State v. Young

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Traivon Dayshad Young, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-001217

Appeal From Allendale County
Brooks P. Goldsmith, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-299
Submitted June 1, 2021 – Filed August 11, 2021

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and
Senior Assistant Attorney General W. Edgar Salter, III,
all of Columbia; and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III,
of Bluffton, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Traivon Dayshad Young appeals his convictions and sentences
for murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime,
arguing the trial court abused its discretion by (1) excluding evidence indicating
the victim was a registered sex offender and (2) declining to instruct the jury that a
person who acts in self-defense "is not required to wait until his adversary is on
equal terms before he acts." We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence
indicating the victim was a registered sex offender. See State v. Jackson, 384 S.C.
29, 34, 681 S.E.2d 17, 19 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The admission or exclusion of
evidence is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion, and an appellate court
may only disturb a ruling admitting or excluding evidence upon a showing of a
manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice."). Because only
those who have been "convicted of, adjudicated delinquent for, [or] pled guilty or
nolo contendere to" certain sexual offenses are required by law to register as a sex
offender, evidence a person is a registered sex offender constitutes evidence of a
prior conviction and specific instance of conduct. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 23-3-430(A) (2007) (Any person, . . . who in this State has been convicted of,
adjudicated delinquent for, pled guilty or nolo contendere to [certain sexual
offenses] . . . shall be required to register" as a sex offender). Moreover, because
the victim's prior offense was not directed at Young and occurred more than
sixteen years before Young shot the victim, the victim's sex offender status was not
sufficiently connected in point of time or occasion with the victim's death to have
caused Young to have a reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm. Thus,
evidence the victim was a sex offender was not admissible as evidence of a
pertinent character trait of the victim. See Rule 405(b), SCRE (providing a specific
instance of conduct is not admissible as evidence of a pertinent character trait
unless the character trait "is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense");
Rules 404(a)(2) & 405(a), SCRE (providing that only opinion or reputation
testimony is admissible to prove a pertinent character trait of the victim); State v.
McCray, 413 S.C. 76, 94-95, 773 S.E.2d 914, 923 (Ct. App. 2015) ("[E]vidence of
other specific instances of violence [by the victim] are not admissible unless they
were directed against the defendant or . . . were so closely connected at the point of
time or occasion with the homicide . . . to produce reasonable apprehension of
great bodily harm" (quoting State v. Day, 341 S.C. 410, 419-20, 535 S.E.2d 431,
436 (2000))).

2. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to instruct the
jury that "a defendant is not required to wait until his adversary is on equal terms
or until he has fired or aimed his weapon in order to act." See State v. Cottrell, 421
S.C. 622, 643, 809 S.E.2d 423, 435 (2017) ("A trial court is required to charge the
current and correct law in South Carolina."); State v. Marin, 415 S.C. 475, 482,
783 S.E.2d 808, 812 (2016) ("The law to be charged must be determined from the
evidence presented at trial." (quoting State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 549, 713
S.E.2d 591, 603 (2011))); id. ("In reviewing jury charges for error, [this court]
must consider the [trial] court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and
issues presented at trial." (quoting Brandt, 393 S.C. at 549, 713 S.E.2d at 603));
State v. Starnes, 340 S.C. 312, 322, 531 S.E.2d 907, 913 (2000) ("In charging
self-defense, the trial court must consider the facts and circumstances of the case in
order to fashion an appropriate charge."); Marin, 415 S.C. at 482, 783 S.E.2d at
812 ("The substance of the law is what must be instructed to the jury, not any
particular verbiage." (quoting State v. Smith, 315 S.C. 547, 554, 446 S.E.2d 411,
415 (1994))); State v. Harris, 382 S.C. 107, 115, 674 S.E.2d 532, 536 (Ct. App.
2009) (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give the
requested jury instruction because "[t]he trial court's instructions made it clear [the
defendant] did not have to wait until he was actually under attack in order to
employ force to defend his life").

AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.