State v. Busby

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

James David Busby, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-001274

Appeal From Chesterfield County
Paul M. Burch, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-239
Submitted April 1, 2022 – Filed June 8, 2022

AFFIRMED

Elizabeth Anne Franklin-Best, of Elizabeth
Franklin-Best, P.C., of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch,
Jr., both of Columbia; and Solicitor William Benjamin
Rogers, Jr., of Bennettsville, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: James D. Busby appeals his convictions for voluntary
manslaughter, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission
of a violent crime and sentences of thirty years' imprisonment, fifteen years'
imprisonment and five years' imprisonment, respectively. On appeal, Busby
argues the trial court abused its discretion by not suppressing evidence found in
Busby's vehicle because the evidence was obtained from a search that violated his
rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the
South Carolina Constitution. We affirm.

We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Busby's request to
suppress evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle because the totality of
the circumstances supported the trial court's finding Busby voluntarily consented to
the search. See State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006) ("In
criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."); State v.
Missouri, 361 S.C. 107, 111, 603 S.E.2d 594, 596 (2004) ("When reviewing a
Fourth Amendment search and seizure case, an appellate court must affirm the trial
[court's] ruling if there is any evidence to support the ruling."); Palacio v. State,
333 S.C. 506, 514, 511 S.E.2d 62, 66 (1999) ("The constitutional immunity from
unreasonable searches and seizures may be waived by valid consent."); id.
("Warrantless searches and seizures are reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when conducted under the authority of voluntary consent.");
State v. Greene, 330 S.C. 551, 557, 499 S.E.2d 817, 820 (Ct. App. 1997)
("Whether a consent to search was voluntary or the product of duress or coercion,
express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the
circumstances."); id. ("A trial judge's conclusions on issues of fact regarding
voluntariness will not be disturbed on appeal unless so manifestly erroneous as to
be an abuse of discretion."); Palacio, 333 S.C. at 514, 511 S.E.2d at 66 ("On a
motion to suppress, the State has the burden of proving the validity of the
consent."); see e.g., State v. Mattison, 352 S.C. 577, 585, 575 S.E.2d 852, 856 (Ct.
App. 2003) (rejecting the defendant's contention that "the fact that he was
'surrounded' by a drug dog and four police officers with squad cars flashing blue
lights demonstrated a 'show of force' that indicate[d] coercion").

AFFIRMED.1

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.