State v. Jenrette, Kristal

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Kristal
Cordelia Jenrette, Appellant.

Appeal From Horry County

Thomas A. Russo, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-275

Submitted May 5, 2010 – Filed May 19, 2010

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle C. DuRant, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief
Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Michelle Parsons Kelley, all
of Columbia; and Solicitor John Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Kristal Cordelia Jenrette appeals her convictions for
two counts of trafficking in crack cocaine in an amount more than ten grams but
less than twenty-eight.  On appeal, Jenrette contends the trial court erred in
(1) denying her motion for a trial severance and (2) denying her motion for a
directed verdict. We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Jenrette's
motion for a trial severance: State v.
Tucker, 324 S.C. 155, 164, 478 S.E.2d
260, 265 (1996) (stating a motion for severance is addressed to the trial
court and should not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is shown); State
v. Simmons, 352 S.C. 342, 350, 573 S.E.2d 856, 860 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Where
the offenses charged in separate indictments are of the same general nature
involving connected transactions closely related in kind, place and character,
the trial judge has the power, in his discretion, to order the indictments
tried together if the defendant's substantive rights would not be prejudiced.").

2. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Jenrette's motion for a directed
verdict: State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442, 455, 503 S.E.2d 214,
221 (Ct. App. 1998) ("In reviewing a denial of directed verdict,
issues not raised to the trial court in support of the directed verdict motion
are not preserved for appellate review."); see also State v.
Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 5, 377 S.E.2d 581, 584 (1989) ("A party cannot
argue one ground for a directed verdict in trial and then an alternative ground
on appeal."). 

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS,
GEATHERS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.