Jerry Powers v. Rizan Properties, LLC (2)

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Jerry Powers, Appellant,

v.

Rizan Properties, LLC, Anthony Pearson, and Tiesha
Dash, Defendants,

Of which Rizan Properties, LLC is the Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000218

Appeal From Greenville County
Charles B. Simmons, Jr., Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-440
Submitted November 17, 2022 – Filed December 7, 2022

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Mark Paget Fessler, of S.C. Legal Services, of
Greenville, for Appellant.

Knox L. Haynsworth, III, of Brown Massey Evans
McLeod & Haynsworth, LLC, of Greenville, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this action to enforce an option to purchase residential real
property, Jerry Powers appeals the grant of summary judgment to Rizan Properties,
LLC (Rizan), the grantor of the option, and the denial of his motion for summary
judgment. The Master-in-Equity held the option was no longer in effect because
Powers had breached a lease of the same property by failing to pay rent for over
eleven months, vacating the premises, and surrendering the keys to the property to
Rizan's agents. We reverse and remand.

1. We agree with the Master that the option and lease must be read together
because the two documents were executed contemporaneously by the same parties
and concerned the same subject matter. See Dixon v. Dixon, 362 S.C. 388, 396,
608 S.E.2d 849, 852-53 (2005) ("This [c]ourt has held that when multiple
documents are executed contemporaneously in the course of and as part of the
same transaction, the [c]ourt may consider and construe the instruments together in
order to ascertain the intention of the parties and the terms of the agreement.").
Furthermore, there was no evidence the parties intended the lease and option to be
considered and construed separately. See Café Assocs, Ltd.. v. Gerngross, 305
S.C. 6, 10, 405 S.E.2d 162, 164 (1991) ("The general rule is that, in the absence of
anything indicating a contrary intention, where instruments are executed at the
same time, by the same parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same
transaction, the Court will consider and construe them together.").

2. However, we hold Powers's option to purchase the subject property remained
enforceable under the contract terms notwithstanding his alleged breach of the
lease and his decision to vacate the property. See McPherson v. J.E. Sirrine & Co.,
206 S.C. 183, 204, 33 S.E.2d 501, 509 (1945) (stating the meaning of a clear and
unequivocal contract is determined from the contents of the writing itself and no
meaning can be given to the contract other than what is stated within the four
corners of the instrument). Here, neither document indicated Powers's right to
exercise his option to purchase the property was contingent on his compliance with
the lease. Therefore, we hold the Master erred as a matter of law in denying
Powers's motion for summary judgment and in granting summary judgment to
Rizan. See United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Pickens, 434 S.C. 60, 64, 862 S.E.2d 442,
444 (2021) ("When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the issue is
decided as a matter of law.").

3. We reject Rizan's argument that the principles of laches and estoppel are valid
reasons to uphold the appealed order. Although Rizan raised these defenses in its
pleadings and referenced them in its summary judgment motion, it did not cite any
authority during the summary judgment proceedings or in its brief to this court to
support its position that Powers was precluded by either laches or estoppel from
exercising the option. Accordingly, we deemed these issues abandoned and
decline to consider them in deciding this appeal. See Broom v. Jennifer J., 403
S.C. 96, 115, 742 S.E.2d 382, 391 (2013) ("Issues raised in a brief but not
supported by authority may be deemed abandoned and not considered on appeal.").

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1

KONDUROS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.