SCDSS v. Sherry H.

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina
Department of Social Services, Respondent,

v.

Sherry H.,
James H., Curtis Ga., and Charles H., Defendants,

Of whom, Sherry
H. is Appellant.

In the interest of one minor child under
the age of 18.

Appeal From Union County

Robert E. Guess, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-050

Submitted February 1, 2011 – Filed
February 4, 2011   

AFFIRMED

Kenneth Philip Shabel, of Spartanburg, for
Appellant.

David E. Simpson, of York, Oshun Cyrus
Hinton, of Rock Hill, for Respondent.

James Hayes Walsh and Laura Anne Filler, both
of Spartanburg, for Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM:  Sherry
H. (Mother) appeals from the family court's final order terminating her
parental rights to her minor child (Child), arguing the family court erred in
finding termination of parental rights (TPR) was in the best interest of
Child.  The family court cited three statutory grounds for termination: (1)
failure to remedy condition that caused removal, (2) Mother has a diagnosable
condition unlikely to change in a reasonable time, and (3) Child has been in
foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months.  We affirm.[1]

Mother contends the family
court erred in terminating her parental rights because DSS failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that TPR was in the best interest of Child. 
Specifically, Mother contends TPR was one of several options that could provide
stability for Child and that it is too severe a solution to the situation.  We
disagree.

The grounds for TPR must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.  S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v.
Parker, 336 S.C. 248, 254, 519 S.E.2d 351, 354 (Ct. App. 1999).  "Upon
review, the appellate court may make its own finding from the record as to
whether clear and convincing evidence supports the termination [of parental
rights]."  S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Headden, 354 S.C. 602, 609,
582 S.E.2d 419, 423 (2003).  However, despite our broad scope of review, this
court is not required to disregard the findings of "the family court, who
saw and heard the witnesses, [and] was in a better position to evaluate their
credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony."  Id.  The family court may order
TPR upon finding one or more of eleven statutory grounds is met and TPR is in
the child's best interests.  S.C.
Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (2010).  The best interests of the child are the
paramount consideration.  S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C.
129, 133, 538 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000).  "The
interests of the child shall prevail if the child's interest and the parental
rights conflict."  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010).

We hold the family court
correctly found termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best
interest.  Although Mother seems to be making progress in dealing with her
psychiatric issues and expresses a strong desire to maintain the parent-child
relationship, Child would be best served by the stability offered by TPR.  To
date, Mother has had very little contact with Child, who has lived with his
maternal aunt most of his life.  Furthermore, the record indicates Mother's
ability to live independently and properly care for a child is limited and not
likely to change in the foreseeable future. The need for stability and
permanence in Child's life would be in his best interest.  These considerations
and Child's guardian ad litem's opinion that TPR would best serve Child further
convince us that it is in the best interest of Child to terminate Mother's
parental rights. 

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS and
KONDUROS, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.