State v. Darryl Eugene Coleman

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Darryl Eugene Coleman, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-000936

Appeal From Fairfield County
R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-156
Submitted January 1, 2022 – Filed April 6, 2022

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Jonathan Scott Matthews, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Randy E. Newman, Jr., of
Lancaster, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Darryl Eugene Coleman appeals his conviction for
second-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor and his sentence of twelve
years' imprisonment, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by (1) excluding
evidence of the victim's prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute
(PWID) cocaine base from trial and (2) considering the victim when it denied his
motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of his right to a speedy trial. We
affirm.

1. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of the
victim's prior conviction. See State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262,
265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court
and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); Rule 609(a)(1), SCRE
(stating a witness's prior conviction is admissible for impeachment purposes
subject to Rule 403, SCRE); Rule 403, SCRE (providing that relevant evidence
may be excluded from trial "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice"); State v. Colf, 337 S.C. 622, 627, 525 S.E.2d 246,
248 (2000) (providing the trial court should consider the following factors to
determine the admissibility of a witness's prior convictions for the purpose of
impeachment: (1) the impeachment value of the prior conviction, (2) the timing of
the prior conviction, (3) the similarity between the prior conviction and the charged
crime, (4) the importance of the defendant's testimony, and (5) whether credibility
is a central issue in the case); State v. Bryant, 369 S.C. 511, 517, 633 S.E.2d 152,
155 (2006) ("Violations of narcotics laws are generally not probative of
truthfulness."); State v. Robinson, 426 S.C. 579, 600, 828 S.E.2d 203, 214 (2019)
(stating a "closeness in time" between the witness's prior conviction and trial
"evoked questions of [the witness]'s credibility"); State v. Black, 400 S.C. 10, 19,
732 S.E.2d 880, 885 (2012) (declining to consider the third and fourth Colf factors
when the witness at issue is not the defendant).

Additionally, we find any error by the trial court in excluding evidence of the
victim's prior conviction was harmless because the DNA evidence presented at trial
of Coleman's semen on the victim's pants was overwhelming evidence of his guilt.
See Pagan, 369 S.C. at 212, 631 S.E.2d at 267 ("Generally, appellate courts will
not set aside convictions due to insubstantial errors not affecting the result."); State
v. Byers, 392 S.C. 438, 447, 710 S.E.2d 55, 60 (2011) ("Where 'guilt has been
conclusively proven by competent evidence such that no other rational conclusion
can be reached,' an insubstantial error that does not affect the result of the trial is
considered harmless." (quoting Pagan, 369 S.C. at 212, 631 S.E.2d at 267));
Smalls v. State, 422 S.C. 174, 191, 810 S.E.2d 836, 845 (2018) (stating evidence of
a defendant's guilt is "overwhelming" when it includes "something conclusive,
such as . . . DNA evidence demonstrating guilt"); Hutto v. State, 387 S.C. 244, 247,
249, 692 S.E.2d 196, 197-98 (2010) (finding the victim's identification of the
defendant and evidence of the defendant's DNA at the crime scene constituted
overwhelming evidence the defendant was guilty of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, first-degree burglary, and armed robbery).

2. We find whether the trial court abused its discretion by considering the victim
when it denied Coleman's motion to dismiss the indictment is not preserved for
appellate review. See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693
(2003) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have
been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court]."); id. at 142, 587 S.E.2d at
693-94 ("Issues not raised and ruled upon in the trial court will not be considered
on appeal.").

AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, C.J., MCDONALD, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.