Armando Acevedo v. Hunt Valley Holdings, LLC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Armando J. Acevedo, through his Attorney-In-Fact,
Marianne Acevedo, Respondent,

v.

Hunt Valley Holdings, LLC; THI of South Carolina,
LLC; and THI of South Carolina at Camp Care, LLC,
d/b/a Lake Emory Post Acute Care, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2020-001146

Appeal From Spartanburg County
J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-281
Submitted June 1, 2023 – Filed August 2, 2023

AFFIRMED

Stephen Lynwood Brown, Russell Grainger Hines, and
Donald Jay Davis, Jr., all of Clement Rivers, LLP, of
Charleston, for Appellants.

Gary W. Poliakoff and Raymond Paul Mullman, Jr., both
of Poliakoff & Assoc., PA, of Spartanburg; Jordan
Christopher Calloway, of McGowan Hood Felder &
Phillips, of Rock Hill; Patrick E. Knie, of Knie & Shealy
Attorneys at Law, of Spartanburg; and Edward John
Waelde, of Greenville, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Hunt Valley Holdings, LLC (HVH); THI of South Carolina,
LLC (THI); and THI of South Carolina at Camp Care, LLC d/b/a Lake Emory Post
Acute Care (the Facility; collectively, Appellants) appeal the circuit court's order
denying their motion to compel arbitration, motion to dismiss, and motion to stay.
Appellants argue the circuit court erred by finding (1) the at-issue arbitration
agreement (Arbitration Agreement) lacked consideration and mutuality; (2) the
Arbitration Agreement lacked material terms; (3) the Arbitration Agreement was
unconscionable; and (4) the Facility was insufficiently named in the Arbitration
Agreement. Appellants further argue that to the extent HVH must seek to address
it on appeal, the circuit court erred by ruling on HVH's motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction after the motion had been withdrawn with the consent of
Armando J. Acevedo, through the consent of his wife and Attorney-in-Fact,
Marianne Acevedo. We affirm.

1. We hold the health care power of attorney document (HCPOA) did not give
Marianne authority to execute the Arbitration Agreement on Acevedo's behalf. See
Rule 220(c), SCACR (explaining this court may affirm "upon any ground(s)
appearing in the Record on Appeal"); Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C.
580, 596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001) ("The question of the arbitrability of a claim
is an issue for judicial determination, unless the parties provide otherwise."); New
Hope Missionary Baptist Church v. Paragon Builders, 379 S.C. 620, 625, 667
S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2008) (explaining an "[a]ppeal from the denial of a motion to
compel arbitration is subject to de novo review"); Stokes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
351 S.C. 606, 609-10, 571 S.E.2d 711, 713 (Ct. App. 2002) ("However, the circuit
court's factual findings will not be overruled if there is any evidence reasonably
supporting them."); Arredondo v. SNH SE Ashley River Tenant, LLC, 433 S.C. 69,
80-84, 856 S.E.2d 550, 556-58 (reviewing an identical authorization provision of a
healthcare power of attorney document and finding the authorization did not grant
the patient's daughter authority to grant the waivers recited in an arbitration
agreement because the authorization was limited to action "necessary" concerning
the patient's healthcare and the patient's daughter was not required to sign the
agreement), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 584 (2021); id. at 84-85, 856 S.E.2d at 558-59
(holding the healthcare power of attorney document did not grant the patient's
daughter the authority to execute the arbitration agreement because the "pursuing
any legal action" language in the healthcare power of attorney document was in the
context of forcing compliance with the patient's wishes and daughter did not
execute the arbitration agreement in connection with an existing claim against the
facility). Here, as in Arredondo, Appellants acknowledge "the Arbitration
Agreement was not a precondition of admission." Thus, Marianne's signature on
the Arbitration Agreement was not necessary to Acevedo receiving care at the
Facility. Here, also as in Arredondo, Marianne did not execute the Arbitration
Agreement in connection with an existing claim against the Facility, as the
document was executed on the day of Acevedo's admission and prior to his fall.
Thus, Marianne did not execute the Arbitration Agreement in the pursuit of legal
action in the context of forcing compliance with Acevedo's wishes. Accordingly,
we conclude the HCPOA did not give Marianne authority to grant the waivers
recited in the Arbitration Agreement; we, therefore, affirm the denial of the motion
to compel arbitration.

As a result of our finding Marianne lacked authority to enter the Arbitration
Agreement on Acevedo's behalf, we need not address Appellants' remaining issues
regarding the Arbitration Agreement. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an
appellate court need not address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior
issue is dispositive). Likewise, we dismiss the appeal of the circuit court's denial
of THI's motion to stay as moot. See Sloan v. Greenville County, 380 S.C. 528,
535, 670 S.E.2d 663, 667 (Ct. App. 2009) ("An appellate court will not pass
judgment on moot and academic questions; it will not adjudicate a matter when no
actual controversy capable of specific relief exists. A case becomes moot when
judgment, if rendered, will have no practical legal effect upon the existing
controversy." (citation omitted)).
2. Regarding HVH's motion to dismiss, we hold that the denial of a motion to
dismiss is not immediately appealable; therefore, we decline to address this issue.
See Mid-State Distribs., Inc. v. Century Imps., Inc., 310 S.C. 330, 336, 426 S.E.2d
777, 781 (1993) (explaining an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction "is interlocutory and not directly appealable"); McLendon v.
S.C. Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 313 S.C. 525, 526 n.2, 443 S.E.2d 539,
540 n.2 (1994) ("Like the denial of a motion for summary judgment, the denial of a
motion to dismiss does not establish the law of the case and the issue raised by the
motion can be raised again at a later stage of the proceedings.").

AFFIRMED. 1

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
WILLIAMS, C.J., and GEATHERS and VERDIN, JJ., concur.