Williams v. Leake

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Hattie Bryson
Williams and Larry Williams, Appellants,

v.

Thelma Marie
Leake, Lucille Leake, Toyota of Greenville, Southeastern Toyota Distributors,
LLC, Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., Defendants,

of whom Toyota
of Greenville, Southeastern Toyota Distributors, LLC, and Toyota Motor Sales,
USA, Inc., are Respondents.

Appeal From Greenville County

Charles B. Simmons, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2011-UP-074

Submitted December 12, 2010 – Filed
February 23, 2011

AFFIRMED

Fletcher N. Smith, Jr., of Greenville, for Appellants.

Shawn Boyd Deery, of Columbia, and Kevin Lindsay Terrell, of
Greenville, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: In
this personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident, Hattie
Bryson Williams and Larry Williams (Mr. and Mrs. Williams) appeal the grant of
summary judgment to Toyota of Greenville, Southeast Toyota Distributors, and
Toyota Motor Sales (collectively, "the Toyota  defendants").  Mr. and
Mrs. Williams alleged the Toyota defendants were negligent.  We affirm.[1]

The
sole allegation against the Toyota defendants was that the Toyota defendants
were negligent for selling and warranting that the airbag in a vehicle
purchased by Mr. and Mrs. Williams from the Toyota defendants would discharge
on impact.  Several years after Mr. and Mrs. Williams purchased the car, it was
involved in two collisions, first with another vehicle and immediately
thereafter with a tree; however, the airbag did not discharge either time, and
Mrs. Williams, who was driving the car, was injured. 

In
granting summary judgment to the Toyota defendants, the trial judge held Mr.
and Mrs. Williams were unable to prove any of the elements necessary for
establishing liability in a products liability action.  Specifically, the trial
judge held that the mere fact that the airbag did not discharge during upon
impact during either collision was insufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case that the vehicle was defective.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1),
SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1.  As to whether a
genuine issue of material fact existed regarding a defect in the airbag:  See  Marchant v. Mitchell Distrib. Co., 270 S.C. 29, 36, 240 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1977) (stating
the fact that an injury occurred and the fact that the allegedly defective
product could have been more safe are not sufficient to support a finding that
the product in question was unreasonably dangerous); Campbell v. Robbins
Tire & Rubber Co., 256 S.C. 230, 234, 182 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1971) (holding
the mere fact that a tire tube exploded "does not demonstrate the
manufacturer's negligence nor tend to establish that the tube was defective")
(emphasis added); Bragg v.
Hi-Ranger, Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 543, 462 S.E.2d 321, 328 (Ct. App. 1995)
(stating that to prevail in a products liability action under a strict
liability theory, "the plaintiff
must establish that: (1) the defendant's product was in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed when the
product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect was the proximate
cause of the injury sustained"); id. ("[T]he mere fact that a
product malfunctions does not demonstrate the manufacturer's negligence nor
does it establish that the product was defective.") (emphasis added); Dema
v. Shore Enters., 312 S.C. 529, 530, 435 S.E.2d 875, 876 (Ct. App. 1993)
(stating a plaintiff must establish the same three elements in a products
liability action "regardless of whether the theory under which he seeks to
recover is strict liability, breach of warranty, or negligence"); Byrd
Motor Lines v. Dunlop Tire and Rubber Corp., 304 S.E.2d 773, 780 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1983) (affirming the grant of summary judgment for the defendant in a products
liability claim arising in South Carolina and holding that because (1) the
allegedly defective product could not be produced, (2) there was no expert
testimony or other evidence that it was defective, and (3) there was no
examination of the product  by one who could make a meaningful evaluation, the
plaintiff failed to make a legally sufficient showing of a defective condition
or unreasonable danger under South Carolina law).

2.  Because we have affirmed the trial
judge's ruling that Mr. and Mrs. Williams failed as a matter of law to
establish that their vehicle was defective, we need not reach their argument
regarding causation.  See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown,
335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need
not review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is
dispositive of the appeal); Bragg, 319 S.C. at 543, 462 S.E.2d at 328
(noting proximate cause as only one of the elements of a strict liability
claim); Madden v. Cox, 284 S.C. 574, 579-80, 328 S.E.2d 108, 112 (Ct.
App. 1985) (noting proof of causation is an element of a products liability
action based on negligence).

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS, PIEPER, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1]  We decide this case without oral argument pursuant
to Rule 215, SCACR.