In the Interest of Dantae M., A Juvenile Under the Age of Seventeen.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

In the Interest of Dantae M., A Juvenile Under the Age of
Seventeen.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000465

Appeal From Spartanburg County
Phillip K. Sinclair, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-287
Submitted June 1, 2022 – Filed July 6, 2022

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch,
Jr., both of Columbia; and Solicitor Barry Joe Barnette,
of Spartanburg, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Dantae M. appeals a family court order adjudicating him
delinquent of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor, sentencing
him to probation until his eighteenth birthday, ordering sex-offender-specific
counseling, and requiring him to register as a sex offender. On appeal, he argues
the family court erred in allowing a sexual assault nurse examiner to testify
regarding hearsay statements that exceeded the time and place limitation
contemplated in Rule 801(d)(1), SCRE. He also argues the family court's
requirement that he register as a sex offender violated his constitutional right to
equal protection of the laws. We affirm.

1. We hold Dantae's argument regarding the nurse's testimony is not preserved for
appellate review. Initially, Dantae objected to the proposed testimony as general
hearsay and did not raise the specific argument that the testimony exceeded the
time and place limitation of Rule 801(d)(1)(D) to the family court. See State v.
Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("A party need not use the
exact name of a legal doctrine in order to preserve it, but it must be clear that the
argument has been presented on that ground."); State v. Stahlnecker, 386 S.C. 609,
622, 690 S.E.2d 565, 572 (2010) (finding an issue was not preserved for appellate
review when during the trial, the defendant objected to the introduction of a
victim's statement as general hearsay and did not argue that the statement exceeded
the time and place limitations of Rule 801(d)(1)(D)). Further, after the family
court stated the nurse's testimony would be admissible "[i]f and when [Victim]
testifie[d]," Dantae responded, "I don't dispute that." Thus, we find Dantae
conceded this issue. See State v. Benton, 338 S.C. 151, 156-57, 526 S.E.2d 228,
231 (2000) (holding an appellant did not preserve an issue for appellate review
when he conceded the issue during trial).

2. We hold the family court did not err in requiring Dantae to register as a sex
offender. Because he has raised an equal protection argument but has not
identified himself as a member of a suspect class or pointed to an implicated
fundamental right, we apply the rational relationship test. The Supreme Court of
South Carolina has held that mandating a sex offender register as such bears a
rational relationship to the purpose of the sex offender registry. See Curtis v. State,
345 S.C. 557, 574, 549 S.E.2d 591, 600 (2001) (stating that in a case which does
not implicate a suspect classification or a fundamental right, "the question under
equal protection analysis is whether the legislation is rationally related to a
legitimate state purpose"); id. at 574, 549 S.E.2d at 599-600 (explaining that under
this analysis, "[a] classification does not violate the Equal Protection Clause if: (1)
the classification bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be
effected; (2) the members of the class are treated alike under similar circumstances
and conditions; and (3) the classification rests on some reasonable basis."); In
Interest of Justin B., 419 S.C. 575, 586, 799 S.E.2d 675, 681 (2017) (holding that
requiring a juvenile to register as a sex offender did not violate his Fourteenth
Amendment rights and stating that "[t]he requirement that adults and juveniles who
commit criminal sexual conduct must register as a sex offender . . . bears a rational
relationship to the Legislature's purpose in the Sex Offender Registry Act to
protect our citizens—including children—from repeat sex offenders"). Thus, we
hold requiring Dantae to register as a sex offender does not violate his Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection. 1

AFFIRMED. 2

GEATHERS and HILL, JJ., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.

1
Dantae also argued the Sex Offender Registry Act's lifetime registry requirement
without judicial review violated his constitutional rights. We need not reach this
argument because the South Carolina Legislature has since amended the statute to
provide a means for judicial review. See 2022 S.C. Act No. 221 (requiring a
juvenile who is adjudicated delinquent of certain offenses—including first-degree
CSC with a minor—at fourteen years of age or older to register as a sex offender
biannually for the rest of his or her life but allowing him or her to apply to the
South Carolina Law Enforcement Division for removal from the registry after
having been registered for at least fifteen years).
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.