Destiny H. Mills v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Destiny H. Mills, Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000013

Appeal From Lexington County
Brooks P. Goldsmith, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-252
Submitted June 1, 2024 – Filed July 10, 2024

AFFIRMED

Tommy A. Thomas, of Irmo, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: This is a felony driving under the influence case. Destiny H. Mills
(Petitioner) crashed her car into another vehicle. The passenger in that vehicle died.
Petitioner pled guilty in November 2017. She later sought post-conviction relief
(PCR) for ineffective assistance of counsel. Two of those allegations are presented
for our review.
The first PCR allegation before us involves Petitioner's blood test. Following the
crash, a blood sample was taken to determine Petitioner's blood alcohol content.
Petitioner claims she requested an independent blood test pursuant to her rights
under section 56-5-2950 of the South Carolina Code (2018) and alleges she was
prevented from obtaining that test due to a law enforcement officer inadvertently
destroying her secondary blood sample by dropping it on the hospital floor.
Petitioner contends this provided a basis to suppress the results of the blood test and
that her plea counsel was ineffective for failing to move for suppression.

Petitioner's second allegation involves a civil deposition. Prior to her plea, Petitioner
was subpoenaed to testify in the civil "dram shop" case that the victim's family filed
against the businesses that served Petitioner alcohol prior to the crash. Petitioner
alleges the public defender representing her at that time was ineffective for failing
to advise Petitioner of her right to remain silent at the deposition. Petitioner further
asserts she was prejudiced by the State's potential use of the deposition.
As outlined below, the PCR court correctly found Petitioner failed to establish
deficiency under either allegation. For that reason, we affirm.
"Our standard of review in PCR cases depends on the specific issue before us. We
defer to a PCR court's findings of fact and will uphold them if there is evidence in
the record to support them." Smalls v. State, 422 S.C. 174, 180, 810 S.E.2d 836, 839
(2018). "[W]e [also] afford great deference to a PCR court's credibility findings."
Frierson v. State, 423 S.C. 257, 262, 815 S.E.2d 433, 435 (2018). Appellate courts,
however, "review questions of law de novo, with no deference to [the PCR] court[]."
Smalls, 422 S.C. at 180–81, 810 S.E.2d at 839.

"To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the [petitioner] has the
burden of proving '(1) counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance under
prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced
the [petitioner]'s case.'" Frierson, 423 S.C. at 262, 815 S.E.2d at 436 (quoting
McKnight v. State, 378 S.C. 33, 40, 661 S.E.2d 354, 357 (2008)). "Failure to make
the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats
the ineffectiveness claim." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700 (1984).
Thus, "there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to
approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the
inquiry if the [petitioner] makes an insufficient showing on one." Id. at 697.

As to deficiency, "the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably
effective assistance." Id. at 687. "[A] guilty plea cannot be attacked . . . based on
inadequate legal advice unless counsel was not 'a reasonably competent attorney'
and the advice was not 'within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases.'" Id. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770, 771
(1970)). "When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's
assistance, [he or she] must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687–88. "[T]here is a strong
presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable
professional judgment in making all significant decisions in the case." Edwards v.
State, 392 S.C. 449, 456, 710 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2011) (citation omitted).

Petitioner's Blood Test
We begin by noting our agreement with the PCR court's finding that this allegation
pertains only to plea counsel's representation of Petitioner. Petitioner was initially
represented by a public defender, but pled only after retaining private counsel. The
public defender's testimony at the PCR hearing illustrates that the majority of his
time representing Petitioner was spent sorting through numerous bond issues.
Petitioner pled guilty about a year after the public defender ended his representation
and roughly a week before Petitioner's trial was scheduled to begin.
Petitioner argues plea counsel was "clearly" deficient under prevailing professional
norms for "fail[ing] to attempt to have the blood evidence suppressed[,]" thereby
"prevent[ing] [Petitioner] from exploring the possibility of winning at trial, thus
encouraging [her] to enter a guilty plea." The PCR court found plea counsel was not
deficient. We agree.
The record well supports the conclusion that this is not a case where counsel failed
to discuss a potential suppression issue with his or her client. As the PCR court
found in its order, both Petitioner and plea counsel testified that they discussed the
potential of suppressing Petitioner's blood test results. Plea counsel predicted that
any suppression motion was unlikely to succeed but explained he would have
pursued a suppression motion if Petitioner had not elected to plead guilty. The PCR
court found plea counsel's testimony was credible. The testimony establishes that
Petitioner was aware of her option to attempt to suppress her blood test results and
still chose to plead guilty.

"[W]e afford great deference to a PCR court's credibility findings," Frierson, 423
S.C. at 262, 815 S.E.2d at 435, and we cannot say plea counsel's representation here
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687;
see also Edwards, 392 S.C. at 456, 710 S.E.2d at 64 ("[T]here is a strong
presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable
professional judgment in making all significant decisions in the case." (citation
omitted)).

Petitioner's Deposition

This allegation, like the first allegation, relates only to one of Petitioner's lawyers.
Petitioner was represented by a public defender when she sat for the civil deposition.
Petitioner argues the public defender was "required" to advise her on "all facets of
[her case,]" including "the ways it could expand into other actions." Petitioner
asserts the public defender "had a duty to protect her against [any] negative effects"
that could result from the civil matter.

At the PCR hearing, the public defender testified that he advised Petitioner to hire a
civil attorney when Petitioner made him aware of the civil case because he was only
representing Petitioner on her criminal charge. At that time, the public defender
framed the decision of whether Petitioner should cooperate in the civil case as a "let's
wait and see thing." Petitioner then hired a civil attorney, but the civil attorney did
not reach out to the public defender. Petitioner's public defender did not hear any
more about the deposition until after it occurred.
The PCR court found the public defender's testimony "more credible than
[Petitioner]'s" on this issue. See Frierson, 423 S.C. at 262, 815 S.E.2d at 435 ("[W]e
afford great deference to a PCR court's credibility findings."). Like the PCR court
found, we do not believe the public defender was deficient for failing to advise
Petitioner of the applicability of her Fifth Amendment rights under these
circumstances. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 110 (2011) ("Strickland does
not guarantee perfect representation, only 'a reasonably competent attorney.'"
(quoting 466 U.S. at 687)); Edwards, 392 S.C. at 456, 710 S.E.2d at 64 ("[T]here is
a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised
reasonable professional judgment in making all significant decisions in the case."
(citation omitted)).
For the foregoing reasons, the PCR court's denial of relief is

AFFIRMED. 1

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.