State v. Curnez Ellerbee

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Curnez Ellerbee, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-000910

Appeal From Richland County
DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-117
Submitted January 1, 2022 – Filed March 23, 2022

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Curnez Ellerbee appeals his conviction for evasion of a tax or
payment and sentence of three years' imprisonment, suspended upon five years'
probation, terminable upon payment of $3,000 restitution. On appeal, Ellerbee
argues the trial court erred by charging the jury on willfulness arising from an
omission or failure to act when tax evasion requires proof of a willful affirmative
act.

Considering the jury charge in its entirety, we hold the trial court did not abuse its
discretion because it instructed the jury on the current and correct law for tax
evasion. Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities: State v. Adkins, 353 S.C. 312, 318, 577 S.E.2d 460, 463 (Ct.
App. 2003) ("In reviewing jury charges for error, [an appellate court] must
consider the court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues
presented at trial."); State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 584
(2010) ("An appellate court will not reverse the trial [court]'s decision regarding a
jury charge absent an abuse of discretion."); id. at 479, 697 S.E.2d at 583 ("The
trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South
Carolina."); S.C. Code Ann. § 12-54-44(B)(1) (2014) ("A person who wilfully
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat a tax or property assessment
imposed . . . is guilty of a felony . . . ."); State v. Sowell, 370 S.C. 330, 336, 635
S.E.2d 81, 83 (2006) ("A willful act is defined as one 'done voluntarily and
intentionally with the specific intent to do something the law forbids . . . .'"
(quoting Spartanburg Cnty. Dep't of Social Servs. v. Padgett, 296 S.C. 79, 82-83,
370 S.E.2d 872, 874 (1988))); State v. Zeigler, 364 S.C. 94, 106, 610 S.E.2d 859,
865 (Ct. App. 2005) ("If, as a whole, the charges are reasonably free from error,
isolated portions which might be misleading do not constitute reversible error.").

AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, C.J., MCDONALD, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.