State v. Parker

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Roger Raynard Parker, Appellant.

Appeal From Charleston County

 R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-378

Submitted May 3, 2010 – Filed August 2,
2010   

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka,
and Senior Assistant Attorney General S. Creighton Waters, of Columbia; Solicitor
Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER
CURIAM: Roger Raynard Parker appeals the trial court's refusal to charge
portions of the Protection of Persons and Property Act (the Act), section
16-11-440 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2009), in his trial for murder.  We
affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Bolin, 381
S.C. 557, 561, 673 S.E.2d 885, 887 (Ct. App. 2009) (concluding the Act was
intended to apply prospectively and affirming the refusal to charge when crime
occurred four months prior to the effective date); State v. Dickey, 380
S.C. 384, 404-05, 699 S.E.2d 917, 928 (Ct. App. 2008) cert. granted Nov.
10, 2009 (holding the Act was intended to apply prospectively and affirming the
refusal to charge when offense took place two years prior to effective date); Futch
v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d
591, 598 (1999) (stating an appellate court need not address remaining issues
when a decision on a prior issue is dispositive).

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS,
GEATHERS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.