 of the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and (2) not allowing Davis to seek a
continuance on behalf of Spencer Real Estate in order to obtain counsel for
Spencer Real Estate.  Spencer Real Estate also argues the master violated their
due process rights by dismissing Davis from the action. We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1.  As
to whether the master erred in allowing Davis to be dismissed pursuant to Rule
41, SCRCP:  Rule 4(a), SCRCP (stating a civil action is commenced when the
summons and complaint is filed and served on the opposing party); Estate of
Corley, 299 S.C. 525, 527, 386 S.E.2d 264, 266 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding it
is not error for a trial court to dismiss an action which was never properly
instituted).   

2.  As
to whether the master erred in not allowing Davis to seek a continuance on
behalf of Spencer Real Estate:  Renaissance Enters.,  Inc. v. Summit
Teleservices,  Inc.,  334 S.C. 649, 651, 515 S.E.2d 257,
258 (1999) ("[A] non-lawyer cannot represent a corporation in circuit
or appellate courts.").

3.  As
to whether the dismissal of Davis violated Spencer Real Estate's due process
rights: Tall Tower, Inc. v. S. C. Procurement Review Panel,  294
S.C. 225, 233, 363 S.E.2d 683, 687 (1988) ("A demonstration of
substantial prejudice is required to establish a due process claim."). 

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.