State v. Tiesh Rhue

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Tiesh Annette Rhue, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2021-001275

Appeal From Georgetown County
Robert J. Bonds, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-264
Heard June 6, 2024 – Filed July 17, 2024

AFFIRMED

Elizabeth Anne Franklin-Best and Jillian Marie Lesley,
both of Elizabeth Franklin-Best, P.C., of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown,
all of Columbia; and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II,
of Conway, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: In this criminal matter, Tiesh Rhue appeals her convictions for
the murder of Leon Harrison, Jr. (Victim) and obstruction of justice, arguing the
trial court erred in (1) failing to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search
warrant for lack of probable cause, (2) admitting autopsy photographs, and (3)
denying her motion for a directed verdict. We affirm.

1. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, with deference to the magistrate, we
agree sufficient probable cause supported the issuance of the third search warrant.
See State v. Frasier, 437 S.C. 625, 633, 879 S.E.2d 762, 766 (2022) ("[A]ppellate
review of a motion to suppress based on the Fourth Amendment involves a
two-step analysis."); id. at 633–34, 879 S.E.2d at 766 (providing that under this
"dual inquiry," an appellate court will "review the trial court's factual findings for
any evidentiary support" and any questions of law de novo); State v. Crummey, Op.
No. 6059 (S.C. Ct. App. filed May 8, 2024) (Howard Adv. Sh. No. 17 at 23)
(noting appellate courts defer to a magistrate's determination of whether probable
cause existed to support issuance of a search warrant). Extracting the illegally
obtained evidence from the two prior searches, the third warrant provides that a
decomposed body identified as Victim was found bound by speaker wire in the
Black River, with the last place Victim was seen being the Rhue residence. See
State v. Kinloch, 410 S.C. 612, 617, 767 S.E.2d 153, 155 (2014) ("A warrant is
supported by probable cause if, given the totality of the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place."); Crummey, Op. No. 6059 (S.C. Ct. App. filed May
8, 2024) (Howard Adv. Sh. No. 17 at 23) (providing that "magistrates are
concerned with probabilities and not certainties" when determining whether the
issuance of a search warrant is appropriate (quoting State v. Dupree, 354 S.C. 676,
683, 583 S.E.2d 437, 441 (Ct. App. 2003))). Considering the body's state of
decomposition, the evidence of homicidal activity, and that the Rhue residence was
the last place Victim was seen alive before the recovery of his remains and his last
known residence, it is logical that police would seek to search the premises as part
of the ensuing homicide investigation. Indeed, authorities would have been remiss
not to search the last place Victim was seen alive.

Furthermore, we hold the trial court properly found evidence seized by authorities
during the first and second search warrants of the Rhue residence would have been
inevitably discovered and therefore exclusion was unnecessary. See State v.
Moore, 429 S.C. 465, 478–79, 839 S.E.2d 882, 889 (2020) ("The 'fruit of the
poisonous tree' doctrine provides that evidence must be excluded if it would not
have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police, and the evidence has
been obtained by the exploitation of that illegality." (quoting State v. Copeland,
321 S.C. 318, 323, 468 S.E.2d 620, 624 (1996))). From reviewing the record, it is
evident that investigators would have discovered the carpet and blood stain
evidence when executing the third warrant in furtherance of a homicide
investigation; the only difference being such seizures would be permitted within
the scope of that warrant. See id. at 481, 839 S.E.2d at 890 (providing that under
the inevitable discovery doctrine, "illegally obtained information may nevertheless
be admissible if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the information would have ultimately been discovered by lawful means"
(quoting State v. Cardwell, 425 S.C. 595, 601, 824 S.E.2d 451, 454 (2019)
(emphasis added))). Thus, the trial court properly admitted the evidence seized
from all three search warrants.

2. Rhue contends the trial court erred in admitting autopsy photographs because
numerous pictures of the bindings were unnecessarily duplicative and the
gruesome photographs showing the whole body lacked probative value. We agree.
Recently, our supreme court has scrutinized the admission of gruesome
photographs, informing our analysis of the images at issue. See State v. Benton,
Op. No. 28185 (S.C. filed Jan. 17, 2024) (Howard Adv. Sh. No. 2 at 27–28); State
v. Heyward, 441 S.C. 484, 501–04, 895 S.E.2d 658, 667–69 (2023); State v.
Nelson, 440 S.C. 413, 419–27, 891 S.E.2d 508, 511–15 (2023); State v. Jones, 440
S.C. 214, 258–64, 891 S.E.2d 347, 370–73 (2023). "'The determination of the
relevancy and materiality of a photograph is left to the sound discretion of the trial
judge' whose 'rulings will not be disturbed absent a showing of probable
prejudice.'" Jones, 440 S.C. at 259, 891 S.E.2d at 370 (quoting State v.
Kornahrens, 290 S.C. 281, 288, 350 S.E.2d 180, 185 (1986)). "Photographs are
relevant if they 'depict the bodies of the murder victims in substantially the same
condition in which the defendant left them.'" Id. at 259, 891 S.E.2d at 371 (quoting
Kornahrens, 290 S.C. at 289, 350 S.E.2d at 185). "[I]t is well-established that
photographs calculated to arouse the sympathies and prejudices of the jury are to
be excluded if they are irrelevant or unnecessary to the issues at trial." Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 24, 339 S.E.2d
692, 693 (1986)).

Similar to the autopsy photographs in Jones, we find the photos at issue here
lacked probative value. See id. at 262, 891 S.E.2d at 372. The full body
photographs do not depict Victim in substantially the same condition as when he
was likely disposed of by the killer. Indeed, the decomposition of the body
prevented discovery or corroboration of a specific cause of death or the
circumstances leading to the fatality. According to forensic pathologist Dr.
Cynthia Schandl, the only demonstratively clear evidence of malice was the
binding of Victim's hands and feet with speaker wire, which was sufficiently
established by the photographs taken at a closer angle, the x-rays, Dr. Schandl's
testimony, etc.

However, we hold the ultimate effect of the photographs' admission was harmless.
See Jones, 440 S.C. at 264, 891 S.E.2d at 373 (holding erroneous admission of
gruesome autopsy photographs was harmless when defendant failed to establish
prejudice). While gruesome and unnecessary to the State's case, we find the lack
of evidence establishing the physical circumstances that ultimately led to Victim's
demise ironically protects against the dangers of unfair prejudice. The photos fail
to corroborate any actions specifically taken by Rhue. Rather, they are duplicative
depictions of the bindings and Victim's state of decomposition. Accordingly, Rhue
failed to establish prejudice suffered from the admission of the photographs, as the
more damaging evidence involved her cell phone activity, relationship history with
the victim, and seized evidence from within the home. See Heyward, 441 S.C. at
505, 895 S.E.2d at 669 ("We have repeatedly observed we will not reverse a
criminal conviction for the erroneous admission of evidence unless the defendant
shows on appeal the error was prejudicial.").

3. We hold the trial court did not err in denying Rhue's motion for a directed
verdict. "On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, [an appellate court]
views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
State." State v. Bennett, 415 S.C. 232, 235, 781 S.E.2d 352, 353 (2016) (quoting
State v. Butler, 407 S.C. 376, 381, 755 S.E.2d 457, 460 (2014)). "The Court's
review is limited to considering the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its
weight." Id. "When the evidence submitted raises a mere suspicion that the
accused is guilty, a directed verdict should be granted because suspicion implies a
belief of guilt based on facts or circumstances which do not amount to proof." Id.
at 236, 781 S.E.2d at 353. "Nevertheless, a court is not required to find that the
evidence infers guilt to the exclusion of any other reasonable hypothesis." Id. at
236, 781 S.E.2d at 354.

Undoubtedly, the evidence concerning all three defendants is intertwined, making
it difficult to ascertain whether the circumstantial evidence presented against Rhue
exceeds mere suspicion of guilt. However, when cumulatively viewing the record,
we find the State introduced evidence to withstand a directed verdict. As noted by
the trial court in its ruling, forensic evidence established Victim was killed in some
act of homicidal violence. On the night of his disappearance, Victim was last seen
by Rhue at their residence where they had an argument, after which Victim
allegedly packed his belongings and left. Rhue repeatedly called and exchanged
harsh words with Victim's paramour from Victim's phone around the time of the
alleged argument. Rhue and Victim often fought over money, and evidence
showed Rhue attempted to withdraw money from the bank account she shared with
Victim on the night of his disappearance. Interestingly, Rhue informed police that
on the night of the fight, she took a shot of tequila and went to sleep in her son's
bedroom, rather than the bedroom she shared with Victim. During the search
warrants, police obtained blood evidence matching Victim, which was collected
from their shared bedroom in an area where someone had cut out part of the carpet
and covered it with blankets and clothes. Cell phone evidence showed Rhue did
not leave the residence all night, but records showed all three defendants turned off
their phones for a period of time during the night Victim was last seen. Both
Rhue's father (Father) and brother (Brother) told police Victim and Rhue argued on
the night he disappeared, and testimony showed Brother confessed to the murder
on two occasions to his friends, implying he dealt with Victim after Rhue called
Brother following one of their arguments. Father lied to police about his
whereabouts, and video surveillance footage showed Father and Brother buying
two bottles of hydrogen peroxide at Walmart around 1:00 a.m. on the night in
question. When examining these facts in a light most favorable to the State, the
evidence could induce a reasonable juror to find Rhue guilty. See Bennett, 415
S.C. at 237, 781 S.E.2d at 354 ("[I]n ruling on a directed verdict motion where the
State relies on circumstantial evidence, the court must determine whether the
evidence presented is sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.").

Based on the foregoing, Rhue's convictions are

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and TURNER, JJ., concur.