Robin Allen v. Richard Winn Academy

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Robin Allen, Appellant,

v.

Richard Winn Academy, Kristen Chaisson (in her
individual capacity and as Head of School), and John
Ryan II, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000561

Appeal From Fairfield County
Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-129
Submitted March 1, 2023 – Filed March 29, 2023

AFFIRMED

Larry Conrad Marchant, Jr., of Columbia; and David
Douglas Hawkins, of The Hawkins Law Offices, LLC, of
Columbia, all for Appellant.

Curtis W. Dowling and Matthew G. Gerrald, of Barnes
Alford Stork & Johnson, LLP, of Columbia; and
Creighton B. Coleman, of Coleman & Tolen, LLC, of
Winnsboro, all for Respondents Richard Winn Academy
and Kristin Chaisson.
Paul L. Reeves, of Reeves and Lyle, LLC, of Columbia,
for Respondent John Ryan II.

PER CURIAM: Robin Allen (Mother) appeals a circuit court order granting
motions to dismiss filed by Richard Winn Academy, Kristin Chaisson (in her
individual capacity and as Head of School), and John Ryan II. On appeal, Mother
argues the circuit court erred by (1) concluding that South Carolina does not
recognize the common law doctrine of tortious interference with parental rights
and (2) failing to find that her complaint alleged facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against Winn Academy and Chaisson.
We affirm.

1. Because South Carolina has never recognized a cause of action for either
intentional or negligent tortious interference with parental rights, we find the
circuit court properly dismissed those claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. See Spence v. Spence, 368 S.C. 106, 116,
628 S.E.2d 869, 874 (2006) ("Under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, a defendant may
move to dismiss a [claim against it] based on a failure to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action."); id. ("In deciding whether the [circuit] court properly
granted the motion to dismiss, the appellate court must consider whether the
complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, states any valid claim
for relief.").

2. Because South Carolina has never recognized the existence of a fiduciary
relationship between a school and a student's parent, we find the circuit court
properly dismissed Mother's claims for breach of fiduciary duty pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6). See Spence, 368 S.C. at 116, 628 S.E.2d at 874 ("Under Rule 12(b)(6),
SCRCP, a defendant may move to dismiss a [claim against it] based on a failure to
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action."); Hendricks v. Clemson Univ.,
353 S.C. 449, 459, 578 S.E.2d 711, 715 (2003) ("[W]hether [a fiduciary
relationship] should be imposed between two classes of people is a question for the
court."); id. at 459, 578 S.E.2d at 716 (declining to recognize "the relationship
between [an academic] advisor and student as a fiduciary one" because our
supreme court "has reserved imposition of fiduciary duties to legal or business
settings, often in which one person entrusts money to another"); Spence, 368 S.C.
at 116, 628 S.E.2d at 874 ("In deciding whether the [circuit] court properly granted
the motion to dismiss, the appellate court must consider whether the complaint,
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, states any valid claim for
relief.").

AFFIRMED. 1

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.